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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The study of foreign policy can be viewed from a number of perspectives : 
thus, certain research focuses on the process whereby foreign policy decisions 
are made; other analyses seek to explore the relationship between foreign 
policy behaviour and the capabil i t ies and influences internalised within 
societies; whilst further approaches are geared towards an examination of 
foreign policy-making and action under specific circumstances, such as cr isis  
conditions, or at part icular  levels of social development and modernisation.^  
Basically however, the foreign policy process reflects an integral  
characteristic of a l l  policy-making processes, namely, that the inputs fed 
into, and the outputs derived from the policy-making process, are a product 
of certain defined mechanisms or structures, formally or informally constituted,  
in interaction with a broa- social context. The analysis of foreign policy is ,  
in this sense, systemic in or ientation,  and what foreign policy is ,  the manner 
in which i t  is formed, and the nature of i ts  application, cannot be divorced 
from this interaction be' eon mechanisms and structures, which respond to,  
and in turn in ject  stimuli into a social environment of which they are a 
a constituent part. I t  is ,  in short,  the interplay between mechanisms and 
context which imparts to foreign policy i ts  features.
In a more specific sense, foreign policy-making can be seen to involve 
three d ist inct  yet interrelated sets of a c t iv i t ie s .  In the in i t i a l  instance 
the foreign policy-maker is a conceptualising creature; the form which the 
eventual output of the foreign policy-making process assumes, is predicated 
to a considerable degree on the assessment of prevailing situations by those 
individuals and groups involved in the policy-making process i t s e l f .  These
individuals and groups may or may not be formally vested with the prerogative 
to ar t icu la te  and apply the foreign policy of the state ,  and the influence which 
each as a unit may bring to bear on what is sought through foreign policy 
action w i l l  be effected by a variety of cross-cutting factors reflect ing  
in ter  a l i a ,  the centralisation of power in the state , i ts  foreign policy 
t ra d i t io n ,  its  value-systerns as well as administrative role-requirements.
In any event however, the making of foreign policy requires the performance 
of an i n i t i a l  interpreting function in terms of which, through the medium 
of the perceptions of those involved in the policy-making process, what is 
desired through foreign policy action is defined and articulated. Over 
and beyond this moreover, the making of foreign policy implies a set of 
formulatory functions or a c t iv i t i e s ,  in terms of which ident if ied objectives 
are integrated with categories of available social resources, and evaluated in 
terms of costs, benefits and risks. The social capacit ies, both human and 
m ater ia l , which can be employed in support of defined foreign policy ends 
is always f i n i t e ,  whilst the very pursuit of these ends is constantly an 
endeavour whose returns and dangers can never be accurately and precisely 
pre-determined. Under such circumstances, the foreign policy-maker is 
obliged to involve himself in a series of choices, characterised by a 
pattern of trade-offs between objectives, and an allocation of p r io r i t ies  
and emphases between possible foreign policy ends. F ina l ly ,  and in the 
ultimate instance, foreign policy-making embodies an applied dimension 
wherein an operationalisation of chosen p r io r i t ie s  is attempted : this 
involves the translation of subjectively desired goals into substantive 
r e a l i t i e s ,  through the implementation in the international environment, 
of strategies which in the perception of policy-makers are deemed to be 
the most appropriate to the real isat ion of chosen ends. I t  is at this  
point that policy-makers must give attention to tactical considerations, 
and must seek to ident ify those results which constitute the v is ib le
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output of the foreign policy-making process.
Viewed in these terms, foreign policy-making is ?t once a conceptual, 
formulatory and implementing endeavour, wherein goals are defined, 
preferences allocated, and strategies ident i f ied and applied. What is 
of major significance however, is that a ll  of these operations which in 
the ir  t o ta l i t y  constitute the mechanism of foreign policy-making, are 
intimately affected by the broad socicl environment within which they take 
place. This environment may be seen as being composed of both the in t ra ­
state environment of which the policy-making process is an integral part ,  
and of the international context within which the state i t s e l f  functions.
In any event, i t  is the combination of domestic and in ter-s ta te  influences, 
pressures and patterns which constitutes the ecological setting within 
which foreign policy is always applied and made, and which establishes 
♦he parameters which determine l imitations on, and options open to the 
policy-making process. The values whose realisation is sought through 
foreign policy action, the hierarchy of foreign policy p r io r i t ie s ,  as well 
as the means which are u t i l ised  by states to achieve those p r io r i t ie s ,  is ,  
in this sense, a direct product of the broad socia l,  economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  
cu ltu ra l ,  ideological and psychological context within which foreign policy­
making takes place.
In current terms, this relationship between the mechanisms of 
foreign policy and the social context within which they operate, is 
re la t ive ly  well understood : thus, i t  is readily appreciated that the 
means, ends and preferences of foreign policy are conditioned by a 
variety of influences located both within and outside of the state. I t  
is also currently recognised that there exists certain functional commonalities 
in the foreign policy-making structures of states : thus, a l l  states are 
similar  in that the ir  foreign policy-making mechanisms are oriented
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towards the threefold operation o f  goal-d e f in i t io n ,  preference-allocation 
and strategy- ident i f icat ion and implementation. What is less appreciated 
however, is the fact that the nature of goals, foreign policy choices and 
tactics vary from state to state in accordance with the d i f fe r ing social 
contexts within which discrete foreign policy-making processes operate.
This tendency is part icular ly  noticeable in comparative analyses of the 
foreign policies of developed v is -a-vis  developing states, where l i t t l e  
attention is often paid to the generic features of the social context 
within which foreign policy in the case of each is made. The developing 
state is ,  a f te r  a l l ,  both an economically and p o l i t i c a l ly  pre-modern 
social ent i ty :  i t  is a society which is ,  for the most part ,  characterised
by economic backwardness, socio-cultural fragmentation, and endemic shortages 
of both information and skil led manpower. The developing societies of the 
international community are at present at a stage of po l i t ica l  experimentation 
where insti tutions and structures are neither re la t iv e ly  established, 
consolidated nor set. International ly the developing state is ,  in its  
in d iv idua l i ty ,  a re la t iv e ly  powerless e n t i ty ,  and, in a manner which 
reflects this fac t ,  policy tends to be made within a psychological 
environment whose main character ist ic is insecurity, anxiety, and, in 
many cases, simple fear: i t  is this that p a r t ia l ly  underwrites the emphasis
placed on ideological values of a group-determined character. The 
combination of incapacities hav moreover induced po l i t ica l  leadership in 
these states to at t r ibute  pr io r i ty  to the so-called 'nation-building' task 
and to orientate policy and action towards injecting formal po l i t ica l  
independence, ju r id ica l ly -def ined ,  with real and substantial meaning.
All  in a l l ,  the environment within which foreign policy of the developing state  
is made, is ,  in many major respects, qua l i ta t ive ly  d i f fe rent  from that 
of the more industria lised and established members of the international  
community : i t  can therefore be logically  deduced that the goals, choices
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and tactics whicn are generated by the structures of foreign policy in 
the developing state w i l l  be q u a l i ta t i v e ly  dif ferent  from those in th e i r  
more developed counterparts.
From an analytical point of view, this element of difference has 
gone largely unnoticed. On the contrary, there exis t two d ist inct  trends 
in interpretation of the foreign policv processes of the developing states,  
both of which tend to obscure the context-mechanism relationship within a 
developing st'.te framework.
First  and foremost, research focused on the foreign policy-making 
processes of developing states ha.; tended to be dominated almost ent ire ly  
by the application of theoretical constructs orawn from the experience of 
the older and more established deveioped states of rhn international  
community, to the ir  counterparts in the less-developed regions of the 
world.2/  The va l id i ty  of th is ,  as has been suggested, is most questionable. 
This is true in two senses. F i rs t ly ,  available evidence tends to suggest 
that the policy-making process in the developing state is sub-system 
dominant. In other words, although policy is a product o '  pressures and 
influences which originate both external and internal to the state , in a 
manner which is unparalleled in the case of the developed state , and which 
reflects the introspective concerns of po l i t ica l  leaderships intimately 
involved in internal social construction, domestic influences in the 
developing state play a considerably greater role in what foreign policy 
seeks to achieve and the means used thereto. I t  is therefore far  more 
valid to in fer  the nature of foreign policy in the developing state from 
internal circumstance, than would be the case at higher developmental 
levels, where values related to actual nation-building are accorded a 
lower p r io r i ty  and significance by mass publics and the policy-making
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el te. Secondly, i t  should be borne in mind that research concerned with 
the developed poli ty  relates to structures, inst itut ions and processes 
which operate within a re la t ive ly  established framework and upon a re la t ive ly  
consolidated social basis : research concerned with the developing polity 
doe; not. In the former case, p o l i t ica l  behaviour reflects a situation  
where the nation-state is a deeply rooted set of social facts : in the 
case of the developing p o l i ty ,  characterised as i t  is by the diffusion of 
lo ya l t ie s ,  economic under-development and socio-poli t ical experimentation, 
the dynamic under consideration derives from a situation which is witnessing 
the nation-state-in-becoming. This is r.o less true at the level of foreign 
policy, where the attitudes underlying policy-making, the choices integrated 
into the policy process, and the behavioural orientations adopted in realtion  
to the external environment, re f lec t  the particular politico-economic demands 
associated with the nation-building task. Such analytical distinctions are 
however seldom drawn:^  the consequence is expressed i r  the continued use of 
conceptual categories reflect ing the nature of established systems, which do 
l i t t l a  just ice to the element of f lu id i ty  which underlies goals, preferences 
and tactics in those states primarily concerned with the expansion of their  
p o l i t ica l  and economic capacities, and with the consolidation of their  new- 
founc independent existence.
Apart from limited reference being made to the d i f ferent  social 
contexts within which mechanisms of foreign policy operate, even where 
atte ipts have been made to integrate these part icular social features 
into modular constructs of foreign policy operations in developing states, 
these have tended to be partia l insofar as they stress certain of these 
factors at the expense of others. In general, research on the foreign 
policy of developing states has tended to identify e i ther  personal -
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idiosyncratic or long-term historic and geographic factors as the sources 
of foreign p o l i c y .^  These variables are not irrelevant;  on the contrary 
the idiosyncratic orientations of a charismatic p o l i t ica l  leadership must 
s ign if icant ly  a f fect  the form which foreign or domestic policy assumes, 
whilst even though geographic and historic  givens tend to affect  the outcome 
of policy choices rather than the nature of choices themselves, they do 
constitute parametric givens which influence the range which policy can assume. 
In the ultimate instance however, over-emphasis of the personal, geographic 
and h istor ic  elements in the foreign policy-making ecology can lead to an 
obscured perspective where the foreign policy of the developing state becomes 
' l i t t l e  more than a game played by a single performer, or by a small band of 
e l i t e  players at the expense of the nation's real in t e r e s t s '^  or,  
a l te rna t iv e ly  where foreign policy goals, p r io r i t ies  and tactics become a 
product of a certain situational determinism which does not fu l ly  accord 
with the range of options actually available to the policy-maker of the 
developing s t a te s .^  An insightful view of the foreign policy of the 
developing state cannot be gained through the view that i t  is merely an 
extension of the personal characteristics of po l i t ica l  leadership, or a 
mere reflect ion of the geographic and historic  re a l i t ie s  confronting the 
s t a t e . ^  What is additional ly required is recognition of the fact  that  
foreign policy also reflects the influence of the prevail ing social,  
economic, ideological,  I tu r a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and psychological configuration 
within the state , which tempers idiosyncrasy and the interpretation of 
environmental givens.
I t  seems re la t ive ly  clear on this basis, that the relationship between 
the foreign policy mechanisms of goal -def in i t ion ,  pr io r i ty -a l locat ion  and 
strategy-implementation, have not, in the case of the developing state , been 
adequately correlated with the broad nature of the domestic environment
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within which the policy-making processes of these states operate. I t  is 
important that this analytical gap be, to some degree, eradicated and that 
models be developed which w i l l  in terre la te  the value placed by po l i t ica l  
leadership on the nation-building task - and the po l i t ica l  and economic 
consequences which flow therefrom - with the foreign policy goals of the 
developing state, the value which i t  attributes to certain of these goals 
vis -a-v is  others, and the means which i t  employs in order to a t ta in  its  
preferred ends. The following thesis is framed in precisely these terms.
In Part I a mo'^1 is developed which indicates how the object ives, choices 
and strategies of the newly-independent developing state are an integral  
function of those p o l i t ic a l  and economic conditions which orientate po l i t ica l  
leadership in these states towards involvement with the nation-building task. 
In Part I I ,  an attempt is made to explain the economic and po l i t ica l  variables 
which function to gear the foreign policy of Swaziland in specific directions: 
part icular  emphasis w i l l  be placed on the domestic sources of Swaziland's 
foreign policy, and the operational dimensions of Swaziland's role as an 
international po l i t ica l  and economic actor. In the f inal  concluding 
section i . e .  Part I I I ,  an attempt w i l l  be made to integrate the material 
referent i . e .  Swaziland, with the theoretical propositions articulated in 
Part I .  I t  is hoped that this e f fo r t  in i ts  to t a l i t y  w i l l  generate a more 
intimate knowledge of Swaziland's international ro le ,  and that i t  w i l l  
concurrently throw l igh t  upon the s t i l l  re la t ive ly  unexplored, yet intimate, 
relationship between nation-building and the conceptual, formulatory and 
applied dimensions of the foreign policy of developing states.
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PART ONE
CHAPTER 2
r'ATION-BUILDING AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON THE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES, 
PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES OF THE DEVELOPING STATES - A THEORETICAL MODEL
In many ways the contemporary era is characterised by action rather
than contemplation, and, in the po l i t ica l  sphere, this emphasis is part icular ly
marked in the case of the developing states of the world, currently deeply
involved in the processes of po l i t ica l  restructuring and modernisation.1//
The form of new po l i t ica l  inst itut ions is as yet in many cases neither clear
nor defined. There is however a deep appreciation on the part of the
nation-buiIders of the developing world, that p o l i t ica l  development
requires the promotion of mass part ic ipation in government, increments in
the social capacities of government, and the increased specialisation of
2/governmental structures. '  I t  is moreover recognised that the real isation
of these objectives depends not simply on the mobilisation of power by the
inst itut ions of state , but, more substantial ly,  on the a b i l i ty  of these
inst itutions to exert power which is reccnnised by society at large as
3/authoritative and e th ica l ly  acceptable. '  In this sense, nation-building 
as a form of po l i t ica l  modernisation is intimately related to the translation  
of power into authority, and with the legitimation of the insti tut ions of 
state.
Within this comprehensive framework, nation-building can be seen to 
imply two sets of legitimating a c t iv i t ie s .  In te rn a l ly , the nation-buiIder  
seeks to promote the authority of the state in the perceptions and sentiments 
of the local populace : he seeks to promote and consolidate the r ight of the 
inst itut ions of state to formally regulate the allocation of po l i t ica l  values
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within the boundaries of society. Externally, nation-building seeks to 
establish the state as a viable and signif icant participant in the processes 
and a c t iv i t ie s  of the wider international community of which the state is a 
part. Nation-building is thus geared to both domestic and international  
audiences, and is oriented towards bolstering the subjective and objective 
position of the state in both a local and external constituency.
( i ) Nation-Building as an Internal Activ ity
In the case of the developing nation, legitimation of the inst itut ions  
of state is hampered by the social framework within which nation-buiIders 
operate. Instead, in contrast to the emergence of the modern nation-state 
in Western Europe, the thrust towards po l i t ica l  modernity in the developing 
areas has neither been preceded nor accompanied by the emergence of common 
po l i t ica l  Sctitimerts, identit ies and loyalties. Genuine nations emerge 
when the ideas and customs of discrete social groupings of a par t icu lar is t  
nature are defined in overarching and collect ive national t e r m s i n  most 
developing states this has not yet  happened, and the result is that the 
nation-buiIder and nation-building must operate in an atmosphere of social 
stress which is far  more pervasive, intense and fissiparous in its  e f fe c ts , 
than anything experienced in the more depeloped areas of the world.
In pract ice, the fragmentation of po l i t ica l  identif icat ions in the
5/developing areas is a product of two factors . In the f i r s t  place, most 
developing societies are characterised by a high degree of ra c ia l ,  cultural  
and ethnic pluralism which does not lend i t s e l f  easily to the processes of 
social unif ication which nation-building im p l ie s .^  In the second place, 
and in a manner which has not conformed with in i t i a l  expectations .social 
and economic modernisation has operated to aggravate social conf l ic t  in the 
developing systems. I t  can well be argued that in the long-term social and
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economi development w i l l  lead to the emergence of cohesive social structures 
which wm  make the concern of the nation-buiIder with the establishment of 
legitimately-recognised po l i t ica l  inst itut ions somewhat easier:  ^ in the 
short-term however, the l imited modernisation which the developing states 
have experienced has created serious discrepancies between social demands 
and capabi l i t ies ,  and between material aspirations and the possib il i t ies  
for th e ir  fulfi lment.®^ Limited socio-economic modernisation has tended 
to lead to vast population increases, uncontrolled urbanisation, progressive 
unemployment and under-employment of a widespread nature. And in the short 
term i t  has, in many ways compounded the social tensions normally associated 
with the state of under-development.^
Defined in these terms, the nation-buiIder in the developing state 
must needs operate under re la t ive ly  adverse conditions where tradit ional  
social divisions and the processes of modernisation have, in in teraction,  
created an environment of conf l ic t  and stress. Under such circumstances 
the integration of po l i t ica l  loyalties and identif icat ions which are part 
and parcel of the po l i t ica l  modernisation or nation-building task, becomes 
extremely d i f f i c u l t .  The capacity of leadership to manipulate unifying 
and common po l i t ica l  symbols is reduced, as is the capacity of this 
leadership to lay claim to recognition as the legitimate formal regulators 
of t e r r i to r i a l  socio-poli t ical processes. I t  is indeed precisely because 
of this situation,  that the major task which currently confronts the nation- 
bui Ider is not simply the construction and operation of modern governmental 
inst i tut ions per se, but , more fundamentally, relates to the promotion of 
centralised po l i t ica l  id en t i t ie s ,  and the diffusion throughout the polity  
of recognition of the legitimate existence and funct'oning of prevail ing 
national authority structures. I t  is the fact that the developing polity  
is a 's tate-nat ion1 rather than a 'nat ion-state ' which gives to nation-
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building in these systems a qua l i ta t ive ly  d i f fe rent  set of p r io r i t ie s  than 
those where the po l i t ica l  inst itut ions of state are widely recognised and 
accepted as legitimate po l i t ica l  facts.
( i i ) Na t i o n - B u i l d i n g  as an External A c t i v i t y
Nation-building is not however only a domestically-oriented task 
concerned with the promotion of the legitimacy of the state on a local or 
internal basis. On the contrary, i t  has external or international aspects 
as w e l l .  I t  is for example re la t ive ly  clear that distinctions can be drawn 
between the ju r id ic  and actual or substantive equality of the actors in the 
international community. In practice, the status of any state in the 
international system is less a function of lega l is t ic  prescription than i t  
is of power, capabil ity and wealth. ^  In r e a l i t y ,  the current international 
system is a highly s t ra t i f ie d  social ent i ty  which in broad and general terms 
is composed of those states which are established and powerful, and which 
can legitimate their  claims to prestige and a system-influencing role through 
reference to heritage and current politico-economic resources, and those 
states which cannot. From another perspective, the contemporary international 
system is composed of a large category of states whose part icipation in 
international l i f e ,  and whose role in the international system, is 
questionable, the doctrines of sovereign equality notwithstanding. These 
states are largely the developing states which have neither a history of 
partic ipation "'or vast power resources to underpin recognition of the ir  
v i t a l ,  credible and s ignif icant  involvement in international l i f e .
This fact is currently appreciated in the policy-making circles of 
developing states. In these states, leadership is inclined to believe 
that the small and developing international actor is not devoid of the 
capacity to exercise international power and, in doing so, to influence
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can legitimate the ir  claims to prestige and a system-influencing role through 
reference to heritage and current politico-economic resources, and those 
states which cannot. From another perspective, the contemporary international  
system is composed of a large category of states whose part icipat ion in 
international l i f e ,  and whose role in the international system, is 
questionable, the doctrines of sovereign equality notwithstanding. These 
states are largely the developing states which have neither a history of 
participation nor vast power resources to underpin recognition of th e i r  
v i t a l , credible and signif icant  involvement in international l i f e .
This fact is currently appreciated in the policy-making circles of 
developing states. In these states, leadership is inclined to believe 
that the small and developing international actor is not devoid of the 
capacity to exercise international power and, in doing so, to influence
the pattern of international events. This sentiment is however balanced 
by the realisation that the p o l i t ica l  options avai lable to the small 
developing state are s t r i c t ly  l imited by the human and material resources 
at its  disposal, and that as a direct result of the power dispar it ies which 
are internalised within the current international system, its  structures and 
operations are not conducive to the performance of viable small power roles. 
Together tnese factors create a policy-making environment for the small 
developing state , whose major characteristic  is an endemic sense of anxiety, 
caution and i n s e c u r i t y . ^  In a more positive sense however, the weakness 
of the small and developing state encourages the view on the part of 
policy-makers that the participatory role of the state in international l i f e  
cannot be guaranteed by legal notions of international equality per se, 
but requires conscious e f fo r t  specif ically  designed to remedy the position 
of the developing state in the international community. In these terms, 
the projection of the state into the international community as a substantial 
and signif icant entity  in i ts  own r ight becomes an objective sought through 
policy act ion .1^  The translation of le g a l is t ic  notions of part icipation  
into operational terms is thus an additional integral feature of the nation- 
building enterprise.
A. Nation-Bui l d i ng and the Definition of Foreign Policy Objectives
In the ultimate instance, a l l  values are social rather than personal, 
and as such policy-making values are rooted in the nature of society.
This means that in the developing sta te ,  foreign policy must to,some degree 
re f lect  the concerns of leadership with the nation-building task. More 
spec if ica l ly ,  the goals sought through the medium of foreign policy action 
must be conditioned by leadership's involvement with the legitimation of 
the state domestically, and in the wider international environment.
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( i ) Nation-Building as an Internal Activ ity  : The Economic Objectives 
Sf the~ ForeignT bTi cy of the Developing Si ate
From an internal perspective, nation-building suggests promoting the 
institutions of statehood as the legitimate focus for domestic po l i t ica l  
identif ications and concerns. This means that leadership in the developing 
state must adopt a set of policies which are, in the ir  perceptions, most 
appropriate to containing the fragmentation of loyalties which reduces the 
capacity of the state to function as a central mechanism and unifying symbol. 
These internal policies may assume a number of forms. Yet by and large 
policy-ma ers in develooing states have come to an appreciation of the role 
of rapid social and economic modernisation as a factor in the nation-building 
process : the result is that in current terms, accelerated socio-economic 
modernisation has become defined as the primary means for promoting the 
social mobilisation required by the integrated national community.
Substantial improvements in material l i f e  on a mass scale are seen as a 
means to channel diffused ident i t ies  towards central inst i tu t ions ,  and the 
expansion of social f a c i l i t i e s  and opportunities to f a c i l i t a t e  the loyalty-  
transference process.1^
This ethos, which is deeply ingrained in the post-independence
philosophy of most leaders of developing countries, has important
implications for both domestic and foreign policy. E x p l ic i t ly ,  i t
suggests involvement in an exceedingly complex and multi-dimensional '
task geared towards the complete transformation of society, and requiring
15/vast expenditures of both human and non-human social resources 
Socio-economic modernisation implies infrastructural construction, 
agricultural development, industr ia l isa t ion,  the exploitation of mineral 
wealth and the promotion of national tourism. I t  implies the mobilisation
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of capital and technology, shortfalls in which can seriously impede the 
development e f fo r t  and the re a l is a b i l i ty  rate of those objectives 
associated with modern social and economic l i f e .  Indeed, to the degree 
that the system does not have at its  disposal f inancial and human resources 
suff ic ient  to meet the appetit ive demands of rapid socio-economic growth, 
the nation-building task, in both its  economic and p o l i t ica l  connotations, 
must suffer.
This is an important proposition which d irect ly  l inks domestic to 
foreign policy. The fact of the matter i s ,  as has been noted, that the 
pattern of current international relationships is profoundly asymmetrical: 
from a developmental point of view, this means that stockpiles of capital 
and technology which are required to meet the demands of accelerated 
socio-economic modernisation tend to be concentrated not at  the point of 
employment i . e .  in the developing states, but rather in those areas of the 
international system which are already highly industral ised, and have 
achieved levels of economic growth to which developing states s t i l l  a s p i r e . ^  
In e ffect ive practice there is no developing society which can e f fect ive ly  
and f lu id ly  meet the resourcc-demands of rapid development purely on the 
basis of indigenous human and financial capacities. The sustained economic 
growth of these societies comes to depend d irect ly  on externally located 
r e s o u r c e s , a n d  the capacity of leadership in the developing state to 
mobilise these in the interests of the domestic development endeavour.
This economic fact has important po l i t ica l  implications, part icular ly  
for  the foreign policy of the developing state. In the f i r s t  place, i t  is 
re la t iv e ly  clear that in terms of the current distr ibution of international  
development resources, the more industrialised states of the international  
community function, at a minimum, as a per u a l ly  potential source of such
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development resources as are required ,or the socio-economic modernisation
18/of th e ir  more penurious counterparts. Insofar as this factor is 
recognised by policy-makers in developed and developing states, the 
distr ibut ion of economic and po l i t ica l  influences in the relationships 
between these states, becomes appreciably tipped in favour of the former.
I t  is the policy-maker in the developed state who can determine the range 
of policy-making options open to his counterpart in the developing state  
rather than vice versa, and although this does not negate the capacity of 
developing states to influence developed states, i t  does nonetheless 
introduce an element of imbalance into the reciprocal pattern of 
interaction.
In the second place, the incapacity of the developing state to 
domestically sustain its economic modernisation operations, d irect ly  affects 
the def in i t ion of foreign policy objectives within the policy-making 
processes of the developing state i t s e l f .  In practice, where policy­
makers are intimately concerned with shortages of capital and s k i l l  which 
are needed for rapid economic growth, they must to some degree become 
concurrently concerned with the means by which these deficiencies can be 
offset ,  through the importation and use of such human and financial resources as 
are located external to the boundaries of the system i t s e l f .  The logic of 
the situation demands that the policy-maker in the developing state give at 
attention to issues related to the transfer of capital and techno1ogy from 
outside the state into the sta te ,  and to the establishment of international 
markets, from which revenue to fuel the development process can be d e r i v e d . ^
In these terms, a variety of economic factors become integrated as c r i te r ia  
into the foreign policy-making process, which in turn becomes geared towards 
the goal of maximising the infusion of internationally-located development 
resources into the local development e f fo r t .  The ends of foreign policy are
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thus d irect ly  conditioned by the pattern of domestic demands motivated 
by leadership's commitment to nation-building through rapid socio­
economic growth.
( i i ) Nation-Building as an External Act iv i ty  : The Pol i t ica l
Objectives of the Foreign Policy of the Developing State
The foreign policy goals sought by policy-makers in developing 
states is not only a function of the economic demands of the ' in te r n a l ' 
nation-building endeavour, but is additional ly a product of the concern 
f e l t  by these individuals with the translation of the ju r id ic  notion of 
sovereignty into something of operational substance and meaning.• Nation- 
building as we have defined i t ,  refers to a set of legitimation a c t iv i t ies  
geared to both a domestic and international constituency, and, insofar as 
i t  is the la t t e r  which is concerned, the primary objective sought by the 
nation-building policy-maker relates to the promotion of the state as an 
autonomous, credible , functional and in f luent ia l  international ent i ty .
In order to fu l ly  appreciate the relationship between 'ex te rna ' ’ 
nation-building and the po l i t ica l  objectives sought through foreign policy 
by the developing state , i t  is important to appreciate two variables, namely, 
the 'permeable' nature of developing state systems, and the relationship 
between the indigenous and international po l i t ica l  cultures within which 
policy-makers in developing states operate. Each of these variables 
generates a certain set of po l i t ica l  consequences for the direction of 
foreign policy, and i t  is the interaction between them which describes the 
features of the broad policy of international legitimation.
F irs t  and foremost i t  should be appreciated that ,  insofar as developing 
states are concerned, profound discrepancies exist between the conceptual
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and actual connotations of the principle of po l i t ica l  self-determination.
There can be l i t t l e  doubt that this principle with its  emphasis on 
po l i t ica l  freedom in decision-making is deeply ingrained in the social 
codes and po l i t ica l  philosophies of the post-independence developing 
world. Indeed, there is considerable evidence to suggest that sensit iv i ty  
to the prerogatives of newly-won independence is considerably more endemic 
and widespread in the policy-making circles of the developing vis-a-vis  
developed world. On the other hand, the universalisation of international 
relations (which has created a wide range of power gradations in the 
international community), and the integration of the international system 
(which has heightened the element of interdependence between states),  has 
led to a situation where i t  is increasingly d i f f i c u l t  for any state to be 
completely autonomous and for the policy-making processes of any state to 
exclude exogenous po l i t ica l  i n f l u e n c e s . ^  Indeed, the social conditions 
of most developing states tend to make them ideal candidates for the 
category of 'penetrable' po l i t ica l  systems where external po l i t ica l  
influences of a voli t ional or unconscious nature can operate with re la t ive  
freedom of a c t i o n . I n  assessing the situation of the developing state 
one should bear in mind the high level of social fragmentation within these 
societies, and the profound discontinuities occasioned either  by tradit ional  
inter-group tensions or by the current clash between the values, inst itut ions  
and structures of tradit ional and modern society. Few developing states too, 
embody the technological capacity to o fsct the p o l i t i c a l ly  l imiting forces 
of disadvantageous strategic l o c a t i o n , w h i l s t ,  as has been emphasised, 
no developing society concerned with economic growth can afford to be immune 
from the involvement of externally derived economic factors in its  domestic 
proc e s se s .^  In toto, the geographic, economic and social circumstances 
of most developing societies create a situation which is part icular ly  conducive
to the operation of foreign influences and pressures within the framework
set by the internal or domestic social dynamic.
I t  is under such circumstances that developing systems have come to
be regarded as exceptionally vulnerable to environmental forces: and i t  is
precisely as a result of the real isation of this situation j . he part of
policy-makers in the developing states that a conscious and , <ble concern
has developed with strategies specif ica l ly  designed to reduce the permeable
24/character of those systems with which they are associated. I t  is
increasingly appreciated b) policy-makers in developing states that the 
capacity of the state to project i t s e l f  as a legitimately indepjndent 
partic ipant in international l i f e  is a direct function of i ts  capacity to
independently determine policy, and to be seen to be doing so by the
international community. This requires that policy be geared to 
strengthening the boundaries of the system to withstand the onslaught of 
external po l i t ica l  influences which, fortuitously or in a conscious 
manner, seek to l im i t  the exercise of the right  of po l i t ica l  se l f -  
determination in the broadest possible m a n n e r .^  In the economic f ie ld ,  
policies oriented towards the regulation and nationalisation of foreign 
investment are a reflect ion of this c o n c e r n ,^  whilst in the realm of 
po l i t ica l  organisation the central isation of power may be seen as as much a 
response to a socially fragmented situation providing unique opportunities 
for external po l i t ica l  manipulation, as of individual leadership styles 
aid dispositions. In this sense the distinguishing lines between domestic 
and foreign policy in the developing state become somewhat obscure: the
category of foreign policy actions includes not only outward-directed 
behaviour, but in addition a variety of policies which are internally  
applied in response to foreign influences and pressures which penetrate 
the system and intrude upon i ts  po l i t ica l  decision-making processes. The
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objectives sought through foreign policy action therefore have a much 
stronger domestic flavour than would he the case where the permeable 
nature of the state is less intimately related to i t s  capacity to be 
recognised as a credible and v ita l  international actor.
Apart from i ts  permeable nature, the developing sta^e is also one
whose policy-makers tend to place an exceptionally high premium on
mult i la teral action. The reason for this is to be found in two facts,
namely the impotence of the developing state as an individual international
un it ,  and the pattern of h is tor ic ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, ideological and
cultural s im i lar i t ies  between most developing states, which f a c i l i t a t e
27/e f fect ive  communication between their  policy-makers. Tactical and 
sentimental considerations thus combine to underwrite mutual associations 
within the developing state category. What is perhaps of even more 
significance than the motivations underlying jo in t  action is the outcome 
of such action and its implication for the def in it ion of foreign policy 
objectives. I t  should be borne in mind that the fact  that most 
developing states are ex-colonial,  poor, non-White and non-aligned, tends 
to cause their  policy-makers to perceive each other rather than states 
outside of the developing state category as 'natural '  a l l ies  in the 
international competitive p r o c e s s .^  This means that insofar as the 
developing state seeks to compensate for  i ts  lack of individual 
international influence through mult i la tera l  action, i t  becomes associated 
with,  and integrated into the Third World po l i t ica l  culture which is in 
turn an outgrowth of common social concerns. Ultimately moreover, to 
the degree that the policy-makers of unit states become socialised into 
the Third World group, and to the degree that they seek status within 
that group, the group po l i t ica l  culture must intrude upon the po l i t ica l  
values, sentiments and prerogatives which underlie foreign policy action
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on the part of the unit state i t s e l f .  The concern f e l t  by policy-makers 
in developing states with extending the international influence of the 
sta te ,  and legitimating its  partic ipat ion in international a f f a i r s ,  thus 
leads indirectly  to exogenous po l i t ica l  values being absorbed into the 
process whereby the po l i t ica l  goals of foreign policy action are d e f i n e d . ^
In these terms the po l i t ica l  objectives of foreign policy are of two 
broad types. In the f i r s t  place policy is concerned with reduction of the 
permeability of the system and with enhancing the resil ience of the system's 
boundaries to withstand the challenge posed by exogenous po l i t ica l  forces.
In the second place policy is related to the promotion of the values of the 
Third World po l i t ica l  culture, with which policy-makers in developing s ta tes , 
to d i f fer ing degrees, ident i fy .  In the ultimate instance the developing 
state is a status-seeking social e n t i ty ,  and this is reflected in its  
external po l i t ica l  goals concerned with the consolidation of independence 
and the extension of influence in the international system. The international  
po l i t ica l  objectives of the developing state indeed re f le c t  a subtle blend 
of both passivity and a c t iv i ty ,  of action and reaction: they mirror both
the vulnerabi l ity of the state and the subjective orientations of policy­
makers concerned with remedies to a l lev ia te  the disadvantageous circumstances 
under which developing states must operate. And i t  is the combination of 
objective weakness with the emphasis placed by policy-makers on the po l i t ica l  
value of autonomy which conditions policy to give attention to the state of 
system boundaries and the po l i t ica l  prerogatives of the Third World group 
as a whole.
B. The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Choice in the Developing State
The functionali ty  of foreign policy is a product of its capacity to 
maximise the real isation of valued e n d s a n d  in any sta te ,  irrespective
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of the level o f  development,  the opt imal gains to be derived from foreign 
policy action r e f l e c t s  the effectiveness with which foreign policy-making 
is organised. In pract ice, the organisational demands of foreign policy­
making stem from the relationship between defined objectives on the one 
hand, and social resources and costs, on the other. In many cases, the 
values sought througn f o re ig n  policy action can be achieved only at a cost 
which is prohibitive or disproportionate to potential benefits: the foreign
policy-maker is thus continually called upon to trade off  certain aspirations
31 /in favour of others. Foreign policy also exacts a price in terms of
32/sophisticated manpower and money, and since any foreign policy is 
supported by only a f i n i t e  amount of human and material resources which can 
be mobilised in support of foreign policy act ion, an e f fect ive ly  organised 
or functional foreign policy must establish some sort of equilibrium 
between the objectives sought and the social f a c i l i t i e s ,  human and non­
human , which are available for employment in this direct ion. The real isation  
of certain foreign policy objectives also involves an element of risk which 
may be greater or lesser in the case of certain objectives v is -a-vis  others, 
and this must additionally be incorporated into the foreign policy 
calculation. What this implies in short is ,  that the foreign policy-maker 
must constantly be concerned with issues pertaining to costs, resources, 
benefits and risks, and that,  more spec if ica l ly ,  he must seek to relate  
these variables to perceived objectives in such a manner as to e l i c i t  
optimal or maximal results from the foreign policy endeavour. This in 
turn requires that the foreign policy-maker adjust and trade-off  perceived 
objectives in relat ion to each other: i t  requires that he define the p r io r i t ies
of foreign policy action, and in many ways i t  is this series of choices, in 
terms of which t 1 ■ foreign policy-maker determines which of the t o ta l i t y  of 
foreign policy goals receive more or less attention and energies than others,
which constitutes the very core of the foreign policy-making p r o c e s s .^
This is no less the case with the developing state where foreign 
policy is geared to the achievement of broad economic and po l i t ica l  goals.
On the contrary, given the part icular ly  l imited material and human resources 
which can be integrated into the foreign policy-making process in these 
states, the distr ibut ion of resources amongst foreign policy objectives 
would seem to be an even more salient task than in the case of those 
societies where a re la t ive ly  larger stockpile of social energies can be 
employed in the pursuit of a variety of international goals.
I t  is moreover of importance to note that foreign policy objectives 
need not be complementary to each other, and in the developing state in 
p ar t icu la r ,  a direct  contradiction may exist between the economic objectives 
of foreign policy associated with the ' internal ' nation-building task, and 
the po l i t ica l  objectives of foreign policy action which are generated by 
nation-building in its  'ex terna l1 aspects. Economic development and 
p o l i t ica l  independence need not of course be ant i thet ica l :  indeed, the
values of independence and development tend to be inextricably linked in 
the minds of the e l i t e  of the new states, so that 'development is a means 
of guaranteeing independence (whilst) i t  is widely believed that real 
development is impossible without i n d e p e n d e n c e ' T h e  processes of 
international integration have also served to blur the ' in te rn a l ' and 
'ex terna l ' aspects of nation-building and state po l i t ica l  behaviour, so 
that the capacity of a state to consolidate i ts  domestic legitimacy may 
be a function of the economic resources which i t  can mobilise on the basis 
of its  international c re d ib i l i t y ,  and a l te rna t ive ly ,  i ts  domestic 
consolidation can contribute to the functionali ty  of its  international 
r o l e . ^ /  In the ultimate instance however, the internal demands of nation-
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building, with the ir  emphasis on economic development, establish economic 
eff ic iency as a main cr i ter ion  of behaviour, irrespective of whether this 
leads to the increased permeability of the boundaries of the state-system 
by exogenous po l i t ica l  forces: this direct ly  contradicts the orientation
towards the consolidation and extension of po l i t ica l  independence, the 
central element of which is the reinforcement of systemic boundaries and 
the exclusion of external influences and pressures from the domestic dynamics 
of the state. In the former case, p r io r i ty  is assigned to the material 
development of the state , in the l a t t e r ,  to the capacity of the state to 
function in an independent p o l i t ic a l  manner.
The result of this situat ion is that in the developing state the 
foreign policy-maker is perenially confronted with the question: should
energies, social resources and attention be essentia lly  directed to 
re u l i .a t ion  of the internal nation-building objective i . e .  of promoting the 
domestic legitimacy of the state through rapid socio-economic growth, or 
a lte rna t ive ly ,  should the major concern be with the international significance  
of the state i . e .  with the 1 external1 nation-building endeavour ? In the 
formulation of foreign pol icy, should preference be given to the task of 
reinforcing the boundaries of the system, and the extension of the system's 
influence in ternat ionally , even though this may detract from the socio­
economic growth-rate of the system, or should predominance be given to the 
promotion of domestic legitimacy through socio-economic development and 
the introduction into the system of external economic inputs, even though 
this may serve to l im i t  the range of independent p o l i t ica l  options open 
to policy-makers, and their  capacity to extend the international influence 
of the state through mult i la teral group value-oriented action ? These basic 
dilemmas may naturally be overcome through simple exclusion of the one or the 
other; i e. the policy-maker becomes to ta l ly  concerned with economic
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development at the expense of po l i t ica l  independence, or vice versa. In
re a l i t y  however, in no developing state do policies designed to mobilise
economic resources and those concerned with p o l i t ic a l  independence,
cancel each other out: in a l l  developing states, where one is dominant,
37 /undercurrents of the other are always v is ib le .  On the contrary, in 
developing states, as in other states, each of these policy categories 
tend to become associated with part icular  role perceptions and performances, 
and in many ways i t  is the basic cleavage between the values and actions of 
the po l i t ic ian  and economic administrator which personify the po l i t ica l  
independence/economic development dichotomy in the foreign policy processes 
of the developing state.
The dynamics of individual and social choice are exceptionally 
complicated, despite the considerable attention given to the construction 
of modular frameworks appropriate to these processes by numerous social 
sc ie n t is ts .38,Z In the case of the policy-maker in the developing state,  
the distr ibut ion of p r io r i t ies  within the p o l i t ica l  independence-economic 
development nexus would seem to be ultimately related to the att i tudinal  
dispositions of members of foreign policy-making e l i t e s ,  and as such, 
could be indicated through empirical surveys of this social group. In 
practice however, data of this nature, relating to discrete sets of 
policy-makers, is usually u n a v a i l a b le ,^  and i t  is in any case questionable 
as to whether the foreign policy choices of states can be valid ly derived 
solely through an evaluation of e l i t e  att i tudes,  the element of po l i t ica l  
centralisation in a system no tw iths tanding .^  What would seem to be 
required are a set of in ferent ia l propositions, which may be refined,  
veri f ied  or rejected by empirical research, and which are in t r in s ic a l ly  
related to the broad social environment within which foreign policy­
making in the developing state takes place.
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Foreign policy reflects the influence o f  a dual environment i . e .  the
domestic ana wider international environments of which the state is a part.
Most fundamentally however, the cho'acter of foreign po l icy , its  goals and
its means, is a product of the domestic context. I t  has, for  example,
been pointed out that 'decision-makers in foreign policy are m;ch more
intimately connected with the ir  domestic than with their  foreign
environment. Through internalis ing its  values, through partaking in the
national culture and characterist ics, through being constantly exposed to
the influences and pressures in the play of domestic p o l i t ic s ,  they are
actually part and parcel of i t . ' ^  This view has in fact been reiterated
in a number of major works.42// In the specific case of the developing state
moreover, this is especially so.43y/ In these systems the immediacy and
importance of local socio-economic and po l i t ica l  problems s ign if icant ly
detracts from the formulation of policy with reference to extra-systemic
variables. The developing society is in fact  in the midst of the 'agonies
of domestic t r a n s fo r m a t io n ' ,^  and this leads to a situation where 'external
45/policies are merely instrumental to internal purposes' and where, in the 
ultimate instance, foreign policy ' is  domestic policy pursued by other means: 
i t  is .'omestic policy carried beyond the boundaries of the s t a t e ' . ^
Under such circumstances, the def in i t ion  o, foreign policy p r io r i t ies  in 
the developing states, must s ign if icant ly  re la te  to the character of 
domestic circumstance .
Any appreciation of the relationship between the conditions within  
states and the defined pr io r i t ies  of  foreign policy action must, in the 
f i r s t  place, take into account the fact that the pattern of domestic 
poli t ics  d irect ly  impinges on the policies which arc adopted by policy­
makers concerned with the pattern of in ter -s ta te  relations. Foreign 
policy, for example, can be used to promote domestic p o l i t ica l  cohesion
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i n  d i r e c t i n g  p u b l i c  a t t e n t i o n  to  rea l  or  a r t i f i c i a l l y  created th re a ts  o f  
an ex te rna l  na ture .  Foreign p o l i c y  can a lso  be used to  create  p a t r i o t i c  
symbols, which in  v a l i d a t i n g  the c re d e n t i a l s  o f  the r u l i n g  e l i t e ,  can be 
used aga ins t  domestic p o l i t i c a l  adve rsa r ies .  Foreign p o l i c y  can a lso  be 
used to  s t i f l e  domest ic c r i t i c i s m  through re fe rence to  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
image o f  the s t a t e ,  and i n s o fa r  as ex te rna l  p o l i c i e s  can win the approval  
o f  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  community they can be used to  coun te r  c la ims by the 
domest ic p o l i t i c a l  c r i t i c s .  Foreign p o l i c y  and the p o l i t i c a l  c o n f ig u r a t i o n  
w i t h i n  the s ta te  are thus c l e a r l y  r e l a t e d , and i t  would seem, under these 
c ir cum stances , t h a t  the involvement o f  the po l icy -m aker  in  the domestic 
p o l i t i c a l  process, h is  concern w ' th  the maintenance o f  s ta tus  in  th a t  
process, and w i th  the m o b i l i s a t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  power, must impinge to  some 
degree on the p r i o r i t i e s  o f  f o re ig n  p o l i c y  a c t io n .  In these terms t h e r e f o r e , 
f o re ig n  p o l i c y  choices are a fu n c t io n  o f  the involvement o f  the po l icy -maker  
in  the dynamics o f  domestic p o l i t i c a l  com pe t i t ion .
I t  i s  however o f  importance to  recogn ise  th-r .  w h i l s t  the p u r s u i t  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  power, by soc ia l  groups o r  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  is  an I n te g ra 1 fea tu re  
o f  a l l  s o c ia l  systems, the ac tua l  i n t e n s i t y  o f  p o l i t i c a l  com pe t i t ion  may 
vary from system to  system. P o l i t i c a l  r i v a l r y  is  a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  
even the most m o n o l i t h ic  regimes: y e t  in  some systems the number o f  so c ia l
j reups which can be considered as ser ious contenders f o r  p o l i t i c a l  power is  
r e l a t i v e l y  g re a te r  than in  o t h e r s , and , as a d i r e c t  r e s u l t ,  i n te r - g ro u p  
p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  tends to  embody a g re a te r  element o f  fe rvency ,  
immediacy and i n t e n s i t y  than would be the case under c i rcumstances where 
the p o l i t i c a l  system is  dominated by a s in g le  o r  l i m i t e d  number o f  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s  or  i n s t i t u t i o n s  whose hegemony cannot be fundamental ly cha l lenged.
In the l a t t e r  case the po l icy -mak ing  process i s  c c i s i d e r a b l y  less in te g ra te d  
w i th  the broader soc ia l  f a b r i c ,  and the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  fo re ign  p o l i c y  goals
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and p r io r i t ie s  can be effected by policy-makers in an atmosphere of 
re la t ive  freedom, qual i ta t ive ly  d i f ferent  from a highly pluralised and 
competitive po l i t ica l  environment. The freedom which policy-makers 
enjoy in making policy choices - including foreign policy choices - is ,  
in this sense, a function of the intensity of po l i t ica l  competition 
within the system, and i t  is this variable which conversely establishes 
the framework from which l imitations on foreign policy action are derived.
This is no less true in the case of the developing s ta te , where the pursuit 
of policies designed to encourage the infusion of external developmental 
resources can be more easily ju s t i f ie d  to a domestic po l i t ica l  audience 
uncer conditions of re la t iv e ly  less competitive in tensity, than in a 
situat ion where there exist powerful and credible oppositional elements which 
can manipulate symbols of national independence in reaction to such policies.  
In the developing state therefore, the choice to seek the real isat ion of 
economic v is -a-vis  po l i t ica l  foreign policy values and the distr ibut ion  
of prior t ies and emphases between these values, is intimately related  
to the nature of po l i t ica l  opposition, and the capacity of counter-elites  
to intensify the po l i t ica l  pressures brought to bear on governing authori t ies.
I t  should be borne in mind that insofar as policy-making operations 
re f le c t  domestic circumstance , they re f lec t  the to t a l i t y  of these internal  
conditions. This means that the dynamics of foreign policy choice are not 
only influenced by domestic p o l i t ica l  considerations related to the 
intensity of po l i t ica l  competition within the system, but, in ter  a l i a ,  
by domestic economic variables as well .  In the developing state for  
example, governing e l i tes  can more easily ju s t i fy  emphasis being placed on 
the pursuit of a development-oriented foreign policy which allows for the 
increased involvement of foreign elements in the national economy, under 
conditions where large proportions of the population have not experienced
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s ignif icant  improvements in standards of l i v i n g .  In this situation the 
l imitations placed on national po l i t ica l  freedom as a result of economic 
dependence can, in a sense, be offset by the benefits derived from progressive 
economic modernisation: the endorsement of p o l i t i c a l ly  disadvantageous
policies are legitimated by reference to the penurious circumstances under 
which large segments of the population musi, labour. A lternatively ,  to 
the degree that economic growth takes place and material benefits are 
distributed throughout the system, i t  becomes increasingly d i f f i c u l t  for  
policy-making authorit ies to follow this logic. Progressive economic 
satisfaction can generate an increased popular concern with abstract 
po l i t ica l  values,and, to the extent that this takes place, i t  becomes 
d i f f i c u l t  for policy-makers to ju s t i f y  the neglect of these values through 
reference to the econo'i ic developmental level of the society of which both 
they and the wider populace are a part. Under such circumstances pressures 
are generated which tend to gear foreign policy choices in a po l i t ica l  
rather than economic direction.
What this implies is that,  in general, foreign policy choices are 
conditioned by two major variables, namely, the intensity of po l i t ica l  
competition within the system, and the rate of economic growth and 
diffusion of economic benefits throughout the system. Indeed, i t  is 
possible to construct a four-fold matrix in terms of which,as a direct  
result of domestic po l i t ica l  and economic circumstances, i t  in turn 
become possible to indicate the pr io r i t ies  underlying foreign policy 
action on the part of the developing state. The four possible situations 
which may exist are characterised by :
( i )  High Intensity Pol i t ica l  Competition/High Economic Returns
( i i )  High Intensity Pol i t ica l  Competition/Low Economic Returns
( i i i )  Low Intensity Pol i t ica l  Competition/High Economic Returns
( iv )  Low Intensity Pol i t ica l  Competition/Low Economic Returns.
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In terms of our descript ion, i t  seems re la t ive ly  clear that the 
economic goals of foreign policy i . e .  those goals defined by the internal  
nation-building task of promoting domestic legitimacy through rapid socio­
economic development, w i l l  be the foci of foreign policy attention under 
situation ( i v ) . In other words, to the degree that policy-making e l i tes  
in developing states are re la t ive ly  free from constraints placed upon them 
by competitive counter-eli tes, and to the degree that economic development 
has not succeeded in improving the material existence of the majority of 
the population, a foreign policy concerned with maximising the infusion of 
external development resources w i l l  be the main concern o"r pol icy-makers 
in these states. By the same token, in situation ( i ) ,  the major concerns 
of foreign policy w i l l  be dictated by the external element of nation-  
building i . e .  by the goals associated with reducing the penetrabil ity  of 
the state , and extending the state's international p o l i t ica l  influence.
Under conditions of re la t iv e ly  intense e l i te -coun ter -e l i te  po l i t ica l  
competition, oppositional elements can e f fect ive ly  manipulate symbols of 
national independence which w i l l  be accorded re la t iv e ly  more signifance 
by a re la t ive  materially sat is f ied mass public: the governing policy-maker
w i l l  thus be considerably more constrained in emphasising the pursuit of 
foreign policy objectives which enhance the permeability of the system and 
detract from i ts  p o l i t i c a l ly  independent and p o l i t i c a l ly  s ignif icant  
international role. Situations ( i i )  and ( i i i )  represent median cases.
In the case of situation ( i i i ) ,  the re la t ive ly  low level of po l i t ica l  
competition w i l l  allow governing e l i t e  to monopolise the symbols of 
national independence: re la t ive  material satisfactions w i l l  however encourage 
a sensit iv i ty  to the p o l i t i c a l ly  independent and signif icant status of the 
state. Similarly in situat ion ( i i ) ,  the re la t ive ly  high level of po l i t ica l  
competition w i l l  place constraints on the governing e l i t e 's  capacity to
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f o l l o w  a development oriented foreign p o l i c y ,  a l though coun te r -c la ims  
t h a t  t h i s  invo lves  a s a c r i f i c e  of na t iona l  independence can be met through 
re fe rence  to  the p r e v a i l i n g  low le ve l  o f  economic re tu rns  in  the s o c ie ty .
In both s i t u a t i o n s  ( i i )  und ( i i i )  t h e r e fo r e ,  the p r i o r i t i e s  d i s t r i b u t e d  
between the i n te r n a l  and ex te rna l  f o re ig n  p o l i c y  demands generated by the 
n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g  task w i l l  be cons iderab ly  more e q u i ta b le  than in  e i t h e r  
s i t u a t i o n  ( i v ) , (where the emphasis o f  f o re ig n  p o l i c y  w i l l  be on maximising 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic a id  f o r  development) or  s i t u a t i o n  ( i ) (where the 
major o b je c t i v e s  o f  f o re ig n  p o l i c y  w i l l  r e l a t e  to  the reduc t io n  o f  systemic 
p e n e t r a b i l i t y ,  and the promotion o f  the p o l i t i c a l  in f luenc e  o f  the s ta te  in 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l i f e ) .
In conc lus ion  i t  should be s ta ted  once aga in ,  t h a t  e f f e c t i v e  fo re ig n  
p o l i c y  requ i res  a c o -o rd in a t i o n  o f  de f ined  goals w i th  a v a i l a b le  resources : 
a f u n c t io n a l  fo re ig n  p o l i c y  demands t h a t  choices be made, p r i o r i t i e s  assigned 
and emphases loca ted.  This i s  no less t ru e  in  the case o f  the develop ing 
s t a te  where, given ^ r i c t  l i m i t a t i o n s  on the human and non-human soc ia l  
resources which can be in teg ra ted  i n t o  the po l icy -mak ing  process, dec is ions 
must be taken as to the r e l a t i v e  importance to  be assigned to  o f te n  
competing p o l i t i c a l  and economic ends. This process i s  both complex and 
dynamic: y e t  i t  can be seen t o  operate w i t h i n  a framework o f  domest ic
economic and p o l i t i c a l  c i rcumstance . Under such c o n d i t i o n s ,  the 
cha rac te r  o f  p o l i t i c a l  and economic fa c to rs  w i t h i n  the s ta te  operat  
to  in f l u e n c e  not on ly  the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  f o re ig n  p o l i c y  o b je c t i v e s  i . e .  
the goals sought through fo re ig n  p o l i c y  a c t i o n ,  bu t  the we ight o r  sa l ience 
a t t r i b u t e d  to  each o f  these in d i v i d u a l  o b je c t i v e s  as w e l l .
C. The Ap p l i c a t ion o f  Foreign Pol i c y to  the I n te r n a t i o n a l Environment
A l l  soc ia l  a c t io n  is  s u b je c t  to schem at iza t ion ,  and in  recent  years
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social scientists in various disciplines have sought to categorise the 
component elements of the decision-making p r o c e s s .^  On the basis of 
these studies, (part icu lar ly  the work of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin)4^ t 
i t  becomes possible to in terpret  foreign policy-making as having an 
ana ly t ica l ly -d is t inc t ive  pre-operational and applied dimension. In the 
pre-operational sense, foreign policy-making is a set of a c t iv i t ie s  centred 
on the def in it ion of the situation in which the state is placed, and in this 
l ig h t ,  the formulation of categories of objectives or goals towards whose 
real isation foreign policy action may be directed. I t  is at this level 
that the values underlying foreign policy action are art iculated,  the 
concerns of policy-makers and mass publics integrated into the policy­
making process and foreign policy is rationalised as a productive and 
u t i l i t a r i a n  social a c t iv i ty .  In order to substantively contribute to 
the protection and promotion of what is perceived to be the national 
in terest however, foreign policy must he applied to the in ter -s ta te  
system of which the state is a part. Foreign policy must be implemented 
in the international environment, and i t  is in fact operations of this  
nature which give substance and meaning to the defined objectives of the 
foreign policy system. Any systematic analysis of foreign policy must 
therefore focus not only on the ends towards which foreign policy is 
oriented, but addit ionally on the strategies or means which are used by 
foreign policy-makers to convert those subjectively defined ends into 
objective rea l i t ies
The strategies which may be employed by foreign policy-makers are 
numerically vast, and analysis is further complicated by the fact that  
these strategies may be s ign if icant ly  altered under the impact of 
circumstances of such issues as arise from time to time. The dynamism 
of foreign policy action thus makes any evaluation of the range of strategies
r r*
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employed by s ta tes  to achieve c e r ta in  goals, a p ro found ly  complex task .
Two hypotheses would seem nonetheless to be o f  p a r t i c u l a r  re levance in 
e x p la in in g  o r  desc r ib ing  the mechanisms o f  f o re ig n  p o l i c y  a c t io n .  In 
the f i r s t  p lace ,  w h i l s t  ' t h e  c-nds-means r e l a t i o n s h i p  c o n s t i t u t e s  the most 
f r e q u e n t l y  analysed aspect o f  dec is ion-mak ing . . .  the main c r i t e r i o n  f o r  the 
e v a lu a t io n  o f  means, one which is  never disputed in  p r i n c i p l e ,  l i e s  in  t h e i r  
e f fe c t i v e n e s s  o r  s u i t a b i l i t y  fo r the achievement o f  the ends. I f  the means 
employed do not a t  a l l  I p i d  towards the s p e c i f i e d  ends, they are obv ious ly  
u n s u i t a b le ,  even i f  the agent i s  unaware o f  t h e i r  uselessness 1 In o the r
words, a d i r e c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  ex is ts  between the o b je c t i v e s  chosen by fo re ig n  
po l icy -makers  and the s t r a t e g ie s  employed in  f o re ig n  p o l i c y  a c t io n .
E f f e c t i v e  fo re ig n  p o l i c y  s t ra te g ie s  are chosen w i th  re fe rence t o  t h e i r  
appropr ia teness to  o b je c t i v e s ,  and t h i s  in t u rn  means t h a t  some knowledge 
o f  the na ture  o f  the o b je c t i v e s  whicn u n d e r l ie  f o re ig n  p o l i c y  a c t io n  can 
prov ide  an i n d i c a t i o n  o f  the s t ra te g ie s  which w i l l  be usea by f o re ig n  
po l icy-makers  in  t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  fo re ig n  p o l i c y  to  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
env ironment.  In the second p lace,  w h i l s t  i t  i s  the i n t e r a c t i o n  between 
s ta te s  which makes up the broad i n t e r n a t i o n a l  system, each s t a te  is  also 
a member o f  a more s p e c i f i c  reg iona l  sub-system. A l l  s ta tes  a re ,  in  t h i s  
sense, m u l t i - s y s te m  actors  in t h a t  they fu n c t io n  in  a reg iona l  as w e l l  as 
a un ive rsa l  c o n te x t ,  and t h i s  impl ies  th a t  in  ev a lu a t in g  the s t r a te g ie s  
which are employed by f o re ig n  pol icy-makers i t  i s  poss ib le  to  draw a n a l y t i c a l  
d i s t i n c t i o n s  between re g io n -o r ie n te d  and un ive rsa l  (o r  e x t r a - r e g io n - o r i e n te d )  
mechanisms o f  fo re ig n  p o l i c y  ac t ion .
In terms o f  our model,  fo re ign  p o l i c y  o b je c t i v e s  in  the develop ing 
s t a te  are cond i t ioned  by the comm,tment o f  po l icy -makers  to the na t io n -  
b u i l d i n g  task .  The concern w i th  promot ing the le g i t im a c y  o f  the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  s ta te  be fo re  the domestic community generates the economic
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c r i te r ia  of foreign policy i . e .  the goal of maximising the infusion of 
externally-located developmental resources into the local economic 
modernisation process. S imilar ly , the policy-making interest in 
legitimating the partic ipation of the state in the international community
i . e .  the so-called 'external'  nation-building task leads to reduction of the
permeability of the state and promotion of the p o l i t ica l  values of the Third
World culture, being defined as po l i t ica l  value* to which foreign policy is 
oriented. In terms of the objectives-strategies relationship this means 
that the strategies pursued by developing states arc of three broad types :
(a) Strategies designed to maximise the infusion into the ■ 
system of scarce development resources;
(b) Strategies designed to reduce the penetrabil ity  of the 
system by exogenous cf external forces ;
(c) Strategies designed to promote the p o l i t ica l  values of the
international po l i t ica l  culture with which the state's  
policy-makers ident ify .
In practice Strategy-Category (a) reflects the economic developmental 
demands of the developing system. Strategy-Category (b) is indicative of 
the fact that ' for  the f i r s t  generation of leaders (in the developing state)  
the past is the present, and the ir  memories make them jealous guardians 
of their  nations' newly-won independence'^'^, whilst  Strategy-Category (c) 
is indicative of what has been called the 'macro-national ist1 s p i r i t  in the 
po l i t ica l  dynamics of the developing s t a t e . ^  I t  should moreover be borne 
in mind, that as noted above, each of these strategy-categories is applied 
in both a regional or universe! (or extra-regional)  context. The general 
application of Strategy-Category (a ) ,  for example, is balanced by the fact  
that ,  from the point of view of the developing state ,  regional economic
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co-operation 1 is an important avenue . . .  to achieve the poss ib i l i t ies  of
52/a more fu l ly  self-sustained economic growth1. ' This leads to the
implementation of strategies designed to tap both regional and wider 
universal developmental resources. The developing state is therefore 
concerned not only with the in t e r - t e r r i to r i a l  transfer of goods, capital 
and technology within the part icular regional system within which i t  is 
situated, but addit ional ly  seeks to broaden its  w.der international economic 
contacts, part icular ly  with states and organisations which embody the 
propensity to export such developmental resources as are required for  
local economic modernisation. S im i la r ly , with regard to those strategies  
in category ( b ) , po l i t ica l  consolidation requires policies which reduce 
the capacities of both regional and extra-regional actors to exploi t the 
vulnerabi l i t ies of the developing state in a manner conducive to the ir  
own po l i t ica l  purposes. Final ly those strategies in category (c) are 
also operationalised in both the regional and universal contexts : the 
developing state w i l l  seek to promote group po l i t ica l  values not only in 
the region of which i t  is an integral part ,  but addit ional ly ,  on the wider 
international stage.
In practice, the relationship between operational contexts, the 
objectives of foreign policy derived from the nation-building task, and 
the strategies pursued by the developing s ta te , can be expressed in 
diagrammatic form :
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Policy Objectives
Economic Poli t ica l
Maximise Infusion 
of External 
Developmental 
Resources
Reduce System Promote Group
P e n e t r a b i l i t y  Values
Regional Strategies to
Promote Regional
Economic
Co-operation
Strategies to 
Reduce
Strategies to 
Promote Group 
Values on aPenetration by 
Regional Actors 
and Neighbours
Regional Basis
Operational
Environments
Universal Strategies to Strategies to 
Reduce
Penetration by 
Universal Actors 
( i . e .  States 
External to the 
Region)
Strategies to 
Promote Group 
Values on a 
Universal Basis
Promote Universal 
Economic
Co-operation and 
Obtain Aid
The Foreign Pol icy  Strategies of the Developing State in Relation to 
Operational environments and Defined Objectives.
A Concluding Note
The purpose of the above model is to demonstrate that the foreign 
policy objectives pursued by developing sta tes , the p r io r i ty  which they 
a t t r ibu te  to certain of these objectives at the expense of others, and 
the strategies which are employed in order to real ise chosen foreign 
policy ends, are, to one degree or another, related to the current 
involvement on the part of leadership in developing states, with the 
nation-building task. In order to demonstrate this proposition, a 
number of sub-propositions have been b u i l t  into the model, and i t  would 
seem opportune at this point to b r ie f ly  summarise the major statements
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which u n d e r l ie  the conceptual  f ramework, and are incorporated i n t o  i t  :
( i )  The n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g  enterprise implies a set of ac t iv i t ies  
oriented towards l e g i t im a t i o n  o f  the inst itut ions o f  state 
in both a domestic and international capacity: in terna l ly ,  
the nation-builder is concerned with counteracting the social 
discontinuities which arise from a situation of fragmented 
loyalties and part ia l  modernisation; ex terna l ly , the nation- 
builder seeks to translate the ju r id ic  notion of state sovereignty 
into actual and substantive terms, and to project the state as a 
credible and functional part ic ipant in international a f fa i rs .
( i i ) The integration of the national po l i t ica l  community is sought 
through the medium of accelerated socio-economic development,
and given the l imited developmental capacities internalised within  
developing states, the mobilisation of external economic assistance 
becomes defined as a major objective of foreign policy action.
The ' internal'dimension of the notion-building enterprise thus 
generates the economic c r i t e r i a  for foreign policy behaviour.
( i i i )  The consolidation of the international po l i t ica l  position of 
the state requires that the state function as a re la t ive ly  
autonomous ent i ty :  given the international weakness of the 
developing state and the sus t i b i l i t y  of its  boundaries to 
exogenous influences, this causes emphasis to be placed on 
reduction of the permeability of the state , and association 
with other l ik * -s ta tes  in the developing world. The po l i t ica l  
objectives of foreign policy, with the ir  emphasis on the 
affirmation of autonomy, are thus a direct  product of the 
'ex terna l1 nation-building task.
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( iv )  Since the economic and p o l i t ica l  values sought through 
foreign policy are essentially contradictory - the former 
tend to increase the role of external influences in the 
national system, the la t te r  are specif ically  oriented 
towards enhancing i ts  independence - choices which re f lect  
an emphasis on either economic or po l i t ica l  foreign policy 
ends must be made. In practice, these are conditioned by 
the interaction between the intensity of po l i t ica l  competition 
within the domestic system, and the rate and manner of i ts  
economic growth.
(v) F ina l ly ,  the tactics employed by states are always those 
most appropriate to defined economic and p o l i t ica l  foreign 
policy ends : as such, the strategies of the developing state 
tend to be oriented towards maximising the infusion of scarce 
developmental resources into the system, reducing the permeability 
of the system to external po l i t ica l  forces, and promoting the 
p o l i t ica l  values of the set of developing states with which 
policy-makers associate and ident i fy .
A more tota l appreciation of this set of relationships can moreover 
be gleaned through the presentation of the model in diagrammatic form 
(see page 41). In these terms i t  becomes possible to c lear ly  observe the 
relationship which exists between the performance of specific foreign 
policy functions - notably, conceptualisation, formulation and implementation - 
and the broad concern with nation-huilding in the developing state. The 
diagrammatic perspective also fa c i l i ta te s  an appreciation of the dynamic 
factor inbui l t  into the model, and in terms of which the application of 
certain defined economic and po l i t ica l  strategies to the international
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environment., acts in a feedback manner to  c o n d i t i o n  the fu n c t io n s  o f  
i n t e r n a l  and ex te rna l  l e g i t i m a t i o n ,  and in  so do ing ,  the form which fo re ig n  
p o l i c y  o b je c t i v e s ,  choices and s t ra te g ie s  subsequent ly  assume.
N a t io n -B u i ld in g
I n te rn a l  L e g i t im a t io n  o f  
the I n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  S ta te
External  L e g i t im a t io n  o f  
the I n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  State
1.
Foreign
Po l icy
Conceptual­
i s a t i o n .
Goal
D e f in i  t i o n
Economic Development Through 
the M o b i l i s a t i o n  o f  External  
Development Resources
Asse r t ion  o f  P o l i t i c a l  
Autonomy Through
i .  Reducing Pe rm eab i l i t y  
o f  System, 
i i . Promot ion o f  Group 
P o l i t i c a l  Values.
2.
Policy" ,n tensit*  of
p?™H?rn:
A l lo c a t i o n .
Rate o f  Economic Growth and 
D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  Be ne f i t s .
High
Low
Low
High
3.
S t ra te g ies  to  
Promote Regional 
Economic 
Co-operat ion
Foreign S t ra te g ies  to
P o l i c y  Promote Un iversa l
A p p l i c a t io n :  Economic
S t ra tegy  Coperat ion and
Implement- Obtain A id .
S t ra te g ie s  tn  Reduce 
P e rm eab i l i t y  to  
Regional P o l i t i c a l  
Forces
S t ra te g ies  to  Reduce 
P e rm eab i l i t y  to  
P o l i t i c a l  trorces o f  
an Extra-Reg iona l  
Nature.
S t ra te g ie s  to  
Promote Group 
Values on a 
Regional Basis
S t ra te g ie s  to  
Promote Group 
Values on a 
Un iversa l  Basis
f t i o n .
Nat i o n - B u i l d i n g  and i t s  I n f ! uence upon the For e i g n P o l i c y O b je c t i v e s ,
F r i  o n  t i  es a no 'S tra teg ies  o f  thc'"DevcTo"p! ng State's -  'TTTneoret i  ca lT fode l
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CHAPTER 3
DOMESTIC SOURCES AND FACTORS IN SWAZILAND'S FOREIGN POLICY
U n t i l  f a i r l y  r e c e n t l y  f o re ig n  p o l i c y  has tended to  be seen as a 
response to  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  env ironment,  and the ana lys is  o f  fo re ig n  
p o l i c y  behaviour  has focused upon the nature  o f  those inputs  i n t o  the 
f o re ig n  po l icy -m ak ing  process which are der ived  from t h i s  source. In 
t h i s  sense the f o re ig n  po l icy -m aker  i s  de f ined as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r o le -  
p l i y e r ,  whose a t t i t u d e s  and ac t ions  are e s s e n t i a l l y  in f luenced  by a v a r ie t y  
o f  fo rces  and pressures o r i g i n a t i n g  ou ts ide  o f  the boundar ies o f  the s ta te  
system w i th  which he i s  a s s o c ia te d , and whose re p re s e n ta t i v e  he is  w i t h in  
the realms o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l i f e .  I t  has however come to  be in c re a s in g ly  
apprec ia ted t h a t  t h i s  view o f  f o re ig n  p o l i c y  i s  somewhat r e s t r i c t e d  and 
c i rcumscr ibed .  Indeed, c u r re n t  research a f f i r m s  the view t h a t  the means 
and goals o f  the fo re ig n  p o l i c y  o f  s ta tes  can n e i t h e r  be s y s te m a t i c a l l y  
eva luated nor understood in  the absence o f  re fe rence to  c ond i t ion s  which 
p e r t a in  w i t h i n  s ta tes  and bear relevance to  the po l icy -mak ing  process.
From t h i s  pe rs pe c t i v e ,  the behaviour  o f  s ta tes  represents  the reac t ion  
of the po l icy -mak ing  process to s t im u l i  de r ived  from i t s  t o t a l  environment
i . e .  both the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  and domestic envi ronment ,  the f o re ig n  p o l i c y ­
maker performs a dual r o le  as both a na t io n a l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c rea tu re ,  
and h i s  ac t ions  represent  a s u b t le  blend o f  such in f luences  as operate 
both w i t h i n  the s ta te  and in  i t s  w ide r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s e t t i n g .  The pa t te rn  
of r e l a t i o n s  between two s ta tes  is  t h e re fo re  to  be seen not s o l e l y  in  terms 
of the i n t e r a c t i o n  between po l icy-makers  in  each: in  a w ider  sense i t  must 
take i n t o  account such s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l ,  economic c u l t u r a l  and id e o lo g ic a l  
c o n d i t io n s  which are i n t e r n a l i s e d  w i t h i n  each o f  the s ta tes  under a n a ly s is .
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The extension of the category of variables sal ient  to the foreign 
policy-making process to include factors which are essentially of a domestic 
character, has s ign if icant ly  blurred tradit ional analytical distinctions 
between the disciplines of international relations and comparative po l i t ics .  
Equally importantly, where the international relations scholar is forced to 
delve into the interplay of social forces within states in order to extract  
data which w i l l  f a c i l i t a t e  his understanding of the pattern' of relations  
between states, the analysis of foreign policy becomes in t r in s ic a l ly  more 
complicated. The fact of the matter is ,  that logically-speaking, everything 
contained within a society bears some relevance to the foreign policy-making 
process, and a systematic analysis of the domestic sources of the foreign 
policy of a state is thus predicated on a total appreciation of the workings 
and operations of society. At this point in time, models which allow for  
this type of knowledge do not ex is t ,  and this is especially the case with 
regard to developing societies whose dynamics are s t i l l  re la t ive ly  
misunderstood.
From this perspective i t  would seem that the analysis of the domestic 
sources of Swaziland's foreign policy can best be approached through 
recognition of one fundamental fa c t ,  namely that Swaziland is a developing 
society, and that the nature of such societies generates specific  
implications for foreign policy operations. All developing societies arc 
in the f i r s t  place characterised by re la t ive ly  low levels of social and 
economic development. The leadership of these societies is intimately 
concerned with the task of consolidating the newly-established insti tutions  
of states upon a f irm, stable and expanding socio-economic base, and i t  
would therefore seem logical to assume that the involvement of leadership 
in the domestic developmental task must have certain implications for the 
objectives which are pursued through the medium of foreign policy action.
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In the second place, a l l  developing societies are, to one degree or 
another, characterised by a pattern of decentralised loya l t ies ,  and the 
majority contain social groupings who either  do not fu l ly  identify with the 
symbols and substance of the state , or identify  with fraternal groupings 
external to the system's boundaries. The fact that a f f i l i a t io n s  can 
transcend legally defined t e r r i to r ia l  boundaries is of obvious foreign 
policy relevance, and this suggests that the social composition of the 
state can be employed as a further indicator of the domestic sources of 
i ts  foreign policy. Thirdly, underdevelopment implies a re la t ive  
scarcity of human s k i l ls  which can be integrated into the policy-making 
process: i t  is this that underlies the centralisation of policy-making
in the developing state , and enhances the role of personality factors in 
the policy-making process. Any consideration of the domestic sources of 
foreign policy in the developing state must thus focus much more speci f ica l ly  
on the po l i t ica l  orientations and ident i t ies  of the governing leadership 
e l i t e ,  than would be the case in more developed pol i t ies  where policy 
is f i l te re d  through a variegated and diverse pat n f  inst i tut ional
devices. The developing state also seldom embodies _ technological
capacities to counteract or  offset the po l i t ica l
of disadvantageous strategic location : the geographic situation of the
state thus emerges as an additional variable which is part icular ly  salient  
to the domestic dimensions of foreign policy-making in the developing state. 
Fina l ly ,  recent research has tended to suggest a def in i te  correlation between 
foreign policy and the level of po l i t ica l  development : i t  is thus incumbent
on the researcher concerned with the domestic sources of foreign policy in the
developing state to a r t icu la te  and c la r i fy  such relationships as exist  between 
the element of p o l i t ic a l  modernity in the state , and state behaviour in the 
broad international system.
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In these terms, the domestic sources of Swaziland's foreign policy 
can be evaluated through reference to f ive specific and fundamental social
factors :
(a ) The nature of Swaziland's economy.
(b) The social composition of Swaziland.
( c ) The orientations and ident i t ies  of Swaziland's po l i t ica l  leadership.
(d) The geographic location of the Swazi state.
( e ) The p o l i t ica l  modernity of Swaziland.
I t  is as a result  of the combination of these factors which re f lec t  the
economic, strategic ,  socia l,  po l i t ica l  and psychological environment within 
which Swazi foreign policy is made, that Swaziland's foreign policy is 
impregnated with i ts  basic character and features.
A. Swaziland's Economy : its  Relevance to Foreign Policy
Swaziland is a te r r i to ry  with f e r t i l e  soil and an abundancy of 
water and mineral resources, and, since the mid-50's has experienced 
considerable economic g r o w t h T o d a y  the economy is growing at a rate of 
f ive per cent per annum,^ the Gross Domestic Product is rising from year 
to year ,^ /  and per capita income is one of the highest on the African 
continent. The healthy state of the economy is also reflected in the 
national budget and balance of trade; since 1970/71 Swaziland has been 
able to dispense with Bri t ish budgetary assistance, and i t  is currently 
hoped that annual additions to the Capital Fund w i l l  be raised to some 
R3 mill ion by 1978.^  Swaziland's exports have not only lept pace with 
rising imports over the last  few years, but have in fact increcsed at. a 
re la t ive ly  more rapid rate : this is reflected in a positive trade surplus
which has more than doubled in the last ten years.
In evaluating Swaziland1? economic position i t  is however of 
importance to bear in mind, that notwithstanding apparent overall 
economic improvement, economic modernisation has led to a variety of 
tensions, strains and problems, which in the present and in the future,  
seriously impinge on the s ta b i l i t y  of the Swazi system as a whole.
The Swaziland economy is ,  in the f i r s t  place, a dual economy which
1s characterised by small pockets of advanced technology and material prosperity
surrounded by subsistence standards of l i f e . ^  From a social point of view
i t  is the minority European community which has benefited most from economic
growth, while geographically, economic improvement h tended to devolve on
specif ic regions, and in so doing create a situation of serious spat’ al
imbalance.^ In general, the standard of l iv ing of the majority of Swazi
has not been s ign if icant ly  raised in the post-independence period, and the
re la t iv e ly  high per capita income level tends to re f iect  disproportionately
high European incomes rather than general real p rosper i ty .^  As a result
of improved health standards which have progressively reduced infant
nv ,a l i ty  rates, Swaziland is also experiencing rapid population increases:
the crude bir th  rate is currently estimated at close on f ive per cent per
annum, and, as a resu l t ,  development planners have been forced to admit
that ' the rapid rate of growth of the population puts a heavy pressure on
available resources and makes the improvement of economic welfare more
d i f f i c u l t . ' ^  A further socio-economic problem relates to signif icant
increases in the wage-earning population and subsequent a lterat ions in
mass expectations, attitudes and values. I f  one takes into account the
number of Swazi employed in the South African economy, then some 30 per
cent of the total working population is involved in the monetary sector i . e .
that sector of the economy where tradit ional passive subsistence attitudes
9 /are most easily eroded. The social importance of this pattern of new
material expectations must be viewed f in a l ly  within the context of a further  
socio-economic problem with which Swaziland's leadership is confronted, 
namely, the lack of employment opportunities in the modern sector of the 
economy. The working-age population is in fact  increasing at a rate of 
some 10,500 persons per annum, and even i f  one makes allowances fcr  the
fact  that a s ignif icant  proportion of the' . are women who are not seeking
employment, i t  is re la t ive  evident tha t ,  at i ts  level of economic development
Swaziland cannot provide for a labour market s u f f ic ien t ly  wide to absorb the
demands placed upon i t . ^
Problems of this nature are not unique to Swaziland : on the contrary, 
rapid population increases, large-scale unemployment and substantial 
alterat ions in patterns of mass material demands, are a l l  integral features 
of the social dynamics of systems which have experienced a modicum of socio­
economic modernisation. Development-induced social discontinuities in 
Swaziland are thus fu l ly  in accord with those social features common to the 
developing state. What is equally similar  moreover, is that in Swaziland, 
as in other developing states, policy-makers have not reacted to the social 
problems generated by part ia l  modernisation by l imit ing socio-economic growth 
on the contrary Swaziland's leadership has come to specif ica l ly  gear policy 
to the promotion of rapid growth, and accelerated development has come to be 
recognised as the very key to the consolidation of the newly-established 
inst i tut ions of state upon a firm and stable social b a s i s . ^
This orientation on the part of the Swaziland leadership, has 
necessarily led to the involvement on the part of the Swazi leadership in a 
broad-based pattern of developmental a c t iv i t ie s .  Accelerated development, 
a f te r  a l l ,  requires enterprise on a l l  fronts. The socio-economic 
modernisation of systems is predicated nut only on such major sectoral
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a c t iv i t ie s  as industrial development, agricul tural modernisation and 
infrastructural construction, but additional ly on a vast host of specific 
endeavours, such as improvements in the oual ity  of l ivestock, the 
standardisation of industrial measures, and the development of postal 
communication systems, a l l  of which, in ter  a l i a ,  contribute to the success 
of development programmes as a total e f fo r t .  Accelerated development 
requires concurrent and integrated e f fo r t  at the highest levels of policy 
making and at the grass-roots level of the community: i t  permeates the
ent ire  constellation of interactions which in the ir  aggregation constitute the 
national society.
This is currently reflected in Swaziland's development programme. I t
is ,  ..for example, acutely appreciated that social and economic modernisation
cannot be e f fec t ive ly  promoted in the absence of a basic infrastructure of
services and f a c i l i t i e s .  .his has in turn led to considerable emphasis
being placed on the promotion of education and training. As a result of
improvements that have been made in the post-independence period, some 65 per
cent of children in the primary school-going age are currently accommodated
in government, government-aided or independent s c h o o ls ;^  specialised and
technical training is currently promoted by the National Council for  Industrial
Vocational Training, and the Lutheran Farm Training Centre. The William Pitcher
College has been instrumental in providing f a c i l i t i e s  for teaching tra in ing,
the Sebenta National Inst i tu te  is involved in l i teracy extension and adult
education, whilst the Swazi a f f i l i a t e  of the University of Botswana, Lesotho
and Swaziland at Luyengo, offers a variety of practical courses at the 
13/university level.  '
Although the development of a broad-based educational system is 
currently regarded as being the primary a c t iv i ty  at the level of in frastructural
construction, Swaziland's development plans also include the development 
of communications services, water resources, health services and hous. : 
f a c i l i t i e s .  In the f ie ld  of ra i l  communications in par t icu lar ,  the 139- 
mile Goba-Kadake railroad has been in operation since 1964: this enterprise
is the core of Swaziland's transport system, and has provided great stimulus 
to the expansion of the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy, 
and contributed s ign if icant ly  to the integration of Swaziland into the 
Southern African industrial p a t t e r n . ^  In the a e a  of road transport,
Swaziland is currently in the process of improving her 870 miles of main
roads and 500 mi Us of secondary roads , w M lst  plans have been mooted for
the construction of a new internation;, airport  to supplement the main a i r
terminal at Matsapa, constructed during 1961.^  The extension and
improvement of posta l, telephone and telex services has taken place since
the early 60 's ,  (between 1950-1966, some R1.3 m was invested in the modernisation
of these f a c i l i t i e s ) ,  and is ongoing at the current t i m e . ^
Swaziland's rivers embody a high potential for both i r r iga t io n  and 
hydro-electric use; this has become increasingly appreciated in the last 
20 years and has led to both the establishment of a number of large-scale 
i r r iga t io n  projects throughout the te r r i to r y ,  and a power station at 
Edwaleni. In the face of demands for cheap and re liable  e le c t r ic i ty  
from the more urbanised areas of Mbabane and Manzini, a supplementary 
hydro-electric scheme was established at Magunduza during 1967, and since 
1970 efforts have been made to extend the Edwaleni network - which is 
integrated with the ESCCM network - throughout the t e r r i t o r y J ^  Health 
services, both for humans and animals, have been improved over the last 
few years: widespread bovine diseases which have hindered the agricultural
development of the te r r i to ry  have to some degree been controlled, whilst  
the promotion of human health has been fa c i l i ta te d  by the establishment
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of a number of hospitals, rural health c l in ic s ,  and a Public Nursing U n i t . ^
In the area of housing, rapid urbanisation has led to the creation of a
National Housing Authority, which announced during 1970 and 1971, the
construction of low cost housing units near Mbabane, and in the Manzini,
19/Piggs Peak and Big Bend areas.
Apart from the construction of an infrastructure of services and
f a c i l i t i e s ,  socio-economic modernisation additionally requires the development
of the agricultural sector of the economy. This has been spec if ica l ly  noted
by the Swazi government, which has placed emphasis on ' the progressive
transformation of tradit ional agriculture from subsistence to semi-commercial
farming, both to create more opportunities for gainful employment and to
20/raise incomes in the rural areas'. The fact of the matter is ,  that in
Swaziland, some 75 per cent of the Black population is either p a r t ia l ly  or
21 1completely dependent on agricul tural a c t iv i ty ,  ' that agricultural
production contributes s ign if icant ly  to both the Gross National Product and
2 2 /to Swaziland's export sector, and that most current industrial  
development is based on the processing or refining or agricultural  goods. 
Swaziland's highly d iversif ied agricultural economy, (founded on sugar, c i trus ,  
r ic e ,  tobacco, cotton, forestry and livestock production), further contributes 
to the view expressed by King S^bhuza, that i t  is the agricultural sector which 
is 'the backbone of the economy‘ , and that the socio-economic modernisation 
of the te r r i to ry  must give specific attention to this integral feature of 
national economic l i f e . ^  To this end, Swaziland's development plans 
have emphasised the consolidation of such agricultural  lands as are currently 
dispersed between individual European and Swazi Nation ownership: the 
establishment of Rural Development schemes; the promotion of cash crop 
farming; the creation of agricultural  research and training f a c i l i t i e s  (such 
as the Mananga Agricultural Management Centre and the Lowveld Experimental
Sta t ion ) ; and the in i t ia t io n  of inst itut ions to co-operatively control 
marketing procedures and to mobilise capital for  investment in the 
agricultural  sector.2^
Industrial development is also regarded as an integial feature of
the development e f fo r t ,  and in current terms Swaziland's industrial base
consists of both a variety of agro-industrial enterprises as well as a
small number of factories engaged in the production of secondary or
manufactured goods. Mention must in part icular  be made of the USUTU
25/pulp mill  at Bhunya, two major sugar refineries at Mhlume and Big Bend 
(which together employ one-f i f th  of Swaziland's w a g e - e a r n e r s ) t h e  
Libby's citrus canning factory at Mai kerns, the Swaziland 'Meat Corporation' 
meat canning factory and the Cotona Cotton Ginning Company plant established 
at Matsapa in 1965 to process the Swaziland cotton crop. In the 
manufacturing f ie ld ,  there currently exis t  a number of enterprises which
27/can provide labour outlets for Swaziland's burgeoning wage-earning class.
Swaziland is in fact a producer of both industrial chemicals and f e r t i l i s e r s
whilst te x t i le  factories have been established at both Matsapa and Mbabane.
Two breweries currently ex is t ,  whilst plans have been laid for a new
RIOO.OOO liquor industry to produce a variety of liquors under German
licence. The Swaziland manufacturing sector also includes a wire, sweet
and plastic  container factory, the NEOPAC packaging plant at Matsapa, and
a .arm equipment factory established in 1972 to produce some 2,000 tractors
per month for both the domestic and export market. At present the
manufacturing sector contributes some 15 per cent to the Gross Domestic 
29/Product, and in order to further promote the economic v ia b i l i t y  of 
this small but growing secondary industrial base, inst itut ions such as 
the National Industrial Development C o r p o r a t io n ,^  the Small Enterprises 
Development Corporation (which is specif ically  concerned with small-scale
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31 /enterprise) ' and the Swaziland Credit and Savings Bank, have been 
created to foster ,  diversify  and encourage increased investment in 
Swaziland's industrial endeavours.
The multidimensional character of Swaziland's development programme
is f in a l ly  expressed in the areas of mining and tourism, both of which are
seen as of v i ta l  importance to national economic growth. The fact tnat
Swaziland has at i ts  disposal a stockpile of mineral resources disproportionate
to it? t e r r i to r ia l  size has, in part icular ,  contributed to the development of
a wide range of important f inancia l ly -v iable  mining endeavours. In current
terms, mining a c t iv i ty  is focused on the exploitation of iron ores at the
Ngwenya-Kadaka deposits: the a c t iv i t ies  of the Swaziland Iron-Ore
Development Company have, since 1964, been of v i ta l  importance in the
mobilisation of foreign exchance, and in the stimulation of complementary
ac t iv i t ies  in the agricultural  and industrial sectors of the national 
32/economy as wel l .  This is no less true of the Havelock asbestos mine
which until  recently constituted the mainstay of the economy, and which
has continued to make a v i ta l  economic contribution in spite of rising
3 3 /
production costs and fa l l in g  asbestos prices over the last  few years,
Swaziland is also rich in natural beauty as well as mineral resources, 
and this has led to a massive increase in the tourist  industry in recent 
times. Since 1969 the number of tourists v is i t ing  the te rr i to ry  has 
increased by an estimated 100,000 per year, and has resulted in an influx  
of some R5 mill ion in foreign exchange. This has in turn led to the 
promotion of tourism becoming recognised by governmental authorit ies as 
an integral part of the development e f f o r t , i t  has led to the extension of 
a number of tour ist  f a c i l i t i e s  available to v is i to rs ,  and to the establishment 
of a new Ministry of Tourism to promote and co-ordinate further a c t iv i t ie s  
in this r e a l m . ^
58.
In these terms i t  can be clearly appreciated that Swaziland is 
currently involved in a major multidimensional e f fo r t  to thrust i t s e l f  
into social and economic modernity. From another perspective, ' t  is 
re la t iv e ly  clear that the leadership of Swaziland is a modernising 
leadership which is intimately involved in the development enterprise,  
and which, as such, must constantly synchronise i ts  attitudes and actions 
with t ie  processes of domestic socio-economic growth. I t  is only to be
expected therefore that the attitudes and actions which specif ically  
re la te  to foreign policy issues are accommodated within the same framework.
In order to fu l ly  appreciate the direct linkage between domestic 
development policies and those policies which are pursued by Swaziland 
in i ts  relationships with the external world, i t  is necessary to take 
cognizance of two v i ta l  facts. F irst  and foremost i t  should be borne in 
mind that even at the best of times accelerated socio-economic development 
places severe strains on the stockpile of social resources, human and no;i- 
human, which are concentrated within the state. In the case of Swaziland 
no less than any other, realisation of the goals associated with infrastructure  
construction, agricultural  modernisation and industrial development, are a 
direct function of the investment in the Swazi economy of large amounts of  
c a p i ta l ,  and of the integration into the local development e f fo r t  of a wide 
and sophisticated range of technical sk i l ls  and capacities. In the second 
place i t  is questionable whether at this point in t ime, and at i ts  level of 
economic development, the Swazi system internalises or contains suff ic ient  
f inancial and technical resources to meet the special demands of the 
modernisation endeavour. To the degree that i t  does not, i t  becomes 
incumbent upon Swaziland's leadership to specif ica l ly  orientate foreign 
policy towards the mobilisation of externally-located capital and technical 
resources, and towards the integration of these resources into the domestic
59.
developmental e f fo r t .  Foreign policy in this sense becomes a mechanism 
specif ica l ly  designed lo compensate for  domestic economic shortages, 
and financial and technical factors become the variables which in terre la te  
internal with external policy.
In effect ive  practice, since the end of World War I I  large amounts
of capital have been poured into the Swaziland economy, both by governmental
inst i tut ions and private investors who have come to increasingly appreciate
35/the economic potential which the te r r i to ry  embodies. ' Capital 
accumulation has also been stimulated by the establishment of a variety  
of local f inancial inst i tut ions whose specific task i t  is to promote the 
stockpile of domestic savings : in this regard such indigenous inst itut ions  
as the National Industrial Development Corporation, the Swaziland Credit 
and Savings Bank and the Small Enterprises Development Corporation must 
be mentioned. In current terms the public debt of R17 mill ion is 
re la t iv e ly  low, whilst in the financial year 1972/3 only five per cent 
of total recurrent revenue was devoted to interest repayment on l o a n s . ^  
Then too, the re la t ive ly  healthy state of Swaziland's finances is indicated 
by the fact that since 1970/71 external budgetary assistance has been 
dispensed with and a signif icant surplus accumulated on national account.
When a l l  is said and done however, the fact remains that the 
Swaziland economy, as the economy of other developing states, is s t i l l  
fa r  from that point of development where i t  can generate quantities 
of capital suff ic ient  to meet the vast f inancial demands of the development 
process. I t  should for example be borne in mind that the rapid improvement 
in Swaziland's budgetary situation in recen. years is not so much a result  
of signif icant development within the Swaziland economy i t s e l f ,  as of the 
conditions of the renegotiated Southern African Customs Union Agreement of 
1969 which made provision for a series of back payments to be made to
Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho until  1974. Recent improvements in 
the Swaziland financial situation also re f lec t  the favourable prices 
which Swaziland's exports have enjoyed on the world markets since 1969, 
and the bolstering e f fec t  of the recently devalued R a n d . I t  should 
f in a l ly  be borne in mind in assessing Swaziland's f inancial situation in 
relat ion to i ts  development goals, that i t  is estimated that development 
expenditures w i l l  rapidly accelerate over the next f ive years, that in 
the period 1973-1976, some R42.7 mill ion w i l l  be required to meet projected 
d.mands, and that allowing for in f la t ion  this amount w i l l  increase 
substantially in the 1976-78 period. To meet these demands, at mid-1972 
Swaziland had a Capital Fund of some RIO,2 m i l l ion ,  whilst  the Second 
National Development Plan of 1973 makes provision for an annual transfer  
from the recurrent budget to the Capital Fund of R1,6 mill ion in the period 
1973-78.38/
The conclusions are quite inescapable; simply, that even though 
the Swaziland economy currently basks in the l igh t  of re la t ive  financial 
prosperity, i t  is highly improbable that even under optimal circumstances 
Swaziland can, or w i l l  In the future be able to finance i ts  development 
programme purely by vir tue of i ts  domestic capital resources. I t  is 
precisely at this point that internal economic development meets foreign 
policy. The fact of the matter is that no* ithstanding increased 
budgetary surplus und irrespective of the increased role of domestic 
savings in capital accumulation, the bulk of Swaziland's development 
capital is s t i l l  imported from abroad : in future terms moreover, the
financial basis of Swaziland's development aims is d irect ly  related to the 
continued infusion of international financial resources, and this is 
perennially emphasised in the statements and pronouncements of Swaziland's 
governing e l i t e .  I t  is this that underpins an acute real isat ion on the part
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of this e l i t e  t h a t  foreign policy is not merely peripherally concerned 
with certain financial ends : on the contrary, i t  has been clearly  stated that  
a major objective of foreign policy is ' to diversify  and expand the sources 
of foreign capital for investment, from both b i la tera l  and mult i la tera l  
inst i tut ions and commercial s o u r c e s .^  Swaziland's leaders not only 
welcome foreign capital and investment : ,n the face of domestic capital
shortages, foreign policy is intentional ly  designed to a t t ract  foreign 
finance and f a c i l i t a t e  i ts  involvement in the local development enterprise.
The same dynamic which links internal to foreign policy can also be 
detected with regard to the factor of technology. Development in the new 
states demands not only capital but a technological infrastructure composed 
of s k i l l s ,  plant and services; and this is recognised in the Swazi state 
where the most recent national development plan specif ically  points that 
the capacity to design, implement and operate development projects is a 
direct function of technical s k i l l s .  I t  is also clearly appreciated at 
the policy-making level ,  that at this point in time Swaziland does not 
contain a suff ic ient ly  large quantity of professionally and technically  
skil led cit izens to plan and man development projects and programmes, 
and tha t ,  for the foreseeable future 'Swaziland must rely on an expanding 
flow of technical assistance i f  the pace of development is to be 
accelerated',4 '^ or, for that matter, maintained. The issue is of course 
not only economic, insofar as national self-control has tended to suggest 
the exclusion of foreign personnel: Swaziland has in fact already promulgated
legis la t ion making i t  re la t ive ly  more d i f f i c u l t  for for ign technicians to 
seek employment within the state. Yet the importation of technology demands 
not only the physical transfer of personnel, but the transfer of information,  
machinery and advice: i t  is in these areas that Swaziland's development 
programme suffers acute shortages. At the personnel level too, i t  is
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recognised that policies of exclusion can only be pursued at the expense 
of development goals, and, as a resu lt ,  po l i t ica l  considerations apart ,
Swaziland must, and does, welcome the involvement of professionally skil led  
foreign individuals and groups in the modernisation e f fo r t .  In fac t ,  
numerous statements have been made 'gra tefu l ly  accepting assistance of this 
nature as is offered from time to t im e '1^  and the mobilisation of international 
technical assistance has indeed become defined as a major value in Swaziland's 
foreign policy-making operations.
A f ina l  economic variable l inking domestic with external policy 
relates to Swaziland's pattern of international trade. Accelerated 
development requires finance, and in Swaziland, as in other developing 
economies the major source of revenue derives from international trade.
Swaziland conforms to the generic features of developing economies also 
insofar as she is an exporter of primary goods and commodities, and an 
importer of such manufactured products which cannot be domestically 
c r e a t e d . ^  Mere spec if ica l ly ,  the Swaziland economy is dependent upon 
a re la t ive ly  small number of international markets. In the export sector, 
although Swaziland has recently increased her trade with Zambia, Canada 
and I ta ly  in part icu lar ,  some 50 per cent of Swazi exports are absorbed 
by either the Brit ish or South African economies: in the import sector
pract ical ly  a l l  of Swaziland's goods originate in South Afr ica, which in 
1970 provided the te r r i to ry  with R39,3 mill ion of a tota l of R42.7 mill ion  
imported produce. Swaziland's foreign policy-makers are exceptiaonaliy 
sensitive to this fuct ,  namely that Swaziland's major source of revenue is 
dependent on the attitudes and actions of ?. minuscule number of externally  
based actors, and, as a resu lt ,  have embarked upon a foreign policy course 
which is specif ica l ly  geared to diversify  Swaziland's markets and trading 
partners. I t  is questionable whether in current terms this policy has met
with appreciable success : i t  can for example be s ta t i s t ic a l ly  demonstrated 
that while Swaziland has established a number of a lternat ive trading contacts 
over the last  few years, and whilst  her exports to the United Kingdom have 
somewhat declined, her level of trade with South Africa has not only been 
maintained, but has increased in both the import and export sectors. I t  is 
nonetheless a fact that in principle the po l i t ica l  leadership in Swaziland 
is concerned with increasing Swaziland's trading relationships with the 
international community, and in a manner which w i l l  allow the economy to 
maximise revenues which can be fed into the local development process.
The extension of Swaziland's markets to allow for greater sales contacts 
and a wider range of import sources thus comes to constitute a further  
domestic and economic factor in Swaziland's category of defined foreign policy 
objectives.
In conclusion, i t  seems re la t ive ly  clear that the Swaziland economy is 
similar  to that of other developing economies where the material demands of 
rapid economic modernisation cannot be accommodated within the framework of 
available domestically located resources. Swaziland is in fact a state 
whose leadership has committed i t s e l f  to what amounts to a major restructuring 
of society, and this transformation cannot, i t  seems, be achieved in the
absence of external support. This would in fact conform to the view of
development economists that the Swazi economy has not yet reached a ' take­
o f f  point for self-sustained economic growth thus, a recent analysis 
points out with regard to Swaziland that ' for  its  type of economy, its  
stage of development and the size of the country, Swaziland is dependent 
for i t s  continued economic growth upon a whole series of external
supporting relations. ' 44,/ This is also a fact which is realised by the
Swazi government i t s e l f :  thus 'the real isat ion of the rate of growth demands 
greater national e f f o r t ,  and depends in no small measure upon continuing
access to . . .  the developed world . . .  as well as expanding assistance from 
45/aid donors.1 ' I t  is this that accounts for the translation of the socio­
economic values associated with the internal task of state-building into 
sal ient  c r i te r ia  in Swaziland's foreign policy-making process: and i t  is 
this which specif ically  conditions the nature of the economic objectives 
towards which Swaziland’s foreign policy is oriented. The real isation of 
Swaziland's developmental goals is intimately related to the creation of 
relationships between Swaziland and the external world which allow for  
Swaziland to mobilise international developmental resources, and maximise 
th e i r  infusion into the local developmental e f fo r t .  Foreign policy thus 
becomes d irect ly  geared to exploiting the c a p i ta l , technical and market 
resources of the international community in a manner most conducive to 
the internal economic needs of developing Swazi society.
B. Swaziland's Social Composition and its Effects on Foreign Pol icy
An outstanding feature of the social make-up of the developing states 
of Africa is the fact that ,  in the majority of cases, legally defined 
t e r r i t o r i a l  boundaries do not conform to patterns of ethnic, racial or 
cultural distr ibution. This means that most developing states are of an 
ethnically plural nature, or a l te rnat ive ly ,  that ethnically similar  peoples 
are divorced and separated from one another by a r b i t r a r i l y  defined ju r id ic  
divisions. This has important p o l i t ica l  effects in both the formulation of 
domestic and foreign policy. Domestically, the major problem facing the 
African nation-building is in the creation of a re la t ive ly  centralised set 
of in s t i tu t ion s , ident i t ies  and symbols which transc nd those associated 
with traditional ethnic groupings; nation-building policies are specif ica l ly  
geared to the establishment of a unitary set of loyalties which offset or,  
at the minimum, counteract those directed towards the component tribes of
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which the nation is a part.  From the point of view of fo; ign policy- 
making, the ethnic diversity of the developing state is of Doth positive 
and negative importance. Posit ively, the po l i t ica l  options available to 
many policy-makers may be increased by the existence of a fraternal ethnic 
grouping in a neighbouring state: these individuals can, in a sense, be 
employed as the agents of the state,and can be manipulated in order to 
create domestic pressures in the state of which they are a part. From a 
negative point of view, i t  is precisely because of this dynamic that foreign 
policy-makers in developing states must constantly give attention to the 
impact of policy upon the ethnic groupings within their  states, and their  
relationships with fraternal counterparts external to state boundaries.
In evaluating the relationship between the social composition of 
Swaziland and the foreign policy of the Swazi s ta te ,  i t  is important to 
bear in mind that Swaziland is a un i- t r iba l  society, and, addit ional ly , that 
i ts  trad it ional  inst itutions continue to exercise po l i t ica l  authority in a 
manner which is ,  in many ways, unparalleled in the rest of developing Africa.  
I t  is certainly true that the Swazi p o l i t ica l  system is not as highly 
centralised as the tradit ional po l i t ica l  systems of the Ashanti or Xhosa or 
Bemba tribes. I t  is also true that the absolute power of the Swazi king, 
or Ngwenyama is ,  in theory, l imited by a Liquoquo or inner council of 
chiefs and commoners and the Libandla Lako Ngwane, or Swazi National 
Council, which consists of a l l  adult males born into the Swazi t r ib e ,  and 
to whom the Ngwenyama is ,  in the ultimate instance, responsible. All 
available evidence however, suggests that the tradit ional inst i tut ions of 
the Swazi t r ibe  have maintained considerable resil ience in the face of 
modernisation, and that,  insofar as there is a single focus of po l i t ica l  
ident it ies for overwhelmingly large numbers of Swaziland's population of 
Black inhabitants, i t  is the Ngwenyama and the tradit ional inst itut ions
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of the tr ibe .  That this is so is a reflect ion of many factors. I t  is 
a product of the personality and sophisticated po l i t ica l  sk i l ls  of the king, 
and of the fact that these individual features are reinforced by symbolic 
magico-ritual factors which connect the nation with the king in a 
metaphysical manner. The continuation of a profound sense of t radit ional  
id en t i f ic a t io n ,  also re f lec t  the social recruitment patterns of the Swazi 
t r ib e ,  which based on achievement rather than ascriptive c r i t e r i a ,  have 
allowed the tradit ional inst i tut ions to both absorb opposition and mobilise 
the very best of Swaziland's human talents on their  behalf. In many ways 
i t  is this element of social mobility within the Swazi t r ib e ,  which underpins 
the predominant po l i t ica l  role of the king, and which has allowed the t r iba l  
inst i tut ions to continue to f u l f i l  a socia l ly- integrat ive  role in the post­
independence period, and in a manner which confounds accepted theories of 
the relationship between tradit ion and modernity in the rest of A fr ica? ^
The fact that Swazi society is u n i - t r ib a l ,  and that the t r iba l  framework 
continues to maintain a considerable degree of cohesion in the contemporary 
era, has important implications for foreign policy. I t  means, most 
fundamentally, that Swazi policy-makers can operate in an environment which 
is re la t ive ly  free of the possib il i ty  that in tra-societal differences and 
group tensions can be manipulated by external forces concerned with p o l i t ic a l  
gain. The fact of the matter is that,  to a l l  intents and purposes, there 
do not exist in Swaziland pockets of ethnic discontent. !;; general therefore,  
the foreign policy-maker in Swaziland does not have to give considerations 
to the effects of external policy upon the opinions and attitudes towards 
leadership on the part of e thnical ly -d issimilar  groupings contained within 
the sta te ,  nor a lternat ive ly  need he take into his calculations the external 
implications of domestic policy as applied to groupings within the state who 
are ethnically linked to similar  groupings outside of +he boundaries of the 
poli ty .
67
This thesis is however, subject to some serious qual if icat ions.
In the f i r s t  place i t  should be borne in mind that although Swaziland 
is a uni t r iba l  society, not a ll  Swazi are concentrated within the t e r r i to r ia l  
boundaries of the Swazi state , nor are a l l  Swazi cit izens members of the 
Swazi t r ibe .  There is ,  for  example, a large concentration of Swazi 
tribesmen who have during this century existed permanently within the 
te r r i to r i a l  boundaries of neighbouring South Africa. In current terms 
the po l i t ica l  future of this group, which is situated near Swaziland's 
borders in the Eastern Transvaal, is uncertain. Plans have been mooted 
by the South African authorit ies for  the creation of a Swazi 'homeland' 
within the framework of the separate development policy. I t  is however 
not inconceivable that,  in the fu tu re , the South African Swazi w i l l  be 
integrated into the Swazi state and the boundaries of Swaziland extended 
to include this pocket of individuals. In present terms however, there 
can be l i t t l e  doubt that Swaziland's policy-makers have a direct  interest  
in this externally-situated Swazi grouping, and that the policies adopted in 
relation to i t  by th° South African government, d irect ly  impinge upon the 
state of Swaziland-South African relations. I t  should also be borne in 
mind that a s ignif icant number of Swazi are i t inerant  and are temporarily 
in employment e i ther  in South Africa's mining or agricultural sector. The 
treatment of these individuals during their sojourn in South Africa also 
constitutes an issue - area in Swazi foreign policy which d irect ly  expresses 
the relationship between ethnic a f f i l i a t i o n  and the operations of foreign 
policy.
Of equal importance is the fact  that not a l l  residents or cit izens of 
Swaziland are members of the Swazi t r ibe .  There are , for example, some 
25,000 non-Swazi blacks within tne te r r i to ry ;  the majority of whom are either
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of Zulu or Shangaan extraction. On the basis of available evidence i t  
seems that few of these 'foreign' Blacks are e i ther  p o l i t i c a l ly  aware or 
involved in the dynamics of Swazi pol i t ics  : i t  is however of significance 
that  the more p o l i t i c a l ly  sophisticated elements of this grouping have never 
fu lly  identif ied with the policies of the Imbokcdvo, and have, to a l l  intents 
and purposes aligned themselves with the oppositional forces of the Swaziland 
Progressive Party or the Pan-Africanist NNLC ( i . e .  Newane National Libcratory 
Congress). This may well re f le c t  a heightened p o l i t ica l  modernisation on 
the part of these individuals, who being drawn from either  Zululand or 
Mozambique cannot fu l ly  associate themselvec ' i tn the essentially t r iba l  
ethos of the INN. Whatever the reasons, Swaziland's attitudes towards, and 
treatment of non-indigenous Blacks may well become an important foreign 
policy issue-area with the independence of a neighbouring Kwazulu, and the 
establishment of a Black independent Mozambique.
The relationship between social composition and external policy is 
however perhaps most visibly expressed through the medium of Swaziland's 
European population who, in a l l ,  make up a quantitat ively  small but 
disproportionately in f luent ia l  element of the local po l i t ica l  community.
In practice, the European presence in Swaziland dates back well into the 
last century, from which time on this minority element has played a v i ta l  
role in the social and economic l i f e  of the te r r i to ry .  Pol it ically-speaking,  
the European community has been responsible for the art iculat ion of conservative 
and colon i l i s t  values in Swazi l i f e  : unti l  f a i r l y  recently, this community 
has tended to emphasise the importance of social segregation and racial  
discrimination. During the decolonisation process the majority of Europeans 
supported the idea of a 'm u l t i - ra c ia l '  federation, which to a l l  intents and 
purposes, supposed the maintenance of White minority r u le .47/Z
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In spite of these facts however, present race relations in Swaziland 
are exceptionally good, so much so that,  in many ways Swaziland can lay 
claim to being a true and functional mult i - racia l society. The reason for 
this is to be found in the fact that during the last  ten years if me 
fundamental alterat ions in the social and po l i t ica l  attitudes of the 
European population have taken place. The European element today seems 
to accept as valid the provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Proclamation 
of 1961 and the Race Relations Act of 1962, the effects of which are to 
outlaw a l l  forms of social segregation conducted on a racial basis.
P o l i t ic a l ly  speaking, the European community has to a l l  intents and purposes 
fu l ly  rejected the emphasis on White minority domination in favour of a low- 
key po l i t ica l  p r o f i le ,  in terms of which a l l  po l i t ica l  power is vested with 
the moderate elements of the Black population of the te r r i to ry .  In the 
post-independence period, Europeans have been members of Swaziland's legis lature  
and executive: yet the Europeans have not created po l i t ica l  part ies, have
tended to associate themselves with the existing Black Imbokodvo party,  
and have neither publicly objected nor attempted to a l te r  th e ir  minuscule 
representational role in Swaziland's law-making and executing bodies. The 
Europeans have, in short,  come to terms with the existence of a unitary  
Black-dominated po l i t ica l  system.
This should not however obscure the fact that the existence of the 
European community impinges very s ign if icant ly  on the making of Swazi 
foreign policy. In the f i r s t  place, i t  is important to appreciate the 
fact that the fundamental readjustments in White Swazi p o l i t ica l  and social 
attitudes have been promoted by the real isat ion,  on the part of the European 
community, that its  economic importance to Swazi society can adequately 
compensate for its  lack of formal p o l i t ica l  influence, and - perhaps more
s ign if icant ly  - that i t  can, to some degree or another, continue to rely 
on the support of i ts  racial counterparts in the neighbouring White South 
African state. This calculation may not necessarily be valid. What is 
important however, is that i t  is largely perceived to be valid by the 
European community and by po l i t ica l  leadership in the Swaziland government. 
As far  as the la t t e r  is concerned, some anxiety continues to exist  that  
the European population continues to more fu l ly  identi fy  with the ir  South 
African counterparts than with the newly-established symbols and 
inst i tut ions of the Black Swazi state. Correctly or incorrectly , the 
sentiment is also present that South Africa w i l l  not quiescently witness 
the pursuit of policies by the Swazi government which w i l l  seriously - 
or be seen to be seriously - prejudicial to the material interests of the 
Swazi European community. The result of these orientations is expressed 
at  two levels. In the f i r s t  place, Swaziland's policy-makers are extremely 
sensitive to the fact that Swazi policies towards South Africa can 
fundamentally affect  the attitudes on the part of Swaziland's Europeans 
towards the Swazi state : there is some evidence to suggest that re la t ive ly  
more m i l i tan t  policies directed against the Republic might well promote an 
unfavourable reaction on the part of the domestic European community, and 
in the process, mobilise them against either prevail ing leadership or even 
against the state. Under such circumstances the potential po l i t ica l  weight 
of the European community acts as a moderating influence on Swazi policy 
towards South Africa. Secondly, the perceived relationship between 
Swaziland's Europeans and South A fr ica , introduces into the realms of 
domestic policy an element of caution which would be unlikely to exist  
in the absence of the Swazi-South African racial interl inkage. Swaziland's 
government is undoubtedly sensitive to the fact that South African 
intervention in Swaziland's internal a f fa i rs  could well become a function
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of the character of policies pursued in relation to the te r r i to ry 's  
European minority community: in many ways i t  is the fear of the potential 
pressures which South Africa could bring to bear, that has moderated 
Swaziland's domestic pol icy, part icu lar ly  her concern with reducing the 
disproportionate economic role of the European minority community in Swazi 
social l i f e .
Social composition relates to foreign policy, and i t  seems that this  
is no less the situation in the case 01 Swaziland, the element of social 
cohesion notwithstanding. From otu perspective, the essentia lly  uni- 
t r ib a l  character of the society substantially widens the range- of options 
open to policy-makers, who can afford to be re la t ive ly  unconcerned with 
the penetration of external subversive influences into the tr iba l  structure. 
From another perspective however, the presence of the European community 
seems to have a dist inct  l imit ing e f fect  : the Swazi foreign policy-maker 
i t  seems can never en t i re ly  exclude this variable from his policy-making 
calculations. And i t  is I .-cause of this that both domestic policy, and 
foreign policy towards South Africa takes on a d ist inct ive ly  moderate 
qual i ty  and form.
C. The Pol i t ica l  I denti t ies of  Swaziland's Leadership : The Psycho-
Ideological Bases o f  SwazTI_and's ForeTgn Policy
The foreign policy of any state reflects the domestic po l i t ica l  
culture of the state i . e .  the set of values, at t i tudes,  beliefs and 
sentiments which are internalised within, and condition the operation of ,  
the insti tut ions and processes of the po l i t ica l  system. In the case of 
the developing state therefore, t' cal ident i t ies  and orientations
of both po l i t ica l  leadership and itically-awase and involved
citizens of the state , impinge d irect ly  upon the def in it ion of foreign
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policy objectives, and in any analysis of the domestic factors which 
condition foreign policy in these states, i t  becomes necessary to evaluate 
this a t t i tudinal  base upon which foreign policy operations are constructed.
In doing so in the case of Swaziland, i t  is of importance to bear a 
v ita l  fact in mind, namely that Swaziland is a state whose historic heritage 
is similar  to that of those states who in current terms constitute the entity  
deemed the "Third World" whilst the racial and cultural characteristics of 
Swazi society, together with the general concern of i ts  po l i t ica l ly - re levan t  
citizens with problems relat ing to development and modernisation, consolidate 
the pattern of linkages which exist between Swaziland and the newly-independent, 
developing non-White states of the international community. Under such 
circumstances, i t  is to these states that Swazi policy-makers w i l l  turn in 
the ir  search for "natural" a l l ies  in the international system, and a l te rnat ive ly ,  
i t  w i l l  be through the ar t icu lat ion of the po l i t ica l  values of this international  
grouping that Swazi policy-makers w i l l  seek to legitimate the ir  association 
with these states. I t  must be emphasised that this is not to suggest that 
Swaziland's international alignments can be automatically inferred from the 
sim i lar i t ies  in development levels, history and race which exist between 
Swaziland and the Third World states : nor is i t  to suggest that the po l i t ica l  
values wnich are f i l te re d  into Swaziland's foreign policy-making process are 
not also a product of independent def in i t ion.  Rather i t  should be borne in 
mind, that perceived common ident it ies founded on race, culture, history and 
po l i t ica l  and economic circumstance perform an important coalescent function 
in in ter -s ta te  re lat ions, that to the degree that states become socialised 
into an international group po l i t ica l  culture, group po l i t ica l  values w i l l  
intrude upon the po l i t ica l  values indigenous to the state i t s e l f ,  and that 
this dynamic cannot be excluded from the systematic analysis of the foreign 
policy of discrete states, Swaziland no less.
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The question to be posed at this point is quite simple i . e .  to what 
degree have the values of the Third World po l i t ica l  culture been absorbed 
into the Swazi po l i t ica l  system ? A lte rnat ive ly , to what degree do the set 
of po l i t ica l  attitudes underlying current Swazi foreign policy-making 
indicate the socialisation of Swaziland into that international group of 
states with which the po l i t ica l ly - re le v a n t  strata of Swaziland society 
are sentimentally and psychologically associated ?
In answering this i t  is s ignif icant to note that ,  to the degree that 
i t  ex is ts, Swazi ident i f icat ion with their  racial and po l i t ica l  counterparts 
external to the Swazi state is a re la t ive ly  recent phenomenon. In large 
part this is a t tr ibutable  to the geographic situation of Swaziland in the 
heartland of South Africa which during the colonial era and well into the 
last years of the decolonisation process constituted an insulating buffer  
against the inflow of po l i t ica l  ideas and concepts from the international  
system and Black Africa into the Swaziland pol i ty .  As late as the early 
S ix t ie s , hy which time ideas associated with African nationalism and Pan- 
Africanism were firmly entrenched on the African continent as a whole, the 
po l i t ica l  philosophies of Swazi poli t ic ians continued to be dominated by 
ethnocentric and pre-modern conceptions of po l i t ica l  society and organisation.
The legacy of this situation is expressed in the fact that even today, Swaziland's 
poli t ically-aware element approach the concepts of modern nationalism and 
supra-national ism of the Pan-African var iety with an element of extreme 
caution, and even deep suspicion on the part of the less urbanised and 
t r ib a l l y  oriented members of the po l i t ica l  community. Contemporary 
ideologies and belief-systems have, in short , exoerienced considerable 
d i f f i c u l ty  in establishing themselves in the minds of many, even p o l i t i c a l l y -  
sophisticated, Swazi who have continued to define their  attitudes and 
po l i t ica l  interests in essentially tradit ional tr ibal-oriented terms. This
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is true not only wi thin the domestic po l i t ica l  context, but in the external 
context as weil : there is for example an appreciation of the ethno­
cultural merits of South Afr ica's  separate development policy amongst many 
members of the Swazi po l i t ica l  leadership, which contrasts sharply with the 
po l i t ica l  attitudes and opinions which currently prevail in most Black
African po l i t ica l  c irc les. And insofar as these values are brought to bear
on the foreign policy-making process, cr it ic ism and opposition to South 
Africa's internal policies - cr it ic ism which is so deeply internalised in 
the feelings of the rest of Black Africa - becomes blunted. In many ways 
the ful f i lment of Swazi national po l i t ica l  aspirations is s t i l l  defined in 
what would be considered in the rest of Black Afr ica ,  as conservative terms; 
i t  is tne t r ibe  which is the nation and the erosion of t r iba l  a f f in i t ie s  
continues to be viewed with a sense of disquiet uncommon to po l i t ica l
thinking in Black Africa as a whole.
When a l l  is said and done however, i t  cannot be denied that the 
part icipation of Swaziland in a modern international environment has not 
l e f t  her sense of po l i t ica l  values either  untainted or untouched. Indeed, 
the communications revolution, which has fa c i l i ta te d  the flow of innovative 
categories of ideas into Swaziland, and Swaziland's involvement in the 
international exchange of goods, services and people, has in many ways 
served to break down the ideological gap between Swaziland and the outside 
world, and in others, served to cement the relationship between po l i t ica l  
elements within Swaziland and perceivedly similar  elements in the external 
system. The ideals of modern nat ional"  i , of racial equality, Black 
sol idar i ty  and economic and po l i t ica l  independence have undoubtedly succeeded 
in penetrating the Swazi system, have attracted the attention of po l i t ica l  
actors within i t ,  and have, in the process, served to promote a redefin it ion  
of po l i t ica l  values and attitudes which stand in sharp contrast to the 
tradit ional dispositions of the past.
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The intrusion of innovative po l i t ica l  ideas into Swazi la. d can be 
traced back to the early sixt ies when a certain amount of l iaison began 
to occur between a number of important individual Swazi, and external 
international inst i tut ions : i t  was this which was to promote a new
acquaintanceship on the part of the former with contemporary po l i t ica l  values 
prevail ing within the la t te r .  U i . Zwane, for example, was to be present at 
the Conference of the Heads of States and Government of Independent African 
States (May 1963) which was to lead to the creation of the 0AU4ti//, as well 
as a variety of other international conferences at which Third World and 
Black African viewpoints were to be articulated. John Nquku was a 
part ic ipant of the Afro-Asian Sol idarity  Conference held in 1964, whilst  in 
1967, for example, i t  was pointed out49'Z that the SPPj0// was recognised not 
only by the AASOj1/ in Cairo, but addit ionally by the OAU, the United Nations, 
the Tri-Continental Conference of Afr ica, Asia and Latin America, the World 
Assembly of Youth and the Pan-Ac ican Solidarity  Organisation i f  the three 
High Commission Terr i tor ies:  individual members of both the SPP and NNLC5^
were to be known for thei,  i t inerant  character during the 6 0 's, whilst both 
df these organisations were responsible during this period for the 
establishment, of party offices abroad. Over and beyond this i t  should oe 
noted that Ghanaian influences were to play an important role in the 
ideological alignment of both these parties, and the tactical procedures - 
with the ir  emphasis on mass mobilisation apart from formal constitutional 
arrangements - which they subsequently adopted and which strongly reflected 
the experiences of the Gl maian Convention People's P a r t y . ^  Dr Zwane 
himself was to undertake a number of tr ips to Ghana whore he established 
relations with the Bureau of African A f fa i rs ,  which in turn was to provide 
a number of scholarships for the training of Swazi in Ghanaian inst itut ions  
such as the Ideological Inst i tu te  at Winneba (which was attended by a number
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of Swazi including Arthur Khosa who was to become the Deputy-Chairman of the 
NNLC). As fa r  as the SPP is concerned, i t  is of interest to note that the 
decision to establish the party followed d irect ly  upon a v i s i t  to Swaziland, 
in May 1960, of Aloysius K. Barden (then-director of Ghana's Bureau of African 
A ffa i rs )  - who in consultations with Nquku seems to have convinced the la t te r  
of tne need to move beyond mere pressure group a c t iv i ty  in the SPA (to which 
most members of the Swazi in te l l igents ia  then confined their  po l i t ica l  role) - 
whilst in the years that followed the Ghanaian authorit ies were to make 
avai lable to the SPP f a c i l i t i e s  similar  to those extended to tne NNLC i t s e l f .  
This of course suggests that the Ghanaian influence in Swazi internal pol i t ics  
was by no means committed to one party or movement -  Nkrumah was indeed to 
la te r  throw support to the Imbokodvo i t s e l f  : nonetheless the linkages 
established undoubtedly not only contributed to the development of modern 
po l i t ica l  thought in Swaziland i t s e l f ,  but,  more subtly to the conditioning 
of that thought in particular African nat ionalist  and Pan-African directions.
Over and beyond the influence of international organisations and of 
part icular Black African countries such as Ghana on the intrusion and 
development of international thought categories into and within the Swazi 
po l i t ica l  system, i t  is of importance to take note of the South African 
influence in the same regard. Indeed, i f  the Swazi-South African geographic 
relationship has on the one hand served as an insulating factor in the process 
whereby ideological forces have penetrated the Swazi state, i ron ica l ly  on the 
other, this relationship has at the same time served to allow for the infusion 
of these forces in a variety of ways. In the f i r s t  place the "haven" nature 
of the Swazi state in terms of which South African po l i t ica l  refugees have 
become both attracted to and involved in the Swazi po l i t ica l  system is an 
important factor in the development of modern and art iculated po l i t ica l
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conceptions on the part o f the indigenous participants in that  system 
i t s e l f .  The year 1960 - with the Sharpevilie incident and the subsequent 
banning of the PAC and AliC in South Africa - is of importance in this 
regard, witnessing as i t  did the in f lux of a variety of South African 
p o l i t ica l  refugees who were in subsequent years (when the refugee community 
was to be swelled by both more South Africans as well as refugees from
Mozambique ) to play important roles in Swazi po l i t ica l  l i f e ;  mention must
be made in part icular of such individuals as Jordan Ngubane (a member of 
both the Liberal Party and ANC) and i . a .  Macdonald Maseko, an o f f ic ia l  of 
the ANC who was to become a leading figure in the NNLC i t s e l f .  In the
second place mention must be made of the role of South African educational
inst i tu t ions ,  which, attended by numerous Swazi, served throught the 20th 
century as contact points for the integration of and introduction to modern 
ideological thought; inst itut ions such as Fort Hare, the University of the 
Witwatersrand (of which Dr. Zwane was a graduate), and St. Chad's College 
in Natal (which was attended by Nquku) should be mentioned in this regard.
F ina l ly ,  the Swazi/South African interchange of labour is another important 
element that should be noted with reference to the South African role <n the 
ideological modernisation of the Swazi state; the presence of a sizeable 
non-Swazi African community - composed mainly of Zulu and Shangaan - in 
Swaziland has constituted an important channel for the flow of ideas across 
t e r r i to r i a l  boundaries, whilst  the presence of a Swazi labour-force in South 
Africa i t s e l f  has s imilar ly  served as a means for the communication of ideological 
categories from the one system to the other. In the la t te r  regard i t  is of 
interest to note both the role of South African based Swazi in the formation 
of the NNLC and a splinter  group within the Swaziland Progressive P a r t y ^ n d ,  
during the early s ix t i e s , t 1 .if 1 uence of this group in the radicalisation  
of thv NNlC.55/
The influence of nationalist  p o l i t ica l  and racial thought systems 
has tended to be most-fel t  and v is ib le  in the more modernised sector of the 
Swaziland socio-poli t ica l system, amongst the more urbanised and educated 
members of the money economy, where in fac t ,  since the early s ix t ie s , they have 
found inst i tut ional expression in the be l ie f  and ac t iv i t ies  of a number of 
p o l i t ica l  ent i t ies  who in one manner or another have demonstrated a degree 
of commitment to doctrinal categories whose source of origin is rooted 
rather in the external international environment rather than within the Swazi 
indigenous system i t s e l f .  This is especially true with regard to the SPP - 
Swaziland's f i r s t  modern po l i t ica l  party, which with i ts  establishment in 
1960 was to be responsible for  the introduction of Pan-Africanist ideas into 
Swazi po l i t ica l  l i f e  - and, following the breakaway from the SPP in the early  
s ix t ie s ,  the NNLC which henceforth was to become the prime ar t icu la tor  of 
modern African p o l i t ica l  values within the Swazi po l i t ica l  system. I t  was, 
more e x p l i c i t l y ,  the l a t t e r  which was to be responsible for both the 
introduction of African Socialist  and the development of Pan-Africanist  
thought orientations within this system; thus i t  was the NNLC which was to 
propose a re la t ive ly  coherent plan for the nationalisation of Swaziland's 
industries and infrastructure during the 1964 election campaign, popularise 
the frequent manipulation and use of such ideology-laden symbols as 
"imperialism", "Colonialism", 'neo-colonialism" e t c . a n d  present to 
the Swazi electorate the concepts of Pan-Africanism and the ir  d i f fe rent ia t ion  
from the l ibera l  mult i -racia l socio-poli t ical id ea l . ( In  the la t te r  regard 
for e x a m p le ,^  a statement to the e f fect  tha t ,  in Dr. Zwane's opinion 
"multi racial ism and Pan-Africanism are l ike  two parallel lines and w i l l  
never meet. Pan-Africanism recognises the existence of only one race 
anthropologically referred to as homosapiens . . .  I f  m u lt ip l ic i ty  of races is 
rejected,  also rejected is the theory of superiority of one race over another.")
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What is perhaps of even greater significance is the fact that 
foreign modern po l i t ica l  influences have not only effected those po l i t ica l  
parties which are, in a sense, on the periphery of Swazi p o l i t ic s ,  but the 
predominant and governing Imbokodvo National Movement i t s e l f .  The Imbokodvo 
never has been, nor is i t  today, a m i l i tan t  Pan-Africanist or African 
nationalist  party defined in the s t r ic tes t  sense : on the contrary the Imbokodvo 
is s t i l l  essentially a conservative movement which operates in close relat ion  
to the t r iba l  framework, and within the context of t radit ional po l i t ica l  beliefs  
and values. There is no doubt however that in the last decade, and part icular ly  
since independence, the actions and attitudes of the Imbokodvo have come 
increasingly to re f lect  the impact of modern African nationalist  thought, 
and that this fact has led to some reappraisal on the part of the 
Imbokodvo leadership of the policies to be pursued within 
Swaziland and within the wider international environment of which Swaziland 
is a functioning part. Insofar as the la t t e r  in part icular  is concerned, 
the basis of po l i t ica l  values which underpin the conceptualisation of 
foreign policy seems to have perceptibly s h i f tc H in the direction of 
in ternationalisation and modernity.
This s h i f t ,  which is indicated by some form of a t t i tud ina l  convergence 
between the po l i t ica l  sentiments of Swazi policy-makers and those of the ir  
counterparts in the rest of Black Afr ica ,  is the result of a combination of 
domestic and external considerations. From a domestic point of view i t  should 
be borne in mind that the early sixt ies witnessed considerable po l i t ica l  
co-operation between the Swazi t r ibal au thor i t ies , (who subsequently established 
the Imbokodvo National Movement) and the minority European se t t le r  element.
The co-operation was largely motivated by common opposition to the modern 
Swazi nat ionalist  movement which began to emerge during this period. I t  
did nonetheless create the public image, both domestically and abroad, of a 
set of t r iba l  authorit ies more concerned with the ir  own narrow interests than
1
those of the Swazi people as a whole, and of a po l i t ica l  grouping 
determined to preserve these interests even at the expense of collusion 
with a rac ia l ly  exclusive s e t t le r  minority. The modernist parties of Swaziland 
were naturally prone to manipulate this symbol both domestically and abroad, 
and the result of this situation was the emergence within the Imbokodvo of 
an acute sensit iv i ty  to charges of Black "sell -out" . As early as 1963 for  
example, i t  seems to have become realised within the Imbokodvo that i f  the 
movement desired to maintain its c r e d ib i l i ty  as the legitimate representative 
of a l l  the Swazi people, i t  would be necessary to draw a clear dist inct ion  
between i ts  po l i t ica l  position and that of i ts  European a l l i e s .  I t  was also 
appreciated by the tr iba l  authori t ies that i ts  capacity to draw off  support 
from the nationalist  movement would require a closer ident i f ica t ion with the 
p o l i t ica l  values of modern African nationalism. I t  was this which was to 
underline the refusal of the Imbokodvo to continue to support the idea of a 
m ult i -rac ia l  federation following the elections of 1964. From this point on 
Imbokodvo po l i t ica l  demands were geared to a non-racial unitary sta te ,  and by 
1967 such issues as labour local isat ion, trade unionism and the immediate racial  
integration of Swaziland were integral features of the INM po l i t ica l  platform. 
From the foreign policy point of view what is perhaps of even more significance  
is the fact that even a f te r  i t  became clear - in the 1964 and 1967 elections - 
that i t  was the INM which occupied a position of v i r tu a l ly  unchallengeable 
domestic authority, the leadership of the INM d'd not revert to the more 
conservative po l i t ica l  stance which i t  had adopted in the pre-1964 period.
In the post-independence period i t  has continued to be f e l t  that the 
international vis-a-vis national image of the party requires demonstrable 
proof of its  ident i f icat ion with Black Africa.  I t  is this that underlie;  
the increased number of personal contacts made by members of the Swaziland 
government with o f f ic ia ls  of Black African states, Swaziland's concern
with i ts  a b i l i t y  to partic ipate in Black African forums, such as the O.A.U. 
and to establish a variety of Black African technical and economic contacts 
in the post-independence period. These actions have in turn promoted closer 
identity t ies between Swaziland leadership and Black Afr ica ,  and have 
fa c i l i ta te d  the introduction of the modern p o l i t ica l  values of the la t t e r  
into Swazi foreign policy-making c irc les. In a cumulative and s e l f -  
reinforcing fashion the concern with an international image has acted to 
affect  the po l i t ica l  perceptions of the Swazi policy-maker.
The absorption on the part of Swaziland's policy-making process of 
innovative exogenous po l i t ica l  values is not however only a product of the 
sensit iv i ty  of Swaziland's leadership to the image of European clientship.
I t  is also a reflect ion of Imbokodvo attitudes and po l i t ica l  style. I t  
is of importance to emphasise that the Imbokodvo has never been an exclusivist  
party, and that i t  has tended in the past to adopt an extremely conci1i tory  
position towards i ts  domestic po l i t ica l  opponents. The Prime Minister 
has, for example pointed out that Imbokodvo welcomes i ts  erstwhile p o l i t ica l  
opponent " l ike  the prodigal son", and that the Imbokodvo philosophy does not 
exclude membership even on the part of individuals who have been i ts  most 
vehement c r i t ics  and opponents. I t  is this 'open-door' policy which has 
allowed the Imbokodvo to fu l ly  exploit Swazi po l i t ica l  talents. This 
emphasis has however also allowed for the incorporation of individuals into 
the INM who have in the past been closely associated with the modernis'1 
nationalist  movement. Many of these individuals have in fact been placed 
in important policy-making roles, and this implies that within Swaziland's 
governing party today, at the highest levels of policy-making, there exist  
a number of individuals who ar t icu la te  a set of  po l i t ica l  dispositions which 
are d ist inct ly  modern and African nationalist  in character. I t  is important 
to emphasise that emergent policy is not only conditioned by these policy-
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makers, but represents a subtle blend of tradit ional and modern po l i t ica l  
thoughts in this regard, insofar as King Sobhuza and persons such as 
Mr. Simon Mxumalo (ex-leader of the Swaziland Democratic Party, and now 
Minister of Industr ies, Mining and Tourism) interact at the policy-making 
l e v e l , foreign policy represents a combination of both tradit ional and 
more modern perceptions and perspectives. In another sense foreign and 
domestic policy represents the integration of the modernist bureaucratic 
ethos with that of the tradit ional t r iba l  authori t ies. That the attitudes  
which underlie policy-making must to some degree be conditioned by the 
influences exerted by individuals of modern ideological persuasions, is an 
important variable which cannot be excluded from the analysis of the 
p o l i t ica l  culture on which Swazi foreign policy is based.
In conclusion therefore, i t  seems that although the domestic po l i t ica l  
culture of Swaziland s t i l l  contains a potent element of t ra d i t io n a l is t  values 
and b e l ie fs ,  domestic and international considerations, subjective and 
objective circumstances have combined to erode some of the po l i t ica l  
conservatism of Swazi society Today, Swaziland's leadership cannot be 
considered mi 1i tan t ly  nationalist  or Black-oriented In the s t r ic tes t  sense: 
yet international pressures and the capacity of the Imbokodvo to include in 
i ts  operations individuals of a more p o l i t i c a l ly  modern orientat ion, have 
led to a situation where policy, both internal and external,  is sensitive 
to the p o l i t ica l  values currently articulated in the developing world.
D. The Strategic Dimensions of Swaziland's Foreign Policy
The state of modern technology allows for the rapid transportation 
of material goods and the communication of ideas in a manner which often 
bears l i t t l e  relevance to the pattern of legal boundaries amongst states.
As a result the geographic location of states is often interpreted as a
variable whose po l i t ica l  relevance is today s ign if icant ly  less than has 
been the case in past international systems. There can be no doubt 
however that factors related to geographic location s t i l l  impinge on 
po l i t ic a l  behaviour: access to maritime o u t le ts , the capacity to 
independently controlled communication routes, the spatial relationship 
between p o l i t i c a l l y  similar or dissimilar  systems - a l l  these continue 
to be factors which must be taken into account by the policy-makers of 
states. In the developing areas in part icu lar ,  the level of technology 
is re la t ive ly  low, so that in many cases states cannot offset  the po l i t ica l  
disadvantages which derive from geographic circumstance : the communications 
structures of developing states s t i l l  continue to be subject to the ways and 
wiles of spatial emplacement. This is no less the case with Swaziland.
Indeed, given the landlocked character of the Swazi state,and the fact that  
i t  is almost completely surrounded by the Republic of South Afr ica ,  except 
in the East, i t  would seem to be invalid to ignore the relationship between 
geographic situation and the making and operation of Swazi government policy.  
Swaziland has no direct physical access to the outside world except via the 
te r r i to ry  of her immediate neighbours, and this fact must to some degree 
condition the attitudes and actions of the Swaziland policy-makers.
In the past, the geographic positioning of Swaziland in relation to 
South Africa has undoubtedly served to f a c i l i t a t e  the role of South African 
p o l i t ica l  influences in the Swaziland system. This is not to suggest that  
Swaziland is a mere po l i t ica l  c l ien t-s ta te  of South Africa or has been so 
in past years : there seems l i t t l e  doubt however, that South African influences 
have profoundly affected the pattern of po l i t ica l  events in Swaziland and that 
they continue to do so, irrespective of the conscious intentions of South 
Africa or i ts  policy-makers. The juxtapositioning of the Swazi and South 
African systems i . e .  the geographic relationship between the two te r r i to r ie s ,
makes the flow of influences from South Africa into Swaziland a l l  but 
inevitable.
In evaluating the role of geographically-induced South African influences 
in the Swaziland po l i t ica l  system, one can in fact distinguish between the pre- 
and post-colonial periods. In the former, South African part ic ipation in the 
Swazi poli ty  was largely expressed through the a c t iv i t ie s  of a variety of 
individuals, e ither  of South African cit izenship or extraction, who were to 
become involved in Swaziland's pol i t ics  of decolonisation. I t  has for  
example been estimated that no less than 60 per cent of the membership of 
Swaziland's major pre-independence white po l i t ica l  party, the United 
Swaziland Association, was drawn from South African c it izens,  and this was 
to substantially condition both the p o l i t ica l  values and tactics which were 
endorsed by this organisation. Under such circumstances, the concern which 
the U.S.A. was to feel for  such issues as dual voting privileges in both 
Swaziland and South Afr ica ,  and the incorporation of Swaziland into the 
framework of the Bantustan programme, can readily be understood. The pre- 
independence period was also to witness a number of personal contacts between 
leading Swazi and South African po l i t ica l  personalit ies : specific examples 
of this would include the meeting between Mr. Vorster and King Sobhuza at  
Ehlame in July 1962, and between representatives of the Swazi National 
Council and Mr. van Wyk de Vries just  prior to the 1964 Swaziland general 
e lec t ion .5^  F ina l ly ,  there is some evidence to suggest that South African 
support was instrumental in the establishment of such po l i t ica l  ent i t ies  as the 
National Convention, and the Mbandzeni Party whose leader. Dr. George Msibi , 
was on a variety of occasions accused of collusion with members of the South 
African Special Branch. Whether or not these conspiratorial a c t iv i t ies  can 
be substantiated is perhaps of loss importance than the fact that even i f  
Swazi-South African po l i t ica l  transactions in the pre-independence period
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were not a direct result of geographic contiguity, they were nonetheless 
fa c i l i ta te d  by i t .
In the post-colonial period, with the existence of a sovereign and 
independent Swazi s ta te ,  South African influence - conscious or unconscious - 
in the Swazi polity has become at once less tangible and direct.  Nonetheless, 
the Swazi-South African geographic relationship continues to be p o l i t i c a l ly  
relevant insofar as i t  touches upon both the t e r r i t o r i a l  permeability and 
communications structures of the newly-established Swazi state. I t  should 
be borne in mind - and i t  is in fact constantly borne in mind by the Swazi 
leadership - that not only is South Africa a p o l i t i c a l l y  dissimilar neighbouring 
sta te ,  but that she is a state whose m i l i tary  and economic capacity vastly 
exceeds m a t  of Swaziland, and which can, v i r tu a l ly  at w i l l ,  adopt policies 
and postures which can fundamentally and negatively a l te r  the course of Swazi 
society. From a m i l i tary  point of view, although Swaziland has recently 
established its  own defence force, i t  is not only beyond contemplation that 
this force could launch an offensive attack upon South Afr ica ,  but even beyond 
question as to whether this force could defend Swaziland in the face of a 
a South African attack. Swaziland does not have the m il i tary  capacity to 
maintain the t e r r i to r ia l  in tegri ty  of the sta te ,  and although there is no 
evidence to suggest that either South African or Swaziland foreign policy­
makers chink in terms of a m i l i ta ry  confrontation between the two states, the 
complete incapacity of Swaziland to defend her national security in the face 
of her more powerful neighbour, constitutes a perennial backdrop to the making 
and implementation of Swazi foreign policy. In practice moreover, the 
a c t iv i t ies  of South African security o f f ic ia ls  in Swaziland in the post­
independence years has consolidated these feelings of extreme v u l n e r a b i l i t y . ^  
South African authorit ies have, i t  seems, become increasingly aware of the 
po l i t ica l  ramifications involved in the 'hot pursuit ' of South African
p o l i t ica l  refugees into Swaziland, and actions of this nature have tended to 
decline in recent years. This has not however been paralleled by a 
corresponding decrease in the anxiety f e l t  by Swazi policy-makers as to the 
extreme vulnerabi l i ty  of the boundaries of the Swazi state. Nor has i t  
reduced the potential influence which can be exerted by South Africa through 
manipulation of the symbols of massive m i l i ta ry  preponderance.
Geo-poli t ical relationship between Swaziland and South Africa is 
also reflected in the current fact that ,  with the exception of its  outlets 
through Mozambique in the East, Swaziland's communications with the outside 
world are d irect ly  dej ndent upon f a c i l i t i e s  which are provided by i ts  South 
African neighbour. The situation is of course p a r t ia l ly  offset  by the 
routing of the Swaziland ra i lroad,  through Lourenco Marques: nonetheless,
with this exception the major flow of Swaziland's transactions is s t i l l  
through South Afr ica, and i t  is through South Africa that Swaziland's aerial  
l inkages, imports and telecommunications connections with the outside world, 
must pass. In pract ice, Swaziland's leaders are acutely aware of this fact:  
they also fu l ly  realise the ease with which South Africa can sever or hamper 
the transportation of goods or personnel into Swaziland, a fact which has 
been demonstrated on numerous occasions in recent years, by the denial of 
t rans i t  rights to numerous individuals who have e i ther  sought to leave or 
enter Swaziland via the medium of South African f a c i l i t i e s . ^
The foreign p 1 icy relevance of this situation is f a i r l y  obvious, and 
in practice i t  seems that the South African-Swaziland geographic relationship 
has implications for both the psychological and operational dimensions of the 
Swazi foreign policy-making process.
F irs t  and foremost, the geographic juxtapositioning of Swaziland and
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South Africa d irect ly  l imits  the range of actual po l i t ica l  options open 
to the Swazi policy-maker. In practice, the South African-Swazi geographic 
relationship p a r t ia l ly  offsets the po l i t ica l  effects of the discrepancy in 
po l i t ica l  values in the Swazi and South African systems. The close geographic 
t ies between South Africa and Swaziland do not necessarily produce an amicable 
relationship expressed through the convergence of po l i t ica l  sentiments: 
nonetheless, these ties do f a c i l i t a t e  interaction between the two systems 
and in so doing produce an element of interdependency in their  relations.
Frc" the Swaziland perspective, to the degree that geography leads to the 
integration of communications systems, and to the degree that geography 
leads to economic integration as w e l l ,  i t  becomes re la t ive ly  more d i f f i c u l t  
to pursue a foreign policy based on h o s t i l i t y ,  po l i t ica l  differences 
notwithstanding. This is clearly evident in any comparison between Swazi- 
South African and Swazi-Rhodesian relationships. In both cases the roots 
of in ter -s ta te  enmity are to be found in differences pertaining to issues 
on the relationship between pol i t ics  and race. In the case of the la t t e r  
however, the states in question are geographically remote, and the rate of 
social transactions between them, essentia lly  non-existent. In the case 
of the former, geographic proximity has f a c i l i t a te d ,  i f  not created, a high 
level of in te r - te r r i  corial transactions of both an economic and po l i t ica l  
nature, and this his tempered Swazi attitudes towards South Africa and i ts  
internal polic ies, in a manner which is not paralleled in the Rhodesian 
case. That this is so d irect ly  reflects the range of foreign policy options 
open to Swazi policy-makers in each instance.
The l imitations imposed on the range of options open to Swazi policy­
makers is also indicated by its a tt i tude and actions in relation to the gueril la  
movements directed against the South African state. From a mil i tary  
perspective, the strategic situation of Swaziland, in the very heartland of
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South A f r ic a , creates an ideal staging point for operations directed 
against South Africa. Geography, in this sense, substantially enhances 
the m i l i ta ry  value of the Swazi state. A lternatively ,  i t  is precisely the 
geographic relationship between Swaziland and South Africa which reduces the 
probabil i ty that this potential m i l i tary  value w i l l  be operationalised. 
Swaziland's policy-makers are aware of these facts : they are cognisant that  
foreign policy cannot be geared to the promotion of guer i l la  a c t iv i ty  against 
South Africa, except at the risk of jeopardising the material and economic 
interests of the state. With alterat ions in the po l i t ica l  status of 
Mozambique they are also aware that the potential m i l i tary  value of Swaziland 
w i l l  increase, and that as a resu lt ,  whereas Swaziland w i l l  reap the advantages 
of being, for the f i r s t  time in its  history , bordered by an independent Black 
sta te ,  its foreign policy w i l l  at the same time be confronted with issues 
related to the translation of potential into actual m i l i ta ry  value. The 
strategic position of Swaziland bordered by an independent Mozambique thus 
poses serious challenges for Swazi foreign policy.
Viewed in these terms Swaziland's geographic position is undoubtedly 
a l imit ing factor in the ma uf foreign policy, and one which serves to 
severely circumscribe the psychological and operational poss ib i l i t ies  of the 
foreign policy-rnak * I t  should not however be thought that these strictures  
cannot, to some degree, be offset .  I t  can for example be argued that through, 
the application of technology, even in the case of a developing state such as 
Swaziland, strategic disadvantage can be p a r t ia l ly  overcome through the 
establishment of a pattern of p o l i t i c a l ly  advantageous communication l inks.
This has in fact been clearly  recognised by Swaziland's policy-makers who, 
in the last few years have sought to increase the ir  po l i t ica l  options through 
the establishment of aerial linkages between Swaziland and the outside world.
I t  can also be ju s t i f ia b ly  argued that the geographic disadvantages 
confronting the Swazi state can be reduced in po l i t ica l  terms as a result  
of the fact that she is surrounded by two vis-a-vis a single state.
There is in fact a further aspect of Swaziland's geographic location 
which has not as yet been dealt with,  although i t  has def in i te  important 
foreign policy effects i . e .  that Swaziland is not completely surrounded by 
South Afr ica, but is bordered by Mozambique on i ts  eastern side. This 
does not a l te r  the land-locked character of the Swazi state , nor does i t  
reduce i ts  total dependence on external actors for physical contact with 
the outside world : on the other hand, the part icipat ion of a second state
in the Swaziland's geograpnic environment does create possib i l i t ies  which 
would not exis t  in a situation of total confinement within the realms of a 
single state. More e x p l i c i t l y ,  the existence of Mozambique to the East allows 
for Swaziland to p a r t ia l ly  compensate for i ts  geographic dependence on the 
Republic of South Africa : i t  provides for a set of transactional alternatives 
which can p a r t ia l ly  offset  the l imitations imposed by the South African 
relationship. In a sense i t  allows Swaziland's policy-makers to diffuse 
their  geographic dependence in a manner which is uncontemplatable in the 
Lesotho situation: trade relations with South Africa can be 'balanced' by
the routing of trade through Mozambique, and physical communications can 
similar ly  be equilibrated in this manner. Thus, whilst almost a l l  of 
Swaziland's imports find the ir  source in South Africa almost a l l  of her 
exports are routed through Lourenco Marques. Similar ly, whilst  Swaziland's 
aerial communications are almost t o t a l V  dependent on south African f a c i l i t i e s ,  
whilst hpr niiu telephone connections with the outside world are
transacted through the South African exchange, her sole r a i l  l ink is 
directed eastwards through the Portuguese te r r i to ry .  I t  can of course be 
valid ly  argued that this 'balance' is not necessarily a product of po l i t ica l
circumstance and calculation : nonetheless i t  is a factor which has 
p o l i t ica l  e f fe c ts , and which substantially increases the range of po l i t ica l  
options and possib i l i t ies  available to the Swazi policy-maker. There can 
be l i t t l e  doubt moreover, that with the establishment of an independent 
Black Mozambique the po l i t ica l  saliency of the Mozambique-Swazi land 
t e r r i to r i a l  relationship w i l l  be vastly enhanced, and i t  is in fact currently 
argued that this relationship and i ts  development, is of suf f ic ient  relevance 
to bring about fundamental alterat ions in the total pattern of Swaziland's 
foreign policy operations.
The geographic relationship between Swaziland and South Afr ica ,  between 
a m i l i tary  and economic midget and a m i l i tary  and economic giant, can never 
be entire ly  eradicated from the calculations and operations of the Swazi 
foreign policy-making process. What would seem to be of even more importance 
is the fact that whether or not South Africa would seriously contemplate 
m il i tary  or economic action against Swaziland, is less relevant to Swazi 
foreign policy-making than the fact that in the perceptions of the Swazi 
policy-maker, the possib i l i ty  of such action can never be fu l ly  discounted.
In other words, the significance of the locational relationship between 
South Africa and Swaziland, insofar as the foreign policy of the la t te r  is 
concerned, is to be found not only in the objective character of Swazi- 
South African re lat ions, but in the subjective orientations of the Swazi 
policy-makers themselves. In this sense, geography is translated into a 
p o l i t i c a l ly - l im i t in g  foreign policy variable through the perceptions of 
Swaziland's foreign policy-making e l i t e .  These perceptions are dominated 
by feelings of anxiety and apprehension, and i t  is as a result of these 
sentiments, that an element of extreme caution becomes injected into the 
Swazi policy-making process, and often to a degree which would not seem 
necessary in the l igh t  of objective circumstance.
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In conclusion i t  is inescapably clear that Swaziland's land-locked 
location in the heartland of the Southern African sub-cuntinent is a v i t a l l y  
important factor in both the set of attitudes which underlie Swaziland's 
foreign policy-making process, and in the nature of the actions which flow 
therefrom. Geo-politics may well be of less relevance in certain international 
situations v is -a-vis  others: in the case of Swaziland however, i t  seems that
an evaluation of the relationships between geographic location and po l i t ica l  
behaviour is central to an understanding of foreign policy orientations and 
operations.
E. Pol i t ica l  Development and Swaziland's Foreign Policy
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Although the amount of research done on the relationship between the 
level of po l i t ica l  development and foreign policy is ,  to date, minimal, the 
stockpile of existing evidence is suf f ic ient  to suggest that such a relationship 
in fact exists, and that in the making of foreign policy, part icular ly  at the 
level of foreign policy formulation, the degree of p o l i t ica l  modernisation 
must be included in the category of domestic variables which impinge on the 
foreign policy-making process. A l ternatively ,  the low degree of authority 
ra t iona l isat ion,  structural d i f fe rent ia t ion  and po l i t ica l  part icipat ion  
within a po l i ty ,  imparts to that system's external pol ic ies ,  certain  
dist inct ive  qual it ies which would be absent under conditions of re la t ive ly  
more heightened p o l i t ic a l  modernity.
The formulation of Swaziland's foreign policy d irect ly  reflects the 
influence of the level of po l i t ica l  modernity defined in terms of the above 
three c r i te r ia .
First  and foremost, i t  is of importance to note that the operations of 
Swazi government do not manifest an exceptionally strong element of structural 
di f fe re n t ia t io n ,  and that as a resu lt ,  in Swaziland as in other developing
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states, the concerns, powers and prerogatives of specific governmental 
inst i tut ions often overlap and are not clearly defined. This lack of 
di f ferent ia t ion  is clearly expressed in the case of Swaziland's Department 
of Foreign A f fa i rs ,  whose operations as d ist inct  from other inst itut ions  
in the governmental structure, are as yet re la t ive ly  unclear. This is 
expressed in two sets of relationships of an inst i tut ional  nature. In the 
f i r s t  place, Swaziland's Foreign Affairs Department is directed to concern 
i t s e l f  purely and only with the po l i t ica l  apsects of external policy, and this 
l im itat ion means that a number of other structures and departments of the 
public service are integrated into the foreign policy-making process in a 
manner which would not apply were Foreign Affairs be granted somewhat wider 
prerogatives. In ef fect ive  practice, departments and individuals outside 
of Foreign Affairs are often deeply involved in negotiations which would 
normally fa l l  within the operational realm of the foreign ministry, and this 
leads not only to a certain inter-departmental competitive element in foreign 
policy-making, but also to breakdowns in communication and co-ordination in 
the policy-making enterprise. In the second place, the low level of 
structural d i f ferent ia t ion is reflected in relationships between Foreign 
Affairs  and the executive arm of government. I t  should be borne in mind 
that i t  is the Prime Minister who is ultimately formally vested with 
responsibil ity for Swaziland's foreign policy, and that although he operates 
on the advice of the Permanent Secretary and Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs  -  and on issues of major importance wi l l  consult the Council of 
Ministers - i t  is the Prime Minister who is the major individual actor in the 
foreign policy-making process. This situation is not necessarily unusual and 
in many states, part icular ly  developing states, the office of Foreign Minister 
is often absorbed into that of the Prime Minister himself. This arrangement 
does however lead to a blurring of the dividing lines between bureaucratic
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and executive operations, and can give rise to a situation where administrative 
and po l i t ica l  perceptions of foreign policy can come into direct conf l ic t .
There is some evidence to suggest that this is the case with regard to Swazi 
foreign policy-making, where considerations of operational eff iciency as 
articulated by the Department of Foreign Affairs  have not ent ire ly  conformed 
with po l i t ica l  attitudes and opinions expressed either by the Prime Minister ,  
or by those members of the Swaziland Cabinet with an in terest  in foreign 
a f fa i rs .  Bureaucracy-executive relationships thus tend to consolidate and 
aggravate intra-bureaucratic variables which detract from maximum eff iciency  
in the policy-formation process.
The rationalisat ion of authority is also central to any defin it ion of 
po l i t ica l  modernity, and i f  this factor be taken to mean, in ter  a l ia ,  that  
ultimate decision-making capacity in policy-making is vested in the formally 
established insti tut ions of state , then certain implications for Swazi 
foreign policy-making arise. I t  should be borne in mind that not only is 
King Sobhuza the focus for domestic po l i t ic a l  sentiments and policies, but 
that additionally he is extremely interested in foreign a f fa i rs .  I t  is this 
orientation,  in combination with the p o l i t ica l  authority wielded by the King, 
which tends to encourage the transmission of major foreign policy decisions 
on the part of the Council of Ministers, prior to implementation, to the King 
himself. Indeed, since the suspension of the Swaziland Constitution in 
April 1973, and the subsequent concentration of po l i t ica l  power in the off ice  
of the King, this process has tended to increase : in current terms the capacity 
of King Sobhuza to influence foreign policy, and his frequency in doing so, 
seems readily evident. I t  is moreover of significance that the c irc le  of 
monarchical advisers includes not only members of the modernised sectors of 
Swazi society, but in addition members of the t r iba l  hierarchy who can, and 
so i t  seems, do, exert influence on the royal decision-making process. The
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King is also known for his tendency to u t i l i s e  the services of individuals  
outside the formal governmental circles in the negotiation of foreign policy 
issues. Under such circumstances, policy-conflicts  can often arise between 
modernised bureaucrats, po l i t ic ians ,  t r ib a l is ts  and outsider individuals a ll  
who seek to capture royal attentions. Foreign policy-making and the output 
of the policy-making process thus often reflects factional considerations which 
do l i t t l e  to enhance eff ic iency,  and which would normally be phased out or offset  
within a more structured inst i tut ional framework.
Swaziland's foreign policy is f in a l ly  affected by the level of 
partic ipation in domestic po l i t ic s .  This is true in two senses, i . e .  within 
the formal realms of governmental service, and within the wider social 
environment of which governmental insti tutions are a part. In the former case 
'part ic ipat ion'  refers to the categories of human sk i l ls  which are integrated 
into government work, and, in this regard, Swaziland in common with other 
developing states, suffers extreme shortages of sk i l led manpower which can 
be employed in the public service. This is reflected in the Department of 
Foreign Affairs which, excluding cler ical s t a f f ,  currently consists of 
less than a dozen individuals. Staff  shortages are in fact an endemic 
feature of the operations of the Department, and can in many cases only be 
overcome through the importation of foreign personnel. At present, for  
example, there is no treaty o f f ic e r  in the department, and treaty work has 
always in the past been performed by foreign o f f ic ia ls .  The Department 
has no visibly-evident structured procedures for the collection of information, 
whilst i ts  information resources are in any case l imited to discrete and 
disparate elements of data haphazardly gleaned from a small numbc of diffuse  
sources. The individual members of the executive, po l i t ica l  and protocol 
sections of the department are both experienced and have, in many cases, 
enjoyed the benefits of sophisticated overseas training. Yet these
95.
individuals lack the support services which are integral to the formation 
of e f fect ive  foreign policy, and i t  seems that until  such time as these 
services are created and manned by larger numbers of skil led s t a f f ,  the 
making of Swazi foreign policy, in common with that of other developing 
countries, w i l l  continue to be very much of a hit-or-miss venture.
Part icipat ion in policy-making can also however be defined in a wider 
context, and can be taken to refer  to those structures, groups and insti tut ions  
outside of the formal realms of government, whose interests and influences 
impinge upon the policy-making process. I t  is of importance to note however, 
that the capacity of these ent i t ies  to penetrate the formal policy-making 
process is a function of organisation, and that the growth of organised 
social associations of this nature is in turn a result of the movement of the
poli ty  towards higher levels of p o l i t ica l  modernisation. Under such
circumstances, the role of modern pressure group ac t iv i ty  on the policy-making 
processes of the developing state is considerably more restricted than in 
re la t ive ly  more developed pluralised societ ies, and a l te rnat ive ly ,  policy­
making, domestic, and par t icu lar ly ,  foreign policy-making, becomes a far  
more centralised ac t iv i ty  than would be the case where the policy-maker 
must constantly refer his actions to the ways and wiles of an interested and 
aware element of public opinion. This is no less the case in Swaziland where, 
with the exception of po l i t ica l  parties, organised extra-governmental ent i t ies  
do not play a role in the foreign policy-making process. I t  is d i f f i c u l t  to
detect or identify  any conerent interest  groups in Swaziland which are to
any degree concerned with foreign policy issues : as such, the foreign policy­
maker operates within an atmosphere of freedom of action unparalleled in the 
more p o l i t i c a l l y  developed poli ty .
Insofar as the foreign policy role of Swaziland's po l i t ica l  parties
are concerned, two factors should be taken into consideration. In the 
f i r s t  place, the number of po l i t ica l  parties which can in any way 
sign if icant ly  e f fect  the domestic po l i t ica l  process is exceptionally mall.
The decolonisation process did indeed witness the emergence of a plethora 
of parties : yet the majority of these - which would include such ent i t ies  
as the Swaziland Progressive Party, the Swaziland Democratic Party and the 
Mbandseni National Convention - have either disappeared from the po l i t ica l  
scene, or continue to exist in such attenuated form as to be, to a l l  intents 
and purposes, p o l i t i c a l ly  meaningless. In fa c t ,  in current terms there are 
only two po l i t ica l  parties or organisations which can in any way be defined 
as functional and as interested in foreign policy issues. These are, in the 
f i r s t  place, the governing Imbokodvo National Movement, and , in the second 
instance, the minority opposition constituted by the Ngwane National Liberatory 
Congress. The major difference between these two parties l ies  in the 
difference between an essentially conservative tradit ional p o l i t ica l  ent ity  
and a modern African na t ional is t ,  Pan-Africanist po l i t ica l  actor. This is 
reflected in the contrasting attitudes brought to bear by the INM and NNLC 
on domestic and foreign policy issues respectively. On external policies 
the NNLC has, for example aligned i t s e l f  with the postures of the more 
m il i tant  Black African states : thus i t  has pressed for the ' l ib e ra t io n '  of 
South Africa and Namibia, the eradication of Portuguese colonialism and the 
immediate establishment of majority rule in Rhodesia. The party has also 
publicly expressed i ts  recognition of the South African National Congress, 
and has on numerous occasions called for the release of the imprisoned 
yet ' legit imate ' leaders of South Africa's Black peoples. The INM on the 
other hand has articulated a much more moderate set of external po l i t ica l  
goals : thus whilst  i t  has publicly ident if ied i t s e l f  with the movement 
for the self-determination of the Black peoples of Southern Afr ica ,  i t  has
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at the same time emphasised i ts  conviction that this should be brought 
about by non-violence, compromise and negotiation. Similar ly, the INM 
has emphasised the need for neighbourly co-operation upon the basis of 
non-interference in domestic a f f a i r s ,  and the material and economic 
benefits which dictate a policy of realism irrespective of the differences 
in the po l i t ica l  values of te r r i to r ia l ly -a d ja c e n t  states.
Apart from the small number of foreign policy-oriented p o l i t i c a l ly  
salient parties in the Swazi system, i t  is important to bear in mind the 
overwhelming predominance of the Imbokodvo in the dynamics of that system.
The truth of the matter is ,  that t r iba l  loyalties continue to dominate the 
po l i t ica l  values of the average Swazi, and as such i t  is the Imbokodvo which 
is ,  to a l l  intents and purposes the extension of the t r iba l  system into 
modern Swazi po l i t ic s ,  which emerges as the po l i t ica l  focus of the majority 
of Swaziland's Black population. The po l i t ica l  acumen of King Sobhuza, 
together with an in t r ica te  web of famil ia l  connections which are diffused 
throughout the Swazi po l i t ica l  system, have further acted to consolidate the 
t ra d i t io n a l is t  oosition. I t  should also f in a l ly  be noted, that the modernist 
parties in Swazi po l i t ics  have fa i led to demonstrate a capacity to u t i l is e  
modern po l i t ica l  techniques, and that insofar as s i tuat ion-def in i t ion ,  
organisation and the manipulation of symbols is concerned, i t  has been the 
INfl which has constituted the font of modern po l i t ica l  aci t i v i t y .  The modern 
nationalist  parties of Swaziland - i . e .  the SPP, SDP and NNLC - have a ll  tended 
to appeal to the Swazi electorate in terms which are unfamiliar to a t r ibalised  
and tradit ional environment: they have fa i led to maintain a sense of cohesion 
adequate to the demands of modern highly-competitive electoral p o l i t ic s ,  and 
they have fa i led to grasp a variety of po l i t ica l  opportunities for the mass 
mobilisation of support. The result is expressed in the po l i t ica l  hegemony of 
the Imbokodvo, and the vir tual elimination of a l l  the modernist parties as
po l i t ica l  forces. In the 1972 election for example, the NNLC (which has 
been defined as the major modernist party) acquired a mere 3 of the 24 
contested House of Assembly seats, and even though this represented an 
improvement over its  1967 electoral position, the decision on the part of the 
King to suspend the constitution in 1973, e l ic i ted  v i r tu a l ly  no support for  
the oppositional NNLC movement.
The fact that Swaziland's po l i t ica l  development has led to a situation  
where the system cannot easily accommodate the p o l i t ica l  part icipation  
of the forces of modern African nationalism, has important implications 
for foreign policy formation. In the f i r s t  place, and obviously so, i t  
introduces into the values which underlie policy-making an element of 
conservatism and moderation which cannot easily be reconciled with the 
m il i tan t  sentiments articulated either by the rest of Black Africa, or 
by the opposition within the Swazi system i t s e l f .  This is not to say 
that the NNLC cannot influence the policies adopted by the government: 
but i t  cannot do so d i re c t ly ,  and the absorption of the values which i t  
art culates into policy-making, can only be effected through the f i l t e r in g  
medium of the Imbokodvo i t s e l f .  This sharply contrasts with the 1NM, which 
as governing party, has direct and immediate access to the policy-making 
process. In the second place, the low level of po l i t ica l  competition in 
the inter-party sense allows the Swazi foreign policy-maker to operate with 
considerably greater freedom and f l e x i b i l i t y  than would be the case wi.ere 
constant reference needs to be made to the values, attitudes and opinions 
internalised within a diverse and dynamic inter-party structure. The 
foreign policy values of the Imbokodvo are known, and insofar as the INM 
continues to dominate the domestic po l i t ica l  process, and the policy-maker 
to work within the broad framework of these values, foreign policy formation 
in Swaziland can a l te r  and adjust with a f a c i l i t y  which would be unknown in
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a less sta t ic  domestic p o l i t ica l  environment. In this sense, the largely 
fossil ised character of domestic po l i t ica l  competition does not automatically 
lead to a static  foreign policy orientat ion. The hegemony of the forces of 
traditionalism may well deprive the policy-making process of the element of 
sophistication which would necessarily grow out of a rapid interchange of 
pressures and opinions in a more intense domestic po l i t ica l  context : the 
predominance of a single po l i t ica l  party does however act to broaden the 
options available to the Swazi foreign policy-maker, i t  reduces domestic 
l imitations on his actions, and i t  gives to the formation of Swazi foreign 
policy a dynamic, i f  unrefined, qual ity .
In conclusion, i t  seems re la t ive ly  clear that the foreign policy 
pursued Ly Swaziland is neither analyt ica l ly  nor operationally d ist inct  from 
the domestic conditions of the Swazi state. On the contrary, i t  is this 
pattern of domestic social,  economic, p o l i t i c a l , ideological and strategic  
circumstances, which d irect ly  conditions the form which Swazi foreign policy 
assumes, the processes by which i t  is made and the objectives which i t  seeks. 
From an a lternative perspective, i t  is these sets of circumstances which 
function in a parametric manner to largely determine the conceptual and 
fo r rulatory dimensions of the Swazi foreign policy-making process. In 
certain ways the nature of domestic circumstance l imits the alternatives  
available to the Swazi policy-maker and detracts from the eff ic iency of 
the policy-making endeavour: in other ways i t  broadens the range of possible
ms and imparts to policy-making a number of d is t inc t ive ly  positive 
» es. In e i ther  event, the def in i t ion of Swaziland's foreign policy 
, and the operation of the inst itut ions which convert ideas and 
concepts into operational r e a l i t i e s ,  is linked to, dependent on, and 
inextricably interwoven with the dynamics internal to Swazi society.
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CHAPTER 4
SWAZILAND'S FOREIGN POLICY IN APPLICATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The output of the foreign policy process represents the operational 
dimension of foreign policy i . e .  the application of foreign policy to the 
international environment of which the state is a part. Thi? is no less 
the case with regard to Swaziland, which through the application of the 
output of i ts  foreign policy process seeks the realisation of certain 
defined economic and po l i t ica l  goals in the in ter -state  context.
A. Swaziland as an In te rnational Economic Actor
Swaziland, as a l l  other developing systems, is intimately concerned 
with accelerated social and economic growth, and this is the case even 
though there is not internalisec within the domestic system i t s e l f ,  adequate 
supplies of cap ita l ,  technology and such other developmental resources whose 
integration into the development e f fo r t ,  in suff ic ient  quantit ies, direct ly  
determines the rate at which the goals associated with modernisation w i l l  be 
achieved. A major function of Swaziland's foreign policy is therefore to 
compensate for such shortfa lls  as occur in domestic development capacities, 
and to do so through maximising externally-located development resources which 
can subsequently be infused into the local development e f fo r t .
In practice this leads to two broad sets of policies which are 
currently pursued by Swaziland's foreign policy-makers, and which re f lect  
the value attributed to the realisation of foreign policy objectives of an 
economic nature. F i rs t ly ,  within the Southern African regional context, 
the objective of external resource maximisation is reflected in policies  
specif ically  designed to enhance regional co-operation, regional trade and
the in t e r - t e r r i to r i a l  transfer of capita l ,  labour and technologies. Secondly, 
outside of the regional environment, the demands of resource mobilisation,  
condition foreign policy in the direction of establishing and expanding 
Swaziland's economic links with such international actors, (s tates , 
multinational organisations and private groups and in teres ts ) ,  who have at 
the ir  disposal such human and material resources as are required by 
Swaziland's development programme, and can be integrated with i t .  I t  is 
through such polic ies, pursued in the Southern African region and external  
to i t ,  that Swaziland seeks to sustain and promote her processes of socio­
economic modernisation.
(a ) Swaziland as a Regional Economic Actor
i  •
( i ) Swaziland-South Africa_n_ Economic Relctions ''
In current terms, geographic, po l i t ica l  and economic circumstance
combine to make relations with South A f r ic a , the primary concern in the pattern
of Swaziland's diplomatic a c t iv i ty .  In current terms moreover, there exists
amongst Swaziland's leadership an acute awareness of Swaziland's vulnerab i l i ty ,
weakness and defencelessness vis-a-vis South Afr ica, as a result of the
geographic and economic relationship to South Africa. This is constantly
alluded to in ju s t i f ic a t io n ,  domestically or in ternat ional ly ,  of the particular
policy positions taken by Swaziland in re la t ion to South Africa from time to 
2 /time, and indeed, acts to create a s i tuat ion,  where through necessity i f  
nothing else, Swaziland must continually l i a is e  with South Africa on matters 
of common concern, and, mure substantia l ly , follow 'a policy of friendship 
ar,. co-operation towards the Republic of South Africa,  differences in 
po l i t ica l  values notwithstanding.^^ Domestic po l i t ica l  calculations  
further act to reinforce the tendency or orientation in this direction : 
leaders of the Imbokodvo National Movement are deeply sensitive to the
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fact that economic decline within Swaziland can only operate to the advantage 
of the opposition MNLC, that South Africa plays a major role in Swaziland's 
economic growth, and tha> , subsequently, the maintenance of a workable 
economic relationship with South Africa is of primary importance in creating 
that situation of political and social stabil ity which underpins the 
politica' predominance of the current ruling party.^ I t  is also deeply fe lt  
that given Swaziland's negligible economic, political and military resources, 
direct action by Swaziland cannot, in current terms, bring about appreciable 
change in South Africa's forms of internal socio-political organisation : 
to directly confront South Africa would only serve to jeopardise the 
territory's favourable socio-economic future. I t  is this combination of 
factors which gives to Swaziland's policy towards South Africa a notable 
pragmatic flavour, with emphasis not on confrontation and revolutionary 
change, but rather on peaceful 'mutual understanding' and er oomic co-operation.^
The result of this orientation is expressed in the broad-based character 
of Swazi-South African economic relations,with the latter,  deeply involved 
in the processes of Swaziland's socio-economic growth, the discrepancy in 
political values between the two states irrespective. In fact. South Africa 
is currently the single most important factor in the economic l i f e  of 
Swaziland.6//
This pattern is expressed, in the f i rs t  instance, in the field of 
technical assistance, where the climatoloqical and geological similarities 
between South Africa and Swaziland in combination with south African 
experience in the requirements of African technical assistance (gleaned 
from its own domestic conditions and participation in such organisations
7  /
as CCTA and the CSA )- make specific South African assistance of this 
nature of particular importance to Swaziland's developmental process.
In current terms South African technical assistance is of importance in
the development of health and sanitary f a c i l i t i e s  in Swaziland; today a
number of South African medical specia lists , operating e i ther  as individuals
or under such group arrangements as 'Harry's Angels' work on a part-t ime basis
in Swaziland, whilst South African organisations such as the National Food
Research Inst i tu te  - which has done research, in te r  a l i a ,  on anmenting food
supplies with technological development - likewise contribute to healthier
conditions in the te r r i to ry .  In the area of infrastructural creation as w e l l ,
Swaziland's post and telecommunications system was operated as an integral
part of the South African system unti l  1953, whilst in current terms, a ll  of
Swaziland's international a i r  and surface mail is handled by South African
postal authori t ies, as is a l l  international telephone and telex t r a f f i c ,
which is routed through Johannesburg's International Trunk Exchange, end
Pretoria 's International Telex Centre, respectively. South African
Railways Road Motor Services have operated in the te r r i to ry  since 1928, and
in transporting goods within Swaziland and between Swaziland and South
African railheads near the border eliminated the need for Swaziland to expend
local resources on such f a c i l i t i e s  and aided the distr ibution of produce
from market to consumer, and vice versa, in a manner conducive to economic 
8/development. South Africa has also played an important role in the 
development of the Swaziland railroad - ra i ls  being provided by ISCOR and 
construction being undertaken by a consortium of South African firms, whilst  
in the f ie ld  of a ir  transportation, Swazi Air currently operates in conjunction 
with South African Airways.
Turning to Swaziland's educational system, and the development of 
i ts  natural resources to meet the te r r i to ry 's  power needs, the influence 
of South African technical assistance is also noticeable. Until recently,  
for example, the entire Swazi teaching community was trained in South
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African in s t i tu t io n s , and although local teacher training f a c i l i t i e s  have
now been established, many of the current leaders of the Swaziland community
are a product of South African educational inst i tu t ions.^ '7 A number of
Swaziland's schools continue to use South African sy l lab i .  In the f i e ld
of power and water resource u t i l is a t io n ,  following an agreement between
ESCOM and the Swaziland E le c t r ic i ty  Board in August 1970, Swaziland became
the f i r s t  of South Afr ica 's  neighbours to have an e lec tr ic  power system
integrated with that of the RSa J 0// South African firms have provided
machinery and equipment for the construction of the Edwaleni hydro-electric
scheme, l iaison has taken place between ESCOM and the S E B ^  regarding the
12 /proposed construction of a coal- f ired thermal power station in Swaziland, 
whilst contacts have been made between Swazi and South African o f f ic ia ls  
regarding the establishment o f  water resource u t i l is a t io n  projects on the 
Usutu and Pongola Rivers.
South African technical assistance has also contributed to Swaziland's
agricultural development. In the veterinary scienc ’ * d, technical
assistance has been f i l t e r e d  through such organisations the Inter-
Te r r i to r ia l  Foot and Mouth Disease Advisory Committee, the South African
Foot and Mouth Research Inst i tu te  and the Onderstepoort Veterinary Research
In s t i tu te ,  which has distributed both veterinary data and animal vaccine in
Swaziland. During 1964 South Africa was to play a leading role in combating
an outbreak of foot and mouth disease which threatened to disrupt the entire  
13/Swaziland economy in 1965 South Africa acted to contain a further outbreak, 
whilst in 1969/70 a large number of South African veterinary o f f ic ia ls  visited  
the te r r i to ry  to further efforts in foot and mout disease c o n t r o l . S o u t h  
African services have also been employed to combat both redfinch and locusts,  
and, unti l  1970 Swaziland was a member of a Southern African in t e r - t e r r i t o r i a l  
locust control organisation. Agricultural development also requires the
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f u l f  ilment of certain administrative functions, and at this le v e l , such 
organisations as the South African Citrus Board, have provided advice on 
both production and marketing to the ir  Swazi counterparts, and have in 
some instances undertaken the sale of Swazi produce both regionally and 
abroad. F ina l ly ,  both before and since independence, considerable liaison  
has taken place between o f f ic ia ls  of the South African Department of 
Agriculture and the ir  counterparts in the Swazi Government.
South African technical assistance, both public and pr ivate, has also 
made an important contribution to the development of Swazi industry. In 
the sugar industry, Natal producers played a v i ta l  role in the i n i t i a l  stages 
of development, whilst  although the Swaziland sugar industry is no longer 
administered by the South African sugar industry, relations continue to 
remain close, especially at the research leve l ,  where the Swaziland sugar 
association continues to draw on the advice of South Afr ica's  Sugar Mil l ing  
Research Inst i tu te .  The wooapulp industry at Bhunya, tends to draw most 
of i ts  personnel from South Afr ica, whilst the plant of the Usutu Pulp Mil l  
is largely of South African origin. Soutn African private enterprise has 
also constituted a useful source of managerial t a le n t ,15,/ and this is true 
not only of such large-scale enterprises such as Anglo-American, but of 
smaller South African concerns, such as Solth African Preserving Company Ltd. 
and Metal Box Company of South A fr ica , both of which have provided signif icant  
administrative advice to the Swaziland canning industry. South Africa also 
constitutes a source of research data. The South African Council for  
Scient i f ic  and Industrial Research with i ts  numerous specialised inst i tutes  
has played a major role at this level : the National Inst i tu te  for Personnel 
Research h.-.s, for example, trained a number of Swazi in the administration of 
the General Adaptibi1i ty  Battery, whilst  Swaziland also draws upon the South 
African Bureau of Standards in che development of a local system of industrial
specif ications.
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Rational development also f in a l ly  requires a rational system of 
administration, and in this regard there has been concluded (in January 
1909) an agreement between Swaziland and South Afr ica ,  in terms of which 
South Africans may be seconded to work in Swaziland's local administration,  
and in terms of which South Africa undertakes to train municipal personnel: 
it. was in terms of this agreement that a number of South Africans were 
employed in the Swazi public service during 1971. In the specific f ie ld  of 
legal administration South African influence is expressed in the dominance 
of South Africans, in Swaziland's High Court of Appeal, and in the private 
legal p r o fe s s io n ^ .  Close co-operation also exists bet'"'em the Swaziland 
and South African Police, with the former often using the forensic science 
f a c i l i t i e s  of the Republic. F ina l ly ,  i t  has been recently reported1^  that 
the South African army has been approached by Swazi o f f ic ia ls  in regard to 
the proposed establishment of a Swazi national army.
Over and beyond technical assistance, Swaziland's policy-makers sec 
South Africa as an important source of investment cap ita l ,  and , although i t  
is a reciated that the domestic development of the South African economy, in 
combination with South African sensi t iv i ty  to charges of ' im per ia l ism '. l im it  
the amount of public investment which can be infused by South Africa into the 
Swaziland development e f fo r t ,  investment derived from private South African 
sources is seen as v i ta l  to Swaziland's socio-economic growth. In practice,  
governmental aid by South Africa to Swaziland, in the form of capital grants, 
has tended to be both sparse and far  between, a notable exception being that  
until  1970, South Africa provided Swaziland with an annual subsidy to meet 
Swaziland's importation of South African maize. This contrasts sharply 
with the exportation of South African capital derived from the private sector, 
where factors of economics and pol i t ics  have combined to both promote South 
African investment in Swaziland, and to encourage Swaziland's policy-makers
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to seek to sustain this v i ta l  source of f inancial support. One should note 
in this regard that the common currency area provides an ideal environment 
for  the exportation of South African capital to Swaziland, that the po l i t ica l  
s ta b i l i t y  of Swaziland acts as a magnet for South African enterprise, and 
that South Africa's l imited capital outlet-  in Africa induce South African 
entrepreneurs to view Swaziland uoth as a useful market for South African 
capital investment in A f r ic a , and as a means to p a r t ia l ly  counteract African 
trade boycotts through the exportation to Black Africa of South African goods 
manufactured under Swazi a u s p i c e s . O n e  should also mention the investment 
opportunities which Swaziland has to of fer  in general, and which have acted 
as an attract ive  lure to South African private capital : her vast mineral 
wealth (which has promoted investment by the large mining companies, South 
African and otherwise), her agricultural  f e r t i l i t y  (which has attracted South 
African investment in processing a c t i v i t i e s ) , her tourist  potential and her 
ris ing standards of l iv ing (both of which have underpinned South African 
part icipat ion in the tourism and commercial sectors) should a l l  be 
considered within this framework. In quantit ive terms the influence of 
these factors on South African entreoreneurship and the flow of the ir  
investment capital is expressed in the fact that in the period 1960-66, of  
the estimated R70/R80 m private investment as a whole, some 60/70 per cent 
derived from Sout h African sources. In the post-independence period the 
South African role seems somewhat to have declined in favour of Bri t ish  
investment; nonetheless South African private investment in Swaziland 
continues to remain of primary importance to the Swazi national economy 
in a l l  i ts  facets.
Swaziland's policy of encouraging South African private enterprise 
is part icular ly  expressed in the mining and agro-industrial sectors of the 
Swazi economy. In the mining sector the Ngwcnya iron-ore enterprise is
controlled by the Swaziland Iron Ore Development Company, which is an
19/Anglo-American enterprise, whilst Swaziland's coal industry near Siteki 
is controlled by Swaziland Col l ie r ies ,  which is a subsidiary of Rand Mines.
In the agro-industrial sector, although the role of South African capital in 
the sugar industry has been eliminated with the purchase of the Mhlume sugar 
mill  by the Commonwealth Development Corporation, South African investment is 
of major importance in the fie lds of forestry - where Peake Timbers is a 
subsidiary of Anglo-American and where the Rand Mining Timber Company owns 
the Goedgegun Sawmill recently opened in Southern Swaziland : in meat canning 
(where the Swaziland Meat Corporation is owned by Imperial Cold Storage); and 
in cotton ginning and m i l l ing ,  both Swaziland Cotona Ginning Company and the 
Swaziland Mil l ing  Company being backed by South African interests.
The role of South African private capital is also evident in the 
manufacturing sector. Swaziland's packaging factory, NEOPAC, is p a r t ia l ly  
owned by South Afr ica's  Amalgamated Packaging Industries L t d . , whilst the 
Mobamech tractor-assembly plant constitutes a jo in t  venture between South 
Africa's  Diesel Electr ic  Group and the NIDC?^/,The Swaziland Laboratories 
pharmaceutical plant is p a r t ia l ly  owned by South African interests, as is 
Swaziland Wire Industries' new wire and nails endeavour. South African 
private investment is also in the Turnwright's sweet factory at Matsapa, the 
Luyt's Brewery, Pretoria Portland Cement and the African Oxygen plant.
Insofar as future ventures are concerned, the proposed new cigar and tobacco 
factory to be established by Swaziland Tobacco Ltd. is to be controlled by the 
NIDC and the Rembrand Tobacco Manufacturing Company, whilst the s t i l l  
unoperational TV assembly plant is to be a jo in t  South African-dapanese 
venture between the Pram Group of South Africa and the Sharp Company of 
J a p a n . ^
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In the f ie lds of commerce and tourism South African interests are 
also noticeable. In the commercial sector such South African trading 
enterprises as O.K. Bazaars are represented in the terrotory, whilst  in 
tourism both the Holiday Inn and the Royal Swazi Spa are owned by Ezulwini 
Properties (Pty) Ltd. ,  which is in turn held by the Swaziland Development
Company, in which Amalgamated Hotels of South Africa has a 90 per cent
22/
share. South Africa has also played an important role in capita lis ing  
Swaziland's transport infrastructure : South African organisations such as
Anglo-American, the Rand Selection Corporation and the South African Mutual 
in all provided more than half  of the loan capital for the construction 
of the Swaziland Railroad. F ina l ly ,  i t  ,iould be noted that Anglo-American 
has expressed interest in the development of a high capital- intensive pig- 
iron project in Swaziland, and although this would be p a r t ia l ly  financed by 
the Salzgi t ter  Group of West Germany, the establishment of this venture would 
vastly increase the already dominant role of South African private investment 
in Swaziland's economic growth.
The promotion of South African-Swaziland trade is another facet of 
Swaziland's policy of regional co-operation. Two points should however be 
noted with regard to this pattern of transactions. F i rs t ly ,  Swaziland- 
South African trade, has, in general been s ign if icant ly  hampered by the 
fact, that in current terms there does not exist a r a i l  linkage between the 
two states; the development and conduct of trade is thus dependent on road 
transport f a c i l i t i e s  - which in the nature of things are provided by South 
Africa -  and this seriously l imits both the type and quantity of products 
(especially bulk products) which can be exchanged between the two countries 
in practice, and i f  more intangibly, frum thi point of view of South African 
producers, reorientates attention away from the l imited Swazi market with its  
enhanced and unfavourable transportation costs. In the second place, from
11 5 .
an analytical , uint of view, i t  should be borne in mind that because of 
the free interchange of goods in the customs union, i t  is d i f f i c u l t  to 
obtain completely accurate trade s ta t is t ics  and investment flows on the 
transactions between the two states.
Within this framework i t  nonetheless seems that some 20 per cent of 
Swazi exports are in e ffect ive  practice routed to South Africa. In 1967 the 
revenue earning-capacity of these products being in the region of R6,3 mill ion.  
Specif ica l ly ,  the bulk of this is derived from the export of asbestos - which 
conveyed by the aerial rope-way from Havelock to Barberton thus avoids the 
transportation problems incurred by other goods - and ca t t le  products. Over 
and beyond th is ,  the entire Swazi tobacco crop is exported to South A f r ic a , 
jo in t  marketing arrangements having been concluded between the Swaziland 
Tobacco Co-operative Ltd. and the RSA's Tobacco Industrial Control Board;
South Africa absorbs a substantial proportion of Swaziland's cotton (expected 
to be in the region of a th ird  of tota l production during 1973), almost the 
total Swazi rice production, ( some 5,500 short tons in 1971), and a variety  
of forestry products. Additionally Swaziland is a member of a butter  pool with 
South Afr ica, (Swaziland's butter surplus being marketed by the South African 
Dairy Board), and until  recently exported its  ent ire output of molasses to 
the South African market.
There can be l i U l e  doubt that the Sr.jth African trading connection is
of v i ta l  importance to the Swaziland economy. In the f i r s t  place, in the
export sector, apart from the export of material to South A f r ic a , Swaziland
also exports a substantial amount of labour, whose income remittances, and
non-involvement in the local employment market, fa c i l i ta te s  the development
of tt)3 Swaziland economy, characterised as i t  is by insuff ic ient  foreign
23/exchange and l imited employment opportunities. In the second place.
in the import sector, some 80 per cent of Swaziland's imports (valued at 
R31,10 mill ion in 1968) derive from South Afr ica, and these imports include 
not only mechanical equipment and other goods without which the economic 
development would be impossible, but in addition, large quantit ies of maize, 
which, from time to time, are essential to a l lev ia te  such food shortages 
as occur in Swaziland's subsistence economy. I t  is factors such as these 
which make trade with South Africa of v i ta l  importance to Swaziland, and which 
inuuce Swazi policy-makers to continue to maintain and expand these part icular  
trading ties as integral elements in national economic growth.
The pursuit of a development-oriented foreign policy at the regional 
level is additionally expressed and consolidated, through Swaziland's membership 
of South African-dominated organisations concerned with regional economic 
interaction.
First  and foremost, Swaziland is a member of the Southern African 
Customs Union established in 1910, arci providing for a common external 
t a r i f f ,  the free interchange of manufactured goods, mutual adjustments of 
duties, and the allocation of equitable percentages of customs duties between 
four part ic ipants , namely. South Africa and the former High Commission 
T e r r i t o r i e s . ^  As a result of pressures on the part of the three minor 
partners concerned with the improvement of the ir  economic lo t ,  this 
agreement was subsequently renegotiated in 1969, and, in current terms 
provides, in ter  a l i a , for  free exchange of goods without quantitative control 
of domestic products, free interchange of duty-paid goods imported from outside 
the area, the levying of uniform customs, excise and sales duties, 
consultation on the amendment and imposition of customs duties,the imposition 
of additional duties for protective purposes by the BIS states , the 
maintenance of external t a r i f f s  for the protection of specified industries
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in the la t te r  s ta tes , regulation of the marketing of ag r ic u l tu ra l  produce,
a revised method for calculating the division of customs, excise and sales
duty revenues,and for the establishment of machinery for inter-governmental
25/consultation through the Customs Union Commission. '
from Swaziland's point of view, partic ipat ion in the customs union 
carries with i t  a variety of d ist inct  economic advantages. At the lowest 
level, i t  eliminates the need for administration of the long and penetrable 
Swaziland-South African border. Additionally, and especially in terms of 
the renegotiated agreement of 1969, part icipation in the arrangement provides 
Swaziland's industrial a c t iv i t ie s  with a degree of protection from South 
African conpet t ion ,  which would not exist in the absence of an agreement 
and without which industrial development in Swaziland would be seriously 
undercut. The customs union also allows Swaziland to benefit  d irect ly  from 
the dynamic growth of the South African economy: i t  provides Swaziland
with export markets for a variety of products which could not be as 
profi tably  sold elsewhere, and i t  provides import markets for goods which 
could only a l ternat ive ly  be acquired by Swaziland from geographically 
distant and more costly sources. Membership in the customs union, which 
allows Swaziland to draw from the customs union revenue pool, also 
constitutes an important source of immediate income for the te r r i to ry .
The size of this income has. in the past, been a source of contention, and 
ju s t i f ia b ly  so, given the fact that until  1965 allocations were based on the 
trade sta t is t ics  of 1906-08; in terms of this arrangement Swaziland received 
a mere 0,149 per cent of the total pool throughout most of the colonial era.
In 1965 however, a rearrangement was effected which raised the Swaziland 
proportion of the pool to 0,53 per cent and which resulted in Swaziland's 
receipts rising from R383.000 in 1964/65 to R1 ,393,000 in the 1965/66 
f inancial year; in terms of the renegotiated agreement of 1969 moreover, based
118 .
as i t  is on a formula involving annual production rather than on a 
superannuated fixed percentage arrangement, Swaziland's share of customs 
union revenues has increased considerably, from R5,4 mil l ion in the 1969/70 
f inancial year to RIO,5 mil l ion in the financial year of 1971/72.?6// This 
dramatic rise in annual returns has in turn allowed Swaziland to balance i ts  
budget, and to s ign if icant ly  reduce the dependence of the te r r i to ry  on external 
budgetary assistance. Certainly, i t  must be conceded that this vast increase 
in revenues in recent years, is essentially attr ibutable  to the series of 
back-payments agreed to under the 1969 agreement, and that by 1973/74 these 
i n i t i a l  adjustments in revenue calculation w i l l  be largely completed, and 
Swaziland's share w i l l  revert to a more real rate of return based directly  
on the growth of the economy as a whole. However, customs union revenues 
do constitute a major source of invis ib le  imports - currently close to 60 
per cent of revenue is derived from this source - and i t  is therefore 
re la t iv e ly  clear that Swaziland has a direct material interest in remaining 
party to the union which is v i ta l  to the operation of the Swaziland economy, 
and that in economic terms, the concern of Swaziland's policy-makers with 
in>. 'vement in inst i tut ionalised regional co-operation of this type, is 
backed by powerful ju s t i f ica t ions .
All of the former High Commission Terr itories also enjoy the use of
27 /South African currency and banking f a c i l i t i e s ,  ' and, as with the customs 
union, the monetary union offers to Swaziland a number of d ist inct  economic 
advantages which underwrite her policy of regional economic interaction.  
Participat ion in the monetary union, for example, allows Swaziland to draw 
upon the expertise of the South African Reserve Bank, both on domestic and 
international monetary matters, and in so doing saves Swaziland from diverting  
local human and material resources towards the establishment and administration 
of a domestic banking system. Membership of the monetary union also
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fa c i l i ta te s  Swaziland's access to the developed South African capital market, 
whilst  the use of the Rand currency i . e .  of a currency of noted international  
s t a b i l i t y ,  vastly improves Swaziland's position on t i e  international trading 
and monetary market. I t  is in any case questionable as to whether Swaziland 
has a suff ic ient ly  viable economy, or a high enough level of foreign trade 
to warrant the establishment on an in ternat ionally-v iable  indigenous currency 
<ssued by a local national central bank.
Swaziland's policy of regional economic co-operation is also manifest 
in Swaziland's membership of the Southern African Regional Commission for  
the Conservation and U t i l isa t ion  of the Soil (SARCCUS), which, since its  
establishment in 1950 has concerned i t s e l f  with promoting 'closer technical 
co-operation amongst the te r r i to r ie s  comprising the Southern African region 
in all matters relating to the control and prevention of soil erosion, the 
conservation, protection and improvement and rational u t i l is a t io n  of the 
s o i l ,  the vegetation and the sources and resources of water supply in the 
countries concerned'. ^  Over and beyond SARCCUS, Swaziland is a member 
of the Southern African Regional Tourism Council (SARTOC) - established in 
1971 to co-ordinate the promotion of tourism in Southern Africa - and the 
South African-directed In ter-Terr i  tori al Foot and Mouth Disease Advisory 
Committee, which in l iaison with SARCCUS, has acted timeously on a number 
of occasions in the past in handling stock disease on the sub-continent. 
Regarding possible future inst i tut ionalised regional economic co-operation, the 
March 1972 announcement of a possible international road transport agreement 
between Swaziland and the former High Commission Terr i to r ies ,  and the 1970 
opening of negotiations on the establishment of principles governing the 
u t i l is a t io n  of the common water resources of Swaziland, South Africa and 
Mozambique, are important indicators of the lines along which interaction  
is e n v is a g e d .^
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( i i ) Swazi-Portuguese Regional Economic Co-operation
Despite discrepancies in po l i t ica l  values, Swaziland's concern with 
maximising externally-located developmental resources has led to a pattern 
of economic co-operation with South A fr ica , at the regional leve l ,  which is 
at once broadly-based, inst i tu t iona l ised ,  and, in such sectors as private  
investment, technical assistance and in t e r - t e r r i to r i a l  trade, re la t ive ly  
intense. This pattern is to some degree paralleled in relations between 
Swaziland and the Portuguese colonial authorit ies in Mozambique, and,as in 
the case uf Swaziland-South African re la t ions , reflects the influence of 
geographic and locational factors which serve to underpin an element of 
economic interdependence between adjacent te r r i to r ie s .
Mozambique is of considerable importance to Swaziland in the f i r s t  
place, in that i t  sits astride Swaziland's nearest outlet  to the sea: i t
is in fact in Lourenco Marques that Swaziland's sole railroad f a c i l i t y  is 
terminated, and i t  is along this railroad that some 95 per cent of Swaziland's 
exports, and 20 per cent of her imports, flow. I t  is also of importance that  
the ro l l ing  stock of the Swaziland railroad is largely owned by the Portuguese 
Caminhos de Ferro e Transportes de Mocambique, and this factor together with 
the Swaziland/Mozambique trade pattern and geographic relationship must 
necessari ly serve to blunt the influence of p i t i c a l  v is-a-vis economic 
considerations in Swazi-Portuguese interactions. This is not to deny that 
there exists in Swaziland policy-making circles today a strong sense of 
antipathy towards the nature of socio-poli t ical organisation in the 
Portuguese East African state, nor is i t  to deny that (though to a l imited  
degree) Swaziland has at i ts  disposal certain economic resources which can 
be employed in bringing pressure to bear on Mozambique in the direction and 
interest of some form of change. Swaziland for example provides employment
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opportunities for large numbers of Mozambique workers whose exportation 
is regarded as v i ta l  to the develf'oment of the Mozambique economy. Swazi 
policy-makers are also aware that with Jie possible establishment of a Black 
African government - or at least an alternative to the current Portuguese 
government - in the Mozambique te r r i to ry ,  the range of po l i t ica l  options open 
to Swaziland would be immeasurably increased, and her capabil ity to assert 
her status independent of South Africa vastly enhanced; Swaziland has 
therefore a direct interest in po l i t ica l  change in the Portuguese East 
African state. I t  is however f e l t  by Swaziland's policy-makers that in 
current terms such advantages as lend themselves to maximisation are 
essentially economic, and that,  under the circumstances p r io r i t ies  be placed 
on fostering amicable relations with Portugal, both in the economic - and to 
a lesser degree - po l i t ica l  realm, the po l i t ica l  disadvantages accruing 
therefrom notwithstanding. I t  is moreover appreciated by Swazi policy­
makers that the establishment of a radical Black regime in Mozambique is 
not without i ts  negative aspects; in part icular  i t  is realised that such an 
eventuality would thrust Swaziland into the front l ine  of the Southern 
African l iberation struggle with a l l  the dangers, po l i t ica l  and economic, 
which this situation implies. This further serves to introduce an element 
of ambiguity into Swaziland's attitudes towards Mozambique, conditioning 
i t  in the direction of co-operation as much, i f  not more so, than in the 
direction of po l i t ica l  change.
The results of this situation are currently expressed in a rapid rise 
in Swazi-Mozambique economic transactions over the last few years. In recent 
years Swaziland has been represented at a l l  the major trade fa irs  held In 
Lourenco Marques, whilst the level of trade between the two te r r i to r ie s  has 
signif icant ly  increased over this period. A Portuguese investment presence 
has also been established in Swaziland - in the form of the Portuguese firm
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of Matola Cement -  whilst Portugal has provided technical assistance to 
Swaziland, and has, for example, undertaken to ta r  the Mbabane-Namacha 
international road. Since 1970 moreover, discussions have taken place 
between Swazi and Portuguese o f f ic ia ls  with regards to the establishment 
of joint policies on the use of common water resources, whilst in 1970 
,  proposals were mooted by the Portuguese authorit ies for the construction of 
a new ra i l  l ink between Swaziland and Lourenco Marques, and the establishment 
of new port f a c i l i t i e s  to handle Swazi bulk exports. Insofar as the future 
industrial development of Swaziland is concerned, the fact has not been lost  
on Swaziland's policy-makers that there exists in Mozambique, near to the 
Swaziland border, extensive lime deposits which would be required for the 
development of the proposed pig-iron venture in Swaziland i t s e l f .  I t  i> in 
fact , variables such as these which have caused Swaziland's foreign policy­
makers to place emphasis on the establishment of close economic associations 
with Portuguese Mozambique.
(b) Swaziland as an Economic Actor Outside of the Southern African 
"Sub-System
The foreign policy objective of maximising externally situated 
development resources in order to counteract such deficiencies as exist  
within the Swazi system i t s e l f ,  and which operate to hamper desired rapid 
social and economic growth, necessitates the implementation of policies  
which emphasise Swazi partic ipat ion in economic endeavours in the Southern 
African region of which Swaziland is a part : the self-  same economic prerogatives 
have also induced Swazi foreign policy-makers to emphasise the importance 
of economic contacts outside of the Southern African region, and, in pursuit 
of capital aid and investment, markets and technologies, this has led to the 
establishment and promotion of a pattern of international economic contacts 
embracing a number of actors, of various types, on the international s c e n e . ^
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( i ) Swaziland's Economic Relations wi + h Black Africa
31 /
Mr. Simon Nxumalo has pointed out ' that 1 one of the most important 
facets of our policy . . .  is to develop intra-African trade relationships 
to tne maximum extent. . . .  We want to expand the scope of (African trade) 
agreements and to establish many more agreements of a similar nature.
Despite our wealth of natural resources and our rapid industrial progress 
we will  continue to need materials and finished products which other African 
countries could supply. On the other hand, there are a number of items which 
we in Swaziland could provide to other African countr ies.1 Indeed, the 
establishment and promotion of trading ties with Black Africa is currently 
attributed much importance by Swaziland's policy-makers, and participation  
in continental economic co-operation, part icular ly  in the fie lds of trade 
and technical assistance, is se*n as a v i ta l  complement to Swaziland's 
economic a c t iv i t ies  at the regional level.
As a result Swaziland has sought over the las t  few years to widen i ts
economic interactions with Africa North of the Limpopo. In part icular
Swaziland has repeatedly expressed interest in membership of the East
African Common Market, and Swaziland was in fact represented at the 1972
33/Al l -A fr ica  Trade Fair in Nairobi. Bilateral  trade agreements were in
fact signed with Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Malawi during 1969, and in 1968
an important and valuable five-year trade agreement was signed between Swaziland
and Zambia, in terms of which the la t te r  has undertaken to purchase some
25,000 frozen beef carcases and 900 tons of offal annual ly .^ 'Z Zambia
has in fact emerged as an important trading partner of Swaziland which
35/exports some 14,500 tones of sugar to Zambia per annum.
In the technical assistance f ie ld ,  Swazilar 1 receives a small amount 
of aid from Black African countries: indeed the idea of importing trained
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personnel from Black Africa is currently seen as an important intermediate 
means to be ut i l ised in application of the labour local isation policy in 
the face of limited Black human resources at home. I t  is moreover f e l t  
that from the point of view of administrative ef f ic iency, imported Black 
personnel can afford to exercise considerably more discipline over subordinates 
than is the case with imported White public service o f f ic ia ls  who are continually 
sensitive to charges of racial domination. These two factors have in practice 
combined to produce a strong incl ination towards the importation of skil led  
Black labour to be employed in the public service - although i t  is recognised 
that the arguments for localisat ion can be used, i f  not as e f fec t ive ly ,  even 
in these cases : in current terms a Nigerian is head of Swaziland's tax 
administration, and a Kenyan, its Director of Agriculture.
Over and beyond the importation of personnel for employment in the local 
administration, other avenues exist for technical co-operation between the 
Swazi government and the states North of the Limpopo. Liaison has taken place 
between the NIDC*^ and the industrial development departments of the 
governments of the East African states : in March 1972, for example, o f f ic ia ls  
of the NIDC undertook a tour of these complementary organisations, holding 
discussions and exchanging in f o r m a t io n .^  In May of the same year, Swazi 
government o f f i c i a l s , including the Training Co-ordinator in the Department 
of Establishments and Training, visited Zambia (which has also provided training  
for o f f ic ia ls  of the SBS) , 38,/' whilst in the same month Swazi o f f ic ia ls  visited  
Nigeria in order to further technical assistance contacts. Following the 
v i s i t  of the Prime Minister to Mauritius in January 1971, the Mauritian 
Government agreed to provide scholarships for the training oi Swazi sugar 
technologists at the Mauritian university and sugar research in s t i tu te ,  
whilst in the educational f i e l d ,  the Association of African un iversit ies,  
in conjunction with the African-American In s t i tu te ,  has established a
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programme for  undergraduate and postgraduate studies, tenable at Afr'can
universities - in the 1972-3 academic year, this programme awarded
39 /scholarships to some 30 Swazi students. Mention should f in a l ly  be 
made of the large number of OAU-sponsored seminars, conferences, symposia 
and training programmes, whose f a c i l i t i e s  have been used by Swazi on a 
number of o c c a s io n s .^
( i i ) Swaziland-_Br i t is h  Economic Relations
As most developing states, Swaziland has continued to maintain an 
intensive set of both po l i t ica l  and economic contacts, with its former 
metropolitan power. Indeed, as a technologically sophisticated and highly 
industr ial ised e n t i ty ,  Bri tain is seen by Swaziland's policy-makers as a 
vita l ly  important element in the post-independence development dynamic.
Close economic ties with Bri tain have thus been maintained since 1966, and 
in fac t ,  in many areas economic relations have been s ign if icant ly  expanded.
The current significance of economic relations with Britain re f lects ,  
in the f i r s t  instance, the fact that Britain is the main source of Swaziland's 
foreign aid in the forms of both public and private capital investment.
With Brita in 's  general withdrawal from Southern Africa in recent years,  
the injection of Brit ish public capital into Swaziland has, to some degree, 
been scaled down, whilst in the l ight  of the renegotiated 1960 Southern 
African Customs Union agreement, annual Bri t ish budgetary assistance is 
no longer required by the Swaziland economy. Bri tain nonetheless continues 
to be the primary source of governmental capital assistance to Swaziland : 
in 1969 she agreed to grant the te r r i to ry  some £2,95 mill ion in economic aid,  
at the beginning of 1970 i t  was announced that Bri ta in would give to Swaziland 
a further RIO,9 mil l ion to be spread over three years, whilst Bri ta in  has
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subsequently agreed to provide £5,5 mil l ion additional loan aid to cover 
the period 1973-76. The effects of this aid can be seen at the level 
of specific projects. I t  was Brit ish public monies which financed the 
establishment of the Swaziland Broadcasting Service in 1966, and p a r t ia l ly  
capitalised Swaziland's University Centre and Agricultural College at 
Luyengo. The government of the United Kingdom also provided some R415,000 
in loans during the period 1969-72 which made possible the development of 
Swaz land's Industrial Training I n s t i t u t e ; ^  i t  was a United Kingdom loan 
of some 11100,000 which provided for the f i r s t  phase of the development of the 
Matsapa Industrial Estate, whilst Bri ta in  has similar ly  provided large amounts 
in capital grants which have d irect ly  underwritten the creation and operation 
of both SEDC0 and the NIOC. Brit ish capital assistance was also instrumental 
in the establishment of the SCSB,^  and has fa c i l i ta te d  the development of 
Swaziland's educational system.43//
The Brit ish capital input into the Swaziland economy is also reflected  
at the level of private and quasi-private investment, where the a c t iv i t ies  
of the Commonwealth Development Corporation are especially n o t i c e a b l e . ^
This organisation has been active in Swaziland since the late  f o r t i e s , and 
has underwritten a variety of projects which have contributeJ s ignif icant ly  
to Swaziland's economic g ro w th ^ :  i ts  investment in Swaziland in 1970
alone, was estimated to be in the region of £1,1 mil l ion - which constituted 
97 per cent of i ts  total investment in the three former High Commission 
Terr itor ies - and i t  is estimated that by 1972 the CDC had pumped no less 
than a total of £26 mill ion into Swaziland's economic development. In 
part icu lar ,  the CDC has played a major role in the capita . isation of 
Swaziland's agro-industrial development. In the f ie ld  of forest products 
processing, i t  is the CDC (in conjunction with Courtaulds) which is the 
owner of the Usutu Pulp Company, and which p a r t ia l ly  financed expansion
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of this venture's a c t iv i t ie s  during 1971/72.^  The CDC has also played 
an important role in financing complementary afforestation projects in 
the South of Swaziland, where i t  has presently invested some R1,4 m i l l ion ,  
to be spread over 10 years, and established the Shiselweni Forestry Company. 
The CDC is f in a l ly  the owner of the Mhlume Sugar M i l l ,  and in conjunction 
with the Brit ish company of Libby (Pty) L td . ,  holds 10 per cent of the share 
capital of the Mai kerns canning factory.
Brit ish involvement in Swaziland's industrial development is also to 
be found in the Swaziland Sugar M i l l ing  Company's sugar refinery at Big 
Bend - in which the Lonhro Group holds 52 per cent of share c a p i t a l ^  - 
and in Brit ish capital investment in the mining industry. In the asbestos 
mining f ie ld ,  e.g. the Havelock mine is owned by New Amianthus Mines (a 
subsidiary of the Brit ish firm of Turner and Newall) and where both the 
CDC and the Brit ish organisation of Guest, Keen, aid N et t le f ie ld  Ltd. hold 
shares in the Swaziland Iron Ore Development Company (5,7 per cent and 10 per 
cent respectively). The CDC has also played an important role in financing 
mineral extraction ventures, whilst in October 1968 the Lonhro Group signed 
an agreement with the Swaziland Government granting the Bri t ish company 
prospecting rights near Havelock (which may in the near future lead to a new 
second asbestos mine whose development capital expenditure, i t  is estimated, 
would be in the region of R15 m il l ion .  Brit ish investment has also played 
a role in the development of manufacturing industries, (CDC holds a share 
in the NEOPAC venture), in the expansion of tourism, (CDC having invested 
some R50C,000 in Ezulwini Properties (Pty.)  L td . ) ,  and in the development 
of the economic infrastructure, where CDC loans were an important element 
in the construction of the Swaziland Railroad, and where CDC has sponsored 
the Vuvulane Irr igated Farms project.
Brita in 's  important role in financing Swaziland's development e f fo r t  
is complemented in the sphere of technical assistance, where the United 
Kingdom is by far  the main source of technical aid. During 1966-67 for  
example, Bri tain provided some £177,000 in technical a id ,  whilst in 1970 
technical aid worth some £452,000 was injected in the Swaziland economy.
In practice, Brit ish technical assistance has been employed throughout the 
economy.
At the level of infrastructural development, private organisations such 
as 0XFAM have been active in the donation of vaccine, and in the promotion of 
preventive and nutr i t ional services. In the development of non-physical 
communications, the establishment of the Swaziland Broadcasting Service was 
both funded and fa c i l i ta te d  by Bri t ish aid, whilst  in current terms the 
operation of the service is aided by the Brit ish provision of training  
courses - such as that offered at the BBC training centre - which have 
been attended by numerous Swazi o f f ic ia ls .  The United Kingdom has also 
played an important technical role in th» development of Swaziland's 
natural resources to meet the power and ir r iga t ion  needs of the expanding 
economy : in November 1969 for example, i t  was announced that the Brit ish  
Ministry of Overseas Development was to employ three firms of consulting 
engineers, to undertake the fe a s ib i l i t y  study for Swaziland's proposed 
thermal power sta t ion,  whilst such organisations as the South Eastern 
E le c t r ic i ty  Board have seconded engineers to aid facility-maintenance, 
expansion and on-the-job personnel training.  The Bri t ish Ministry of 
Overseas Development has also been responsible for the employment of the 
Brit ish company of Watermeyer, Legge, Piescld and Uhlman to undertake the 
planning of the Umbuluzi River Basin P r o j e c t . ^  Bri tain has f in a l ly  
played an important role in the development of the Swaziland educational 
system through the planning of s y l lab i ,  (the Cambridge Overseas School
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Cer t i f ica te  is used in a number of Swazi schools, the provision of s ta f f  
of educational f a c i l i t i e s :  member of the Brit ish Volunteer Service Overseas^  
and the Brit ish International Voluntary Service have taught in a number of 
Swazi secondary schools: during 1972 the Brit ish Council donated a mobile
l ibrary  to Swaziland, and Brit ish advice has been of importance in educational 
planning at UBLS, where the Academic Planning Mission has been headed by 
Sir Norman Alexander of Bri ta in.
Bri t ish technical assistance has also been of importance in agriculture  
and industrial development. The CDC for example, has established fa c i l i t i e s  
for training agricul tural managers i . e .  the Mananga Centre near Mhlume, 
during 1972 a crop laboratory and i r r iga t ion  workshop valued at over R40,000 
was donated by the Brit ish government, whilst  numerous Swazi have attended 
the Ministry for Overseas Development's International Co-operative Training 
In s t i tu te .  In the f ie ld  of industrial development, the CDC manages such 
ongoing enterprises as the Mai kerns pineapple factory, and, in the sugar 
industry, provides training for personnel in administrative, f inancial and 
technical work. The Ministry for Overseas Development has recently sponsored 
the coal exploration programme at Mpaka, whilst in April 1972, for example, 
i t  engaged a firm of Brit ish consultants to investigate the fe a s ib i l i t y  of 
establishing a Swaziland ceramics industry. Bri ta in has f in a l ly  also 
provided personnel, (19 in the period 1969-72) to the Swaziland Industrial 
Training In s t i tu te ,  to aid the training of skil led t e c h n ic ia n s .^
In the technical assistance f ie ld ,  one must f in a l ly  mention Brit ish  
aid designed to improve the qual ity  of Swaziland's public and industrial  
administration. In terms of its  Overseas Service Aid Scheme and Special 
Commonwealth Assistance to Africa Programme, Britain has provided training  
to numerous Swazi in a variety of tasks from crime detection to immigration
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control, and has also seconded o f f ic ia ls  to Swaziland governmental 
departments. Additionally the Brit ish Department of Employment has 
offered courses in the training of trade unionists, which a number of 
Swazi have attended.
The important economic role of Britain in post-independence Swaziland 
is f in a l ly  reflected in the pattern of British-Swazi trading re la t ions , where, 
from the Swazi point of view, the United Kingdom constitutes a v i ta l  export 
and import market. In practice, despite the considerable sale of Swazi 
goods on the South African market, Bri tain  is the main customer for 
Swaziland's exports. According to figures issued by the United Kingdom 
Department of Trade and Industry, Swazi ports to Britain in 1971 tota l led  
over £9J m i l l ion ,  whilst though these experienced a decline in the following 
year, they nonetheless tota l led some £7,9 mill ion for 1972.^  In specific  
categories, these exports consisted mainly of sugar, (in terms of the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, the United Kingdom is a major market for this 
important Swazi export, whose value was some £4J mill ion in 1971); also 
exported were fe r t i l is e r s  and minerals(worth over £2 mil l ion in 1971), 
forestry products which are sent mainly to the Courtaulds processing plant 
in Northern Wales (The United Kingdom is also a primary market for such 
products), and f r u i t  and vegetables (these being valued at £1,8 mill ion in 
1971). With regard to Swaziland's imports, although goods brought in from 
South Africa constitute the bulk of products imported into the Swaziland 
economy, the United Kingdom is s t i l l  of importance in that some 20 per cent 
of Swaziland's imports, valued at some R63Q,G00, were derived from this  
source in 1972. These imports consist mainly of e lectr ical  and non­
electr ical  machinery and of transport equipment.
( i i i ) Swaziland's Economic Relations with the non-British 
non-Soutir7\’f r i  can World
Although the promotion and expansion of economic relations with Bri ta in ,
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and to a lesser extent, Black Afr ica ,  constitute the major foci of 
Swaziland's economic foreign policy outside of the Southern African region, 
Swaziland's foreign policy-makers also at t r ibute  importance to the 
establishment of economic contacts with a variety of other international 
actors, who with capital and technology at th e i r  disposal, can, i t  is 
f e l t ,  enhance and promote the domestic developmental process. Policies 
designed to maximise externally-based developmental resources thus go well  
beyond the establishment of economic relationships in the region, on the 
continent and with the former metropole, and this is expressed in a current 
situat ion where Swaziland has established rnd seeks to expand i ts  economic 
interactions, of both a b i la te ra l  and m ult i la tera l  nature, with the
international system at large.
At the b i la tera l  leve l ,  the United States is ,  for  example, an important 
source of investment capital and technical assistance, whilst  Swazi-United 
States trade is also of importance to the Swaziland economy.^ In current
terms, American private investment in Swaziland is concentrated largely in
only two ventures, namely the NEOPAC enterprise (which is p a r t ia l ly  owned 
by the St. Regis Company of New York), and Radio Swazi (which is 80 per 
cent an American venture). The United States is however an important 
source of public capital a id , directed into Swaziland via the Agency for  
International Development, which provided a R1 ,5 mill ion loan for agricultural  
development (1971), which provided a grant of over R70.000 for the establishment 
of SCSB, and which in April 1972, agreed to donate some R300.000 for the 
extension of UBLS f a c i l i t i e s  in Swaziland and Botswana. I t  is also important 
to bear in mind that domestic pressures broi"' ' to bear on United States firms 
to dis-invest in South Afr ica ,  may well .he future to United States
enterprises transferring the ir  a c t iv i t i i  ..aziland, from which they can
s t i l l  take advantage of the lucrative South African market without incurring
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accusations of financing apartheid in South Africa d irec t ly .
Turning to United States technical assistance, this is expressed
through the work of the Peace Corps, and the Agency for International
Development, both of which have participated in a number of local projects.
Members of the Peace Corps have been active in promoting education and health,
54/and have also aided in the codification of Swaziland's laws, whilst  during 
1971 American agr icul tura l is ts  arrived in Swaziland to conduct f e a s ib i l i t y  
studies on agricul tural development projects to be earned out with AID 
finances. Individual American educational experts have participated in the 
Academic Planning Commission of UBLS, whilst such private organisations as 
the American National Baptist Convention, and the African-American In s t i tu te ,  
have contributed to the development of education.
With the development of the Ngwenya mine, Japan has also become of 
importance to the Swaziland economy. In terms of the 14-year contract 
between Anglo-American and the Japanese steel producers of Yawata and Fuji 
Steel ,  i t  is Japan which currently absorbs the bulk of mined iron-ore, and, 
as a result of an extension introduced into the i n i t i a l  contract in 1970, 
i ts  total value has been raised to some R35 mil l ion. Plans have also been 
mooted to fuel Japanese steel mills with Swazi coal, and this should further  
increase the importance of the Japanese market. Japan is in any case an 
important source of private investment, the main venture at present being 
the construction of an electronics assembly plant at a cost of close on 
R1 mill ion. Japanese investor^ are also interested in the exploitation  
of Swaziland's coal resources, and i t  would seem, given the v is i t  to 
Swaziland of representatives of the Toyoda Spinning Company in June 1972, 
the establishment of a local cotton spinning industry.
The encouragement of West German investment and trade is also regarded
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as being of importance in Swaziland's international economic policy. In 
the past, during 1973, West German financiers provided a R1,5 mil l ion loan 
to assist Swazi entrepreneurship, whilst in current terms West German 
investment is involved in the proposed new liqueur industry, end especially,  
in the promotion of Swaziland's tourism potentia l ,  where such German firms 
as Salzgit ter  and Hausch International,  have either planned, or are currently 
involved, in hotel construction a c t i v i t i e s . 55^  I t  should also be mentioned 
that Sa lzg i t ter  has entered into negotiations with Anglo-American regarding 
the establishment of a possible pig-iron plant in Swaziland, whi ls t ,  in what 
was an important breakthrough for Swaziland trade in the European market,
West Germany purchased some 65,000 tons of iron ore during 1970.
Swaziland has also established important economic relations with 
Taiwan. A Sino-Swazi Technical Agreement has in fact been concluded in 
terms of which Swazi cit izens are provided with training in Taiwan, whilst  
Chinese technicians engage in work in Swaziland i t s e l f .  Numerous Swazi 
have in fact availed themselves of scholarships to study at such inst itut ions  
as the Sino-African Technical Co-operation Centre in Taiwan, whilst the 
Chinese have established agricultural missions at flalkerns and in the Shiselweni 
D is t r i c t ,  have sent industrial missions to Swaziland, and have provided both 
personnel and advice on the promotion of small-enterprise industrial a c t iv i ty .  
Nationalist  China is also an important source of capital investment for
Swaziland: i t  i s ,  for example, Taiwanese investment which has backed the local
t e x t i l e  industry, and i t  is Chinese finance which is currently involved in the
construction of a new luxury hotel in the Ezulweni Valley near Mbabane.
Swaziland has also succeeded in promoting a number of lesser international  
economic contacts with a l a n e  number of other states. I ta l ia n  private  
Interests are currently behind the proposed ureaformaldohyde resin plant55/
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and the newly-established Swaziland mushroom industry, whilst the proposed 
ethyl alcohol plant w i l l  involve French capita l .  Denmark has provided a 
R1,5 mill ion loan for the development of telecommunications (in 1972), 
whilst some R1 mill ion has been received from Sweden for educational purposes 
Israel has sent agricultural technicians to Swaziland, and sponsored Swazi who 
wish to study at Is rae l i  technical in st i tu tes ,  whilst Australia has trained 
members of Swaziland's foreign service, under the Special Commonwealth 
African Assistance Plan.
As other small, developing states with l imited economic resources and 
constricted international economic contacts, Swaziland has developed a deep' 
appreciation of the economic advantages of membership of such international  
organisations as can provide the capital and technical resources necessary 
for  rapid social and economic growth. As a consequence the policy of 
maximising externally-located development resources has involved not only 
the establishment of economic relations of a b i la tera l  nature but, addit ional ly ,  
part ic ipation in multinational inst i tu t ions ,  concerned, p a r t ia l ly  or t o t a l l y ,  
with the task of promoting socio-economic modernisation and development.
The f i r s t  of these organisations, most obviously, is the United Nations, 
whose socio-economic a c t iv i t ie s  are seen by Swaziland's policy-makers as 
being of major importance to the local development process.
In current terms, the importance placed on United Nations socio-economic 
a c t iv i t ie s  by Swaziland is manifest in i ts  partic ipat ion in a variety of 
inst i tut ions operating within the United Nations Specialised Agency framework; 
in terms of the International Financial Organisations Act No. 27, 1969,
Swaziland is a member of IMF, IBRD, IFC AND IDA, under the Aviation Act No.
31 of 1968 Swaziland is a subscriber to both the Convention on International  
Civil Aviation and the International A ir  Service Transit Agreement of the
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ICAO. Swaziland has also made i ts  influence f l e t  in UNCTAD deliberations - 
where i t  has supported moves to increase free trade and establish general 
preferential trade agreements - and has participated in a number of UN 
sponsored conferences and conventions, such as the UN Environmental 
Conference held in Stockholm in 1972, where the Swazi delegate, Dr. Gamedze, 
was elected the conference's vice-presidert.
The material returns on the policy of UN involvement, is expressed,
Inter a l ia ,  by the important technical assistance which has been offered to 
Swaziland, by the United Nations in the post-independence period. In the 
area of in frastructural construction, World Health Organisation has been active 
in Swaziland, and has sent personnel to the te r r i to ry  to promote the 
development of health f a c i l i t i e s .  A United Nations-sponsored Regional 
Science Teacher Training Project has been established at Manzini, both 
UNICEF and UNESCO have played a role in the development of education, whilst  
the United Nations Fund for Population Act iv i t ies  has established, equipped 
and staffed a health centre at S U e k i ,  and granted fellowships to Swazi 
nurses. I t  was the United Nations which undertook the i n i t i a l  survey for 
the 15-year programme of developing Swaziland's major r iver  basins, whilst  
the IMF has provided expert advice on the rational and e f f ic ie n t  operation 
of the local f iscal system.
In agriculture and industry, the United Nations, has also f u l f i l l e d  
an important technical assistance function . In the agricultural  sector 
for example, the Rural Development Area Project has been assisted by FAC 
technicians, whilst to f a c i l i t a t e  the collation and dissemination of 
agricultural s ta t i s t ic s ,  a United Nations Agricultural S ta t is t ic ian  has 
been located at Mbabane. In the development of Swaziland's industrial  
potentia l,  at the level of research and t ra in ing,  the UNDP has undertaken 
a major fe a s ib i l i ty  study on mineral development, and, through such
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inst i tut ions as the United Nations S ta t is t ica l  Training Centre, provided 
f a c i l i t i e s  for the training of local s ta t is t ic ia n s .  Advice is often 
supplied through the United Nations Industrial Advisory and Consultancy 
Project,  to o f f ic ia ls  of the NI DC. The United Nations has moreover played 
a leading role in the development of Swaziland's l ight industrial sector: 
i t  was the United Notions which established the Swaziland Handicrafts Industry 
in 1967, and i t  was the UNDP in conjunction with the ILO which subsequently 
created the Project for Small Enterprises and Handicrafts Development, which 
was to lead to the establishment of SEDCO. In current terms SEDCO works 
closely with the ILO and UNDP, which supply experts in the small-enterprise 
f i e l d ,  basic equipment for enterprises of this nature, and technical, 
managerial and financial advice. I t  was also in terms of this operation tha t ,  
for  example, the ILO established a Tannery Training and Leatherv/orks Centre 
at I ' lat ikulu  in March 1972.
Swaziland's concern with the socio-economic a c t iv i t ies  of the United 
Nations is also underwritten by the a b i l i t y  of the United Nations to finance 
development projects, and, in effect ive practice, the United Nations has in 
the past injected considerable caoital into Swaziland's developing economy.
As early as 1963 the IBRD loaned R3 m il l ion  for the construction of the 
Swaziland e le c t r ic i ty  system, an extension of R1,95 mill ion was acquired 
from the same source during 1967, and in 1969 a further R2 mil l ion;  the 
IBRD was to finance the construction of the Edwaleni Dam, and has continued 
to play an important f inancial role in the further development of Swaziland's 
hydro-electric resources. The World Bank Group has also been involved in the 
capitalising of road development, whilst in December 1971 i t  was announced 
that World Bank finances w to be employed in the construction of Swaziland's
thermal power s t a t i o n . , ' h e  United Nations, through UNDP and ILO has 
also played a primary role * +he development of smal1-enterprise l ight
industry; thus during 1971 the UNDF was to underwrite SEDCO to the value 
of R635,000 spread over a three-year period, whilst  in May 1972 i t  was further  
announced that the United Nations would provide SEDCO with a further 1 mill ion  
dollars over a further three year period. Over and beyond th is ,  the United 
Nations Fund for Population Act iv i t ies  has provided funds for the construction 
of rural c lin ics and health centres , whilst UNDP, UNICEF and WFP have a ll  
agreed to make small sums avai lable during 1973-76 for f inancial and commodity 
assistance. The UNDP has in fact established a permanent representative in 
Swaziland, and i t  is expected that during 1973-76, UNDP aid w i l l  be in the 
region of some 5,7 mill ion U.S. d o l l a r s . ^
In the promotion of her international economic contacts Swaziland has
also sought to avail  herself of the resources of regional in s t i tu t io n s ,
outside of South Africa, both on and outside of the African continent. In
recent years, Swazi foreign policy-makers have repeatedly expressed interest
in associate membership of the European Common Market, and indeed, by
1971 some sort of accord on this matter seems to have been reached, which
has further stimulated Swazi interest in this important European market as
an exporter of development resoui ces. Insofar as mult i la teral organisations
on the African continent i t s e l f  are concerned, Swazi policy-makers have in
the past sought to promote Swazi membership of the East African Community,
59 /which in turn has expressed an interest in Swazi membership , and 
Swaziland is in fact a member of the African Development Bank, which she 
joined in 1971, and which in the subsequent year provided a loan of close 
on R1 mill ion for the development of Swaziland's telecommunications system. 
Mention should also f in a l ly  be made of such non-governmental international  
organisations, such as the Lutheran World Federation, which has established 
a farm training school, and whose work is seen as a useful complement to the 
technical and financial a c t iv i t ie s  of those international inter-governmental
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inst i tut ions with whom Swaziland has established contacts in the past.
B. Swaziland as an International Pol i t ica l  Actor
Swaziland's foreign policy seeks the realisation of po l i t ica l  as 
well as economic goals : as such Swaziland functions in the international  
system in a po l i t ica l  as well as an economic capacity.
(a) Swaziland as a Defensive Pol i t ica l  Actor : Policies Designed to 
Reduce the' Role of Exogenous Pol i t ica l  Influences in the System
In the f i r s t  instance i t  has for example been pointed out that 'a 
principal aim of government since independence has been to create the 
inst i tut ions and instruments for the more e f fect ive  guidance and control 
of the economy'. I t  is this orientation which underwrites the so-called 
' loca l isat ion '  policies in Swazi po l i t ica l  l i f e  i . e .  policies spec if ica l ly  
designed to concurrently enhance the role of the indigenous Swazi in the 
local processes of socio-economic growth, and to red"ce the po l i t ica l  
influence which can potentia lly  be wielded by exogenous ent it ies  as a 
result of the ir  part ic ipation in the Swazi economic system.
The local isation policies, which are analogous to 'Africanisat ion'  
policies employed in other parts of the continent in the consolidation of * 
p o l i t ica l  independence, are expressed in various areas of economic l i f e .
In the case of foreign investment, for  example, while the general demands 
of economic development have prompted the Swazi government to encourage 
foreign private in v e s tm e n t^ , there exists in government circles today, 
an acute real isation of the need to regulate external capital inflows and 
to promote greater partic ipation by local inhabitants in the direction of 
industrial commercial and mining a c t iv i ty .  I t  has been clearly pointed out, 
by Mr. Khumalo, for example, that while the Swazi Government desires rapid
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industrial development in pr inciple i t  is committed to the view that this
should take place in a manner which 'w i l l  enable a smooch evolution to take
place at the rate decided by the leaders of the country ', and in a manner
which 'w i l l  preserve the independence of the nation' The King himself
has emphasised that investors must be prepared to accept a policy of
'partnership for mutual benefi t '  the Second National Development Plan
has identi f ied as a major objective of policy 'increase in the degree of
national control over, and part ic ipation in ,  foreign private investments' ,
whilst  even in moderate government circles disquiet has occasionally been
expressed at the 'economic colonisation' of the newly-independent Swazi 
64/state. The result of these sentiments is moreover manifest in a number 
of statutory devices which l im i t  the freedom of operation of foreign 
investment and seek to widen local participation in how external capital  
is to be allocated and used. Provisions have been made to place local 
inhabitants on corporate management boards, to allow for the purchase of 
shareholdings by local public and private e n t i t ie s ,  to promote jo in t  action 
between government and foreign investment in the establishment and operation 
of foreign-backed enterprises, and to allow for government supervision of 
production and output. Swazis are in fact today on the directing board 
of Mhlume Sugar, whilst  Turnwrights, NEOPAC and the Royal Swazi Hotel group 
have set aside large shareholdings for local participants. A number of 
foreign-backed ventures have been incorporated , . Swaziland, including the 
Havelock Asbestos M i n e , ^  whilst the NIDC is an important shareholder in 
a number of major ventures, including Usutu Pulp, the Swaziland Iron Ore 
Development Corporation and Swaziland Laboratories. In the tourist  industry,  
the government has holdings in the Royal Swazi Hotel group, the government 
owns half of the major private wholesale company in Swaziland, and has 
minority interests in several other commercial enterprises. F in a l ly ,
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SEDCO (which is specif ica l ly  directed towards promoting locally-backed 
small-enterprise industrial development) and the SCSB^ (which was 
specif ica l ly  established to promote domestic investment) constitute two 
further expressions of the concern with regulating foreign investment capita l.
The desire of the Swaziland government o control the inflow of 
foreign financial resources is paralleled a1 ‘ rc personnel l e v e l , where i t  
is conscious government policy to maximise the n miber of responsible 
economic and administrative positions oren to Swazi national, and in so 
doing to reduce the dependency of the economy on imported technical sk i l ls  
and advice. The policy of labour localisat ion has in fact been pursued 
with some vigour since independence; in February 1970 the King was to call  
for the promotion of labour localisation policies 'as rapidly as possib1e,67|/, 
whilst  the Second National Development Plan emphasises 'the highest rate of 
localisat ion consistent with the maintenance of e f f ic iency1 and envisions ' f u l l  
localisat ion throughout the economy* within the next decade.®^ S ta tu tor i ly -  
sanctioned localisat ion committees have been established by the government to 
accelerate the localisat ion e f fo r t  in both the public and private sectors of 
the economy, and, i t  is as a result of these combined pressures and a c t iv i t ies  
that ,  by the end of 1972, some 93 per cent of public service positions were 
held by indigenous Black members of the population. *n the private sector,  
government sensit iv i ty  to White commercial and industrial opinion has 
prevented comparable results from being achieved, whilst i t  is inevitable  
that the rate of labour localisation must decline in future years i f  
residual posts of a high-level technical nature do not lend themselves to 
local s k i l ls  and human r e s o u rc e s .^  There seems l i t t l e  doubt however that  
Swaziland government policy is strongly oriented towards the ideal of labour 
localisat ion in a l l  sectors of economic l i f e  : both private employers and such 
public bodies as the Public Service Commission have been repeatedly urged to 
emphasise government employment polic ies, and the Government is currently
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involved in a rapid expansion of training f a c i l i t i e s  in the interests of 
complete localisat ion of the public sector in the short-term future.
The implementation of policies of the localisat ion brand relate not 
only to governmental regulation of the a c t iv i t ies  of foreign capital and to the 
promotion of wider employment opportunities for the local populace, but, in 
those societ ies, where national lands are either foreign-owned, or owned by 
an expatriate population, encompass issues concerned with local partic ipat ion  
in land ownership as well .  The localisat ion of land ownership thus becomes 
integrated into that category of policies designed to reduce the penetration 
of the system by exogenous forces. This would indeed seem to be part icular ly  
pertinent in the Swaziland case, given the fact that in 1971 some 2,224,000 
acres of the te r r i to ry 's  4,290,000 acres of land were owned by the Swazi 
Nation, v i r tu a l ly  a l l  of the remainder being owned by the te r r i to ry 's  
minority European community. in percentage terms this means that 2,3 per 
cent of the population own some 44 per cent of the land. This situation  
has moreover not substantially changed since the end of the Second World 
War (and the result is expressed in the fact that ,  in the post-independence 
period, the land distr ibution question has become a fundamentally important 
issue in Swazi po l i t ica l  l i f e  and in the process whereby the Swaziland 
government seeks to in ject  the status of po l i t ica l  independence with 
substance and meaning.
The po l i t ica l  importance of the land ownership issue is however not 
only a reflect ion of the maldistributed character of land apportionment : 
i ts  po l i t ica l  salience is in fact reinforced by a number of other factors.
In the f i r s t  place, agricultural development, part icular ly  that involving 
the implementation of regional development plans, is made v i r tu a l ly  
impossible by the fragmented pattern of ownership, with communally owned
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Swazi Nation land being mixed in at random with freehold land throughout
the te r r i to ry .  In the second place, considerable population pressures
exist  within the Swazi-owned areas, where, in terms of the 1966 Census,
concentration was in the region of 75 persons per square mile, v is-a-vis
27 persons per square mile in, what are euphemistically called the 'alienated
s e t t le r  areas'.  In the third place, a considerable discrepancy exists in
production levels in the freehold, and largely European-owned areas, and
those in the Swazi Nation areas : in 1966-67 for example, Swazi Nation
land produced some R8 mill ion in agricultural exports, v is-a-vis RIB mill ion
in the case of the freehold areas, and, although this may re f lect  the higher
state c f  technology in the European areas - which, for example contain 96 per
cent of the te r r i to ry 's  i r r igated lands - i t  nonetheless means that the
majority of the population is sustained by low productivity lands, whilst
the high productivity land provides for the l ivelihood of a small minority of
the population. In the fourth place, vast tracts of land in the freehold
European areas are held purely for speculative purposes, or by absentee
landlords who have no interest in the agricul tural  development of the ir
property: in 1960, for example, there were no farm owners or managers l iving
on 35 per cent of the freehold propert ies. ^  With rises in land prices
over the last few years, many European farmers have become increasingly
interested in f inancial rather than agricultural considerations, large
tracts of potentially  high-yield land have been lo f t  fallow, and this has
resulted in a situation which is generally recognised as being disadvantageous
72/to Swaziland's agricultural development.
This combination of factors have caused Swaziland's policy-makers to 
regard the issue of land reform as being of v i ta l  importance to the 
development of Swaziland's economy. They have also come increasingly to an
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appreciation of the po l i t ica l  implications of a situation where a minority
community, through ownership of v i r tu a l ly  ha l f  of the te r r i to ry 's  land,
can exercise influence in the dynamics of the state vastly disproportionate
to i ts  numbers. In practice moreover, the po l i t ic isa t ion  of the land
ownership questions, is stimulated and compounded by two other factors. The one
is the historical ly -rooted po l i t ica l  importance of land ownerhsip issues in
the Swazi past. The very f i r s t  act undertaken by Sobhuza following his
assession to the throne in 1921 was to challenge the va l id i ty  of the 1907
Proclamation, which ef fect ive ly  barred the Swazi from ownership of two-
73/thirds of the te rr i to ry :  Throughout the colonial period i t  was the
question of land ownership which was to dominate the pattern of Swazi- 
British po l i t ica l  relationships, i t  was this matter which was to play a 
disturbing role in independence negotiations, and i t  was to be matters 
pertaining to land ownership, more than any others which were to be 
responsible for Swaziland's po l i t ic isa t ion  in the years preceding the 
po l i t ica l  ' t a k e - o f f  of the te r r i to ry  at the beginning of the 1960's.74^
Under these circumstances, land reform designed to enhance the role of the 
indigenous Swazi in the pattern of ownership, was to become deeply integrated 
into the scale of Swazi po l i t ica l  values, to become closely associated with 
the demand for po l i t ica l  freedom and independence, and to become viewed as a 
major variable in the capacity of the system to function in a self-determining 
manner.
The po l i t ica l  relevance of the land reform issue is not only bolstered 
by historic sanction, but additionally by the fact that a considerable 
proportion of non-Swazi-owned land is owned not by European cit izens of 
Swaziland, but by South Africans who have l i t t l e  interest in the economic 
development of their  land, situated across the border, in an alien state.
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From the p o l i t ica l  point of view. South African ownership of large tracts 
of Swazi national land, is seen to constitute a significant and direct  
i f  unconscious intrusion into the sovereign and independent status of the 
Swazi state. This symbolic variable in combination with the histor ic  
concern with extending Swazi ownership of Swazi land, has let .0  the feeling 
in current terms, that what is at stake is not simply a question of 
agricultural productivity and economic development, but, more fundamentally, 
the po l i t ica l  independence of the Swazi state. Pol it ics and history have 
thus operated to reinforce economics, and, at the operational l e v e l , the 
result has been expressed by the adoption and implementation of a number of  
strategies specif ica l ly  designed to increase Swazi ownership of the land 
resources of the t e r r i to ry ,  and in doing so, to reduce the influence of 
foreign land-owners in the dynamics of the state.
The policies of land localisat ion have ranged from government attempts 
to purchase European freehold land to the negotiation of arrangements with 
the former metropole for f inancial assistance for the land repurchase 
programme. Thus the £6 mill ion Bri t ish aid agreed to in 1970, made specific 
provision for some £1,5 mill ion to be allocated to government purchase of 
'a l ienated' lands over a 3-year period. The reluctance on the part of the 
Swazi government to outr ightly  nationalise certain segments of land, and 
the irmense financial demands of the land repurchase endeavour, have however, 
seriously l imited the effectiveness of the programme. The government has 
in fact come to appreciate that the large-scale transference of ownership is 
not a realisable short-term goal. At best, the further alienation of 
Swazi land can be controlled, and i t  is this motivation which underlies the 
controversial Land Speculation Control B i l l  of 1972, in terms of which, with 
certain l imited exceptions, a l l  land owned by non-citizens must be registered,  
and any transactions in such land must be approved by specially-created
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governmental authori t ies. Ultimate decisions regarding the disposal of 
non-citizen-owned land is made the prerogative of a Land Control Board, 
composed of government o f f i c i a l s , and specif ica l ly  responsible not to the 
High Court of Swaziland, but to a government Land Control Appeal Board.
I t  is important to emphasise that this B i l l  makes no provision for the 
state expropriation of lands : i t  does however establish s t r i c t  l imitations  
within which the purchase and sale of Swazi lands must be effected,  and, 
subject to a number of clearly-defined exemptions, specif ically  seeks to 
control such land transactions as would involve the alien elements 
economically active in the Swazi state. As such, the Land Speculation 
Control B i l l ,  constitutes a direct and conscious attempt on the part of the 
Swaziland government, to l im i t  the ro le ,  and control the a c t iv i t i e s ,  of 
external economic influences whose part ic ipation in the Swazi economy is 
occasioned by virtue of that economy's demand for labour and s k i l l s .
The B i l l  is thus an integral part of that category of policies reflect ing  
the concern of Swaziland's decision-makers with the economically penetrable 
nature of the Swaziland system.
( b) Swaziland as an In ternational Pol i t ica l  Activ ist
I t  is however of fundamental importance to emphasise that Swaziland's 
international po l i t ica l  action is not purely passive in the sense that i t  
merely reacts to stimuli originating in the external environment in a 
'blocking' manner. On the contrary, there are elements of foreign policy 
which are d is t inc t ly  a c t iv is t  and essentia lly  outgoing in an in i t ia to ry  
rather than responsive manner.
( i )  Mult i la teral Po l i t ica l  Action : Swaziland's Relations with
‘ W e ro Y W F W g F T a Tsion"TeFFTtoFTes------------------------------
At the regional level such policies are expressed in the establishment
1 ■
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and promotion of po l i t ica l  relations with the former High Commission 
te r r i to r ie s  of Botswana and Lesotho. These policies are spec if ica l ly  designed 
to compensate for the part icu lar ly  disadvantageous strategic situation in 
which Swaziland finds herself.
I t  is important to note that  in current terms the idea of some sort of 
federal arrangement between Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana, is ,  in Swaziland, 
not seriously contemplated, h istor ic  t ies notwithstanding. In fact Swaziland 
does not even have formal diplomatic relations with either Lesotho or Botswana, 
and this suggests that there exis t  in the BLS group-relationship, certain  
differences which detract from the coalescence of these states, even though 
the tendency has developed for them to be considered as a single po l i t ica l  
and analytical unit.  In the case of Swaziland in par t icu lar ,  i ts  differences 
with Botswana and Lesotho are of an economic, po l i t ica l  and tactical nature.
In the economic f i e ld ,  there is currently very l i t t l e  in the way of economic 
intercourse between Swaziland and these two states: in fact an element of 
economic competition exists between Swaziland and Botswana, both of which 
seek to tap the Zambian beef-import market. Differences also exist at the 
p o l i t ic a l  leve l ,  where po l i t ica l  developments in Lesotho and Botswana •• 
witnessing as they have a radical decline in the po l i t ica l  role of t radit ional  
authorit ies - have generated some crit ic ism on the part of Swaziland's 
powerful t rad i t io n a l is t  ruler.  F ina l ly ,  in a l l  three te r r i to r ie s ,  and in 
Swaziland no less, there exists a strong be l ie f  in the greater po l i t ica l  
productivity of diverting time and resources to fostering Black African 
continental t ie s ,  rather than p o l i t ica l  linkages between similar ly  'coptive* 
states in Southern Africa.
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Despite these negative influences however, there has tended to develop 
within policy-making circles of a l l  three BLS states, an increased appreciation 
of the poss ib i l i t ies  of co-operative action. I t  has for example become 
increasingly recognised that  the differences between the BLS states are 
complemented by certain common interests which can serve to underwrite 
concerted action. In the f i r s t  place, a l l  three states are developing 
states, and in each, the real isation of socio-economic goals is intimately 
related to the South African connection. There is also a common heritage 
of Brit ish colonial administration which has conditioned administrative  
attitudes and procedures in a l ike  direction, and which has, in a l l  three 
te r r i to r ie s ,  fostered a profound resistance . 0  the possib i l i t ies  of South 
African incorporation. There is ,  f in a l l y ,  a certain consonancy of po l i t ica l  
values - part icular ly  those relating to race relationships - a common 
antipathy to the current South African po l i t ica l  system, and a common desire 
for social and po l i t ica l  change in the South African society.
Factors such as these have induced Swaziland's policy-makers to give 
somewhat more 'on to closer po l i t ica l  relations with Lesotho and
Botswana. Thi,  in turn has led to some signif icant  changes in Swaziland's 
histor l ly-rooted policy of isolation from i ts  two counterparts in 
Southern Africa. In 1970, for example. President Khama was invited to 
Swaziland to deliver  the address at the UBLS annual graduation ceremony, 
and in 1971 President Khama met Prime Minister Dhlamini, and a jo in t  
communique was issued which emphasised 'the closest possible consultation
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on a l l  matters of mutual in te re s t1 and a common commitment to the 'eventual 
triumph of self-determination, human dignity and equality through Southern 
A fr ic a 1. 75  ^ During 1970 the Queen Mother of Lesotho was to v is i t  Swaziland, 
during 1972 Botswana's Acting High Commissioner for Nigeria, Mr. Udoh, 
vis ited Swaziland, whilst during 1973 King Moshoeshoe of Lesotho was a guest 
at the Fif th Swaziland Independence Day celebrations held at Lobamba.
This interchange of prestigious individuals has been accompanied by 
increased substantive functional co-operation between Swaziland and Lesotho 
and Botswana respectively. In the educational f i e l d , the Swaziland 
Government has encouraged Swazi part icipat ion in the a c t iv i t ies  of UBLS,7^  
and has looked favourably at the development of educational f a c i l i t i e s  at the 
Luyengo campus, which currently hosts a variety of conferences and symposia 
involving students and o f f ic ia ls  from Lesotho and Botswana.777 In 1972 a 
Swazi delegation v is ited Botswana to negotiate the establishment of a regular 
Swaziland-Botswana a i r  service. More substantially however, increased 
personnel interchange and functional co-operation has la id  the ground-work 
for inter-governmental po l i t ica l  co-operation at a number of various levels.
In this regard i t  is of importance to note t h a t , as ye t ,  no formal inst i tut ions  
for  consultation, least of a l l  policy co-ordination, have been established by 
the BLS group, and that under the circumstance, po l i t ica l  co-operation is of 
an ad hoc issue-based nature. Within this framework however, Swaziland has 
concluded an extradition agreement with Lesotho (which has been used on a 
number of occasions in the past against 'undesirable' members of the Lesotho 
opposition). Swaziland, along with Botswana and Lesotho, is a member of the 
Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations and the Commonwealth, and 
on a number of occasions - the most notable being the promulgation of a Joint  
Memorandum to the OAU in 1969 - l iaison leading to the adoption of common 
strategies in these international inst i tu t ions ,  has taken place. This is
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no less true, and considerably more evident within the Southern African 
inst i tut ional  framework, where in 1969, the BLS states presented a united 
front to South Africa in a call for  the renegotiation of the Customs 
Union agreement. The success which this mult i la teral venture achieved 
has served to stimulate, in Swaziland as well as in Lesotho and Botswana, 
a recognition of the poten t ia l i t ies  of co-operative action. Swaziland's 
decision to participate in the establishment of a jo in t  commission to 
investigate BLS part icipation in the Rand monetary area, during 1971, is a 
further indication of the growing emphasis placed by Swaziland's policy­
makers on mult i la teralised action by the small Black states of the Southern 
African region.78//
( i i )  Culture and Po l i t ica l  Ident if icat ion : Swaziland and Black 
" A fr ica
Swaziland's concern with broadening i ts  pattern of international 
p o l i t ica l  contacts is also reflected in i ts  po l i t ica l  relations outside 
of Southern Afr ica, on the African continent as a whole. Indeed, given 
the ra c ia l ,  cultural and experiential a f f in i t ie s  which exist between Swaziland's 
policy-makers and those of the Black African states, this part icular set of 
po l i t ica l  relations is vested with important symbolic value, which adds to 
the importance attributed to the goal of expanding Swaziland's international 
po l i t ica l  contacts as a whole.
In practice however, Swaziland's desire to establish po l i t ica l  
communication with Black Africa, and i ts  attempt to project i t s e l f  to Black 
Africa as an independent and fraternal po l i t ica l  actor in continental 
developments has been fraught with considerable d i f f i c u l t i e s  in the past.
This reflects the fact  that in Black African perceptions, and even in more 
moderate Black African po l i t ica l  c i rc les ,  Swaziland has been regarded as a
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manipulable and obedient c l ien t-s ta te  of rac ist  South Africa. Past
relationships between Swaziland and the rest of the African contininent
North of the Zambesi have, unti l  recently, been characterised by a strong
defamatory element in terms of which, as Mr. Simon Nxumalo has put i t ,  Black
79/Africa 'has called us stooges, sell-outs and other insulting names'.
The task confronting Swaziland's policy-makers in establishing channels of 
po l i t ic a l  communication to Black A f r ic a , has, as a result  been perennially 
dominated by the attempt to promote an altered image of  Swaziland, i . e .  of 
Swaziland as a p o l i t i c a l ly  independent Black African state . I t  was this 
factor which was to underlie the f i r s t  s ignif icant  po l i t ic a l  contacts made 
with Black A fr ica , during the few years immediately preceding independence, 
when numerous important Swazi dignitaries vis ited the newly-independent 
states of the African continent. Towards the end of 1964, for example,
Mr. Simon Nxumalo v is ited Central and East Afr ica ,  Ghana and Ethiopia at  
the behest of the King himself, whilst  in 1965, Dr. Msibi and Prince Makhosini 
undertook extended v is i ts  to Ghana, Nigeria and a number of other states.
Their concern was specif ica l ly  to promote a new image for Swaziland, ^nd this 
concern, upon which the success of Swaziland's po l i t ica l  contacts with Black 
Africa depends, has continued to be an important variable in Swazi-Black 
African relations throughout the post-independence period.
Personal contacts, alterations in Black African po l i t ica l  leadership, 
Swazi-Black African economic contacts, and the demonstrable support given 
to a variety of causes close to Black Afr ica 's  heart, by Swaziland, have 
combined to underwrite the success of Swaziland's dialogue with Black Africa.  
In current terms, Swaziland has, to a considerable degree, succeeded in 
presenting herself as Black, African and independent, and in doing so, in 
breaking out of the atmosphere of continental po l i t ica l  isolation in which 
she found herself in the early s ix t ies .  Swaziland has managed to impress
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upon Black Africa both the d i f f i c u l t i e s  inherent in her geographic and 
economic position and her commitment to the Pan-African cause. The result  
is expressed today in the fact that Swaziland has diplomatic relations with 
many African states, including the East African states, Malawi, Zambia and 
Ethiopia. I t  is expressed in the fact that on his 1969 state v is i t  to 
Zambia, Prime Minister Dhlamini, was lauded by Dr. Kaunde as 'a great son 
of A f r i c a ' ,  and that similar accolades were heaped upon King Sobhuza as a 
stalwart upholder of human values and the principles of humanity.
The nature of Swaziland's po l i t ica l  communication with Black Africa is 
also reflected in the fact that Swaziland has been accepted as a sovereign 
and equal member of the Organisation of African Unity, in which, despite 
frequent cr i t ic ism, especially in the early years, i t  has played a constructive 
partic ipatory role. Swaziland's policy-makers have in fact always placed 
considerable emphasis on the need to supplement b i la te ra l  in ter -s ta te  contacts 
with membership of mult i la tera l  intern tional organisations and this has been 
no less the case with regard to Africa, where membership of the Organisation 
of African Unity is not only viewed as being of symbolic significance, but 
as an important means to counteract Swaziland's strategic isolation from 
the Black African continent. The OAU, as a major regional organisation, is 
also viewed as an important guarantor of the sovereign independence of its 
member states. I t  was this combination of factors which led to Prince Makhosini 
and Dr. Msibi being specif ica l ly  instructed, during 1965, to make contact with 
the Organisation, to present Swaziland's case, and to seek the admission of 
Swaziland to the organisation as a ful ly -f ledged African member. The 
problems confronting Swaziland reflected those of her b i la tera l  re la t ions,  
namely that her c red ib i l i ty  as an independent Black state was in question.
In the case of the OAU moreover, these problems were compounded by the 
a c t iv i t ie s  of Swaziland opposition party leaders, who fostered the view that
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the Imbokodvo was no more than an extension of South Africa on Swazi te r r i to ry .  
The Swazi delegation was however to make headway, and as early as 1966, for  
example, seems to have been able to win some support. The Joint Memorandum, 
submitted by the BLS states, outlining the ir  part icular  problems, was 
generally we.l received, and as such demonstrative of the headway that  
Swaziland was making.
In the post-independence period , Swaziland has further succeeded in 
establishing her position in the ranks of the OAU. Seme radical elements 
continue to adhere to the view that the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress 
constitutes a freedom movement concerned with the overthrow of the South 
African-backed Imbokodvo regime: yet in general Swaziland's policy-makers 
have been able to establish workable po l i t ica l  relations with the African 
mult i la teral body, where Swaziland is today recognised as a valid and 
independent Black African po l i t ica l  actor. The state of po l i t ica l  relations  
is reflected in the part ic ipation of Swaziland in OAU a c t iv i t ie s  and 
operations. Swaziland has regularly attended OAU surrnit meetings (such 
as the 1972 Rabat Conference) and high-level ministerial conferences (such 
as the 20th Ministeria l Council Meeting held in Addis Ababa in February 1973), 
and she has also sent delegates to OAU-sponsored seminars on such functional 
matters as local administration, university education and home economics.
The election of Swaziland as Rapporteur at the 20th Ministerial Council 
Meeting is indicative of its  new found p o l i t ica l  status in Black African 
c i rc le s .80^
( i i i ) The Establishment of International Po l i t ica l  Contacts : 
^Swaziland and the Global System
Outside of continental A f r ic a , Swaziland's pattern of p o l i t ic a l  relations  
is manifest in her maintenance of po l i t ica l  contacts with her former metropole, 
the establishment of diplomatic t ies with a f a i r l y  large number of individual
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states , and Swaziland's part ic ipation in the po l i t ica l  a c t iv i t ies  of the 
United Nations Organisation.
The important post-independence economic role of Bri tain in the 
Swaziland system, has consolidated and underwritten Swaziland's maintenance 
of cordial po l i t ica l  t ies with the United Kingdom. I t  is however of 
significance to note that whilst  Swazi-Brit ish relations have in the last  
few years been generally close, th e i r  intensity has somewhat declined, and 
there are considerable grounds to believe that this pattern w i l l  prevail 
into the near future. Swaziland's foreign policy-makers continue to regard 
t ies with Bri tain as being of economic and p o l i t ic a l  importance : economically, 
Britain can provide substantial amounts of capital and know-how for  
Swaziland's socio-economic development, whilst p o l i t i c a l l y ,  she is seen as an 
in ternationally  important guarantor of Swaziland's independent po l i t ica l  status.  
There are however, a number of outstanding issues which contrast with , and 
balance the po l i t ica l  and economic rationale for closer Swazi-Brit ish t ies.
In the f i r s t  place, Swaziland has continued to regard Bri tain as responsible 
for  the alienation of Swazi lands, and has adopted the position that Br i ta in 's  
obligation to maximise Swazi land-ownership has not been eliminated by the 
formal grant of po l i t ica l  independence: the issue of land-ownership thus
formed a dominant part of formal negotiations held between Swaziland and 
Britain during 1968 and 1970. Secondly, Swaziland has perceived an element 
of discrimination to exist in the Brit ish aid pattern to the former High 
Commission Terr i tor ies ,  and has, as a resu lt ,  pressed for a greater  
proportion of this aid to be diverted to Swaziland than Brit ish policy­
makers are prepared to allow. At the p o l i t ica l  1 vel moreover, Swaziland 
has seriously c r i t ic ised  two aspects cf Bri t ish policy towards Southern 
Africa: namely, Bri ta in 's  in a b i l i ty  to impose majority rule in Rhodesia,
and the tendency of some British governments to continue to supply arms to
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South Africa. This la t t e r  issue was to be a dominant element in Prime 
Minister Dhlamini's speech to the Commonwealth Prime Minister's conference 
in 1971.
The passage of time has succeeded in blunting the land ownership issue 
as a negative factor in Swazi-British rela t ions, whilst  tn<_ important 
contributions of Bri t ish aid to Swaziland's economic development in the last  
few years has reduced the salience of the economic aid question. The 
refusal of Bri ta in 's  Labour government to sanction South African arms 
sales has further improved Swazi-British po l i t ica l  re la t ions, although 
the Rhodesian issue remains outstanding. What is however of major 
importance in current terms is the fact that Brit ish relations with 
Swaziland cannot be conceived of apart from Bri t ish policy towards Southern 
Africa as a whole, and that in this regard recent years have witnessed a 
pattern of gradual disengagement in terms of which the United Kingdom is 
seeking to l im i t  i ts  responsibil i t ies in the region as fa r  as is possible.
In the case of Swazi-Brit ish relations this orientation towards withdrawal 
is reflected in economic terms, where Brit ish aid and trade with Swaziland, 
whilst s t i l l  of major importance, has s ign if icant ly  decreased in the last  
few years. At the po l i t ica l  level this has led to the feeling on the part 
of Swazi policy-makers that Bri tain  has neither the inclination nor a b i l i t y  
to continue to f u l f i l  a v i ta l  role in Afr ica ,  and that as such the r e l i a b i l i t y  
and importance of Swazi-Brit ish relations must be viewed in decreasing terms. 
Bri t ish entry into the European Common Market, which w i l l  deprive Swaziland 
trade of important markets, (part icu lar ly  the sugar market) has only served 
to reinforce Swazi doubts on this matter. Bri tain  has of course requested 
the EEC that special trading privileges between herself and the Commonwealth 
African states be maintained unti l  renewal of the Yaounde Convention in 1975, 
whilst Swaziland has been specif ica l ly  assured that the EEC wi l l  continue to
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admit large quantities of Swazi sugar even a f ter  the expiry of the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in 1974. This has however, not allayed the 
currently growing Swazi view that po l i t ica l  relations with he United Kingdom 
are not quite as valuable as has been the case in the past.
Under these circumstances i t  has become necessary to supplement 
Swazi-British relations with as wide a range of p o l i t ica l  contacts, 
bi la tera l  and m u l t i la te r a l ,  as is possible. As some sort of a lternative  
to the United Kingdom, Swaziland's policy-makers place emphasis on expanding 
and improving relations with the United States, which i t  is f e l t  has a direct  
interest in promoting Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana as mult i - rac ia l  
alternatives in Southern Africa. Currently, the United States is represented 
at the ambassadoral leve l ,  (by a BLS ambassador stationed in Gaborone), by a 
Peace Corps contingent, and by the Office of the Southern African Regional 
Act iv i t ies  Co-ordination (OSARAC) which has moved from Lusaka to Mbabane in 1971.
Swaziland has also established b i - la te ra l  p o l i t ica l  relations with a 
number of other states. In May 1972, for example, diplomatic relations were 
established with Sweden, this being followed by the establishment of Swazi- 
Swiss diplomatic contacts in May, and the a r r iv a l ,  in December, of an Israel i  
charge d 'a f fa ires  (who is also responsible for Botswana and Lesotho).
Diplomatic relations also exist between Swaziland and l/est Germany ('vhich has 
a roving ambassador in Malawi) and between Swaziland and Taiwan, South Korea, 
Japan, Iran, Austria and the Netherlands. Swaziland also has diplomatic 
missions stationed in Belgium, Canada and France. F ina l ly ,  Swaziland has 
established p o l i t ica l  relations with Portugal, which is regarded as a useful 
po l i t ica l  counterweight to South Africa in the region : Portugal was in fact
the f i r s t  state a f te r  the United Kingdom to establish ambassadorial relations  
with Swaziland a f te r  independence, and on numerous occasions since then 
important Portuguese o f f ic ia ls  have visited the te r r i to ry ,  ( including he
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Portuguese foreign minister,  Mr. Rui. Patr ic io ,  in March 1973). Swazi- 
Portuguese relations have also been reinforced by a number of Swazi-Portuguese 
conventions, including one on the Swaziland Railroad, and one on the elimination 
of visa restr ict ions on movements between Swaziland and Mozambique.
At the mult i la tera l  leve l ,  Swaziland's foreign policy-makers,as is 
the case with the policy-makers of a l l  small s ta tes , a t t r ibute  great 
importance to Swaziland's membership of the United Nations. Participat ion  
by Swaziland in United Nations po l i t ica l  a c t iv i t i e s ,  in fact pre-dates the 
achievement of independence : during this period the United Nations was 
frequently used by those intent on achieving the decolonisation of Swaziland 
and the attainment of independent rule . As early as 1963, John Nquku of 
the SPP attended meetings of the United Nations 4th Committee (on Non- 
Self-Governing Terr i tor ies )  to demand United Nations intervention against 
British ru le ,  whilst in subsequent years United Nations action on a variety  
of issues related to the Swaziland independence struggle was demanded.
In the post-independence period, Swaziland's partic ipat ion in United 
Nations po l i t ica l  a c t iv i t ie s  are no longer characterised by attempts to 
mobilise international support for the domestic l iberation struggle. Yet 
membership of the United Nations is seen not only as a v i ta l  symbol of 
Swaziland's independent po l i t ica l  status, but more substantially as an 
important international guarantor of that status. Insofar as Swaziland's 
policy-makers are concerned, partic ipat ion in the United Nations po l i t ica l  
system allows Swaziland to project i t s e l f  into the international community, 
to ar t icu la te  its  views and opinions before an international audience, and to 
establish workable p o l i t ica l  relationships with a variety of other actors in 
the international system. Reciprocal l y , to the degree that Swaziland engages 
in such a c t iv i t ies  and is seen to be doing so, the international community
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becomes, in a sense, sensitised to the existence of the t e r r i to r y ,  and 
involved in the maintenance of i ts  sovereign status. In these terms 
therefore, the United Nations constitutes an important international mechanism 
to be employed in counteracting the effects of Swaziland's strategic and 
p o l i t ica l  is o la t io n .® ^
( i v ) The Promption of Group Po l i t ica l  Values : Swaziland as a 
' Regional "Actor
As a result of racial a f f i n i t i e s ,  the re la t ive ly  low level of economic 
development of the Swaziland system, and an historical heritage dominated by 
the experience of colonial ru .e ,  Swaziland's policy-makers have deemed the 
states of the so-called 'Thin World' as 'natural '  a l l ies  in the task whereby 
Swaziland seeks to extend her influence in the international system.
Moreover, as a means to legitimate part ic ipation in the mult i la tera l  a c t iv i t ies  
of the Third World group, the Swaziland policy-makers have been obliged to 
integrate into the ir  system of po l i t ica l  values, the values of the Third 
World po l i t ica l  culture: as a result  of the concern with group acceptance, 
Swaziland has become, to one degree or another, socialised into the Third 
World po l i t ica l  culture and, at the foreign policy leve l ,  this is expressed 
by the concern of Swaziland's policy-makers with the promotion of those 
po l i t ica l  values regarded as in t r ins ic  to the causes and c cerns of the 
Third World group of states. This means that the international po l i t ica l  
role of Swaziland cannot be evaluated solely in terms of categories of 
foreign policy action designed to consolidate po l i t ica l  independence through 
reduction in the economic and strategic penetrabil ity  of the Swaziland system, 
but must addit ionally take into account a second category of international  
po l i t ica l  actions, namely those concerned with the promotion of the po l i t ica l  
values of that mult i -state  group with which Swaziland's policy-makers ident i fy .
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Swaziland's commitment to the promotion of group po l i t ica l  values is
expressed most cogently through i ts  relations with South Africa, part icular ly
through the implementation of a variety of policies conceivably designed to
f a c i l i t a t e  and promote social and po l i t ica l  change in the Republic. The
po l i t ica l  culture of South Africa is naturally seen by the Third World states
as unacceptable : Swaziland's social isation into the po l i t ica l  culture of
the Third World must thus d irect ly  lead to the society's involvment in the
movement for po l i t ica l  a lterat ion in South A fr ica , and this is so notwithstanding
Swaziland's dependence on the South African system as a result of geographic and
economic circumstances. This does not necessarily mean that Swaziland is
83/engaged in direct  confrontation with South Africa. I t  does however imply, 
that in principle at least Swaziland's policy-makers are concerned with such 
change in South Africa as w i l l  enhance the po l i t ica l  role of the majority Black 
population, and this has in fact been recurrently emphasised by leading Swazi 
poli t icians who see the main source of conf l ic t  in South and Southern Africa 
to l i e  in the socio-poli t ical structure of the South African s t a t e . ^  In 
the interests of regional s t a b i l i t y ,  i f  not in the interests of morality,  
Swaziland's policy-makers would l ike to see some short-term solution to the 
South African racial problem, and from this perspective i t  is f e l t  that 
whilst  Swaziland is forced by circumstances to adopt a relationship with 
South Afr ica, which, in the words of King Sobhusa, requires 'wisdom, patience 
and t a c t ,8Sy/, Swaziland has nonetheless, both vested and substantive interests  
in promoting South African po l i t ica l  change.
The result  of these considerations is that while Swazi-South African 
relations have generally been characterised by economic co-operation 
and po l i t ica l  amity, Swaziland has nonetheless adopted a variety of po l i t ica l  
postures v is -a-vis  South Afr ica ,  which re f lect  both its  concern with change, 
and its  conformity to general Third World po l i t ica l  conceptions regarding the
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South African situation. I t  is believed in Swaziland, that through such 
postures, i t  can contribute to change in South A fr ica , and to the degree 
that i t  is seen to be doing so, consolidate Swaziland's membership of that  
international po l i t ica l  culture with which her policy-makers identify. To 
the degree that this is in turn achieved, Swaziland w i l l  increase her c re d ib i l i ty  
as a substantive actor in the international community long accustomed to the 
image of Swaziland as a mere South African appendage.
Swaziland's foreign policy to promote group po l i t ica l  values v is -a-vis  
South Africa manifests i t s e l f  in a number of ways.
In the f i r s t  place, Swaziland has not established formal diplomatic 
relations with South A f r ic a , aid, although such relations may be technically  
necessary, current South African-Swazi diplomatic contacts tend to take place 
either  by telephone, or through occasional ad hoc meetings between South 
African and Swazi o f f i c i a l s ,  from time to time. I t  is also of importance to 
note, that wi'.h the exception of such meetings as that between Prime 
Ministers Vorstcr and Dhlamini in Cape Town during 1971, and the periodic 
meetings of the governing commission of the Customs Union, most of these 
contacts take place in a low-prof ile atmosphere in the absence of publ icity:  
this arrangement is perfectly suitable to Swazi o f f ic ia ls  who are reluctant  
to provide evidence of contacts with their  South Afrikar counterparts, wnich 
can be used as international or domestic po l i t ica l  capita l.  In current 
terms, there also exists amongst Swaziland's policy-makers very l i t t l e  
entnusiasm for more insti tu t ionalised po l i t ica l  t ies with South \ f r ica  : 
thus following a press conference in 1969, Prime Minister Dhlamini stated 
that  formal contacts with South Africa were unnecessary in the l ight  of the 
geographic proximity between the two <tales, and the 'unnecessary expense' 
which would be involved in establishing such t ies .  Sim ilar ly ,  following 
the Vorster-Makhosini meeting of 1971, at a time when i t  was widely speculated
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that formal Sv/azi-South African diplomatic relations would shortly be 
established, a statement was issued by the Swazi Government which emphasised 
i ts  opposition to apartheid, and i ts  f irm refusal to take any 'uni la teral  
action on the dialogue question, part icular ly  i f  such action is unconnected 
with the Lusaka Manifesto1.
This raises the second manifestation of Swaziland's policy of 
promoting group po l i t ica l  values v is-a-vis South Afr ica, namely, Swaziland's 
att itude to the question of 'dialogue'.  Swaziland is o f f i c i a l l y  committed 
to peaceful rather than revolutionary change in South Afr ica ,  and as such 
recognises the need for  consultation with South African authorit ies at the 
po l i t ica l  leve l ,  a lb e i t  within an informal framework. Minister Nxumalo 
has for example point that - ' I f  d i f f i c u l t i e s  arise between nations and 
governments, as they are bound to arise, l e t  these be thrashed out through 
discussion and through the mutual exchange of ideas . . .  (This) is the sort 
of approach to Afr ica 's  problems which we are trying to uphold and pursue.
In doing this we need the goodwill of Africa;  we need the understanding of 
our neighbours. Given that,  I believe that there are no problems which we 
in Southern Africa cannot solv-. t o g e t h e r . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  this however, 
Swaziland is a signatory of the Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969, and is 
o f f i c i a l l y  committed, as has been reiterated from time to time, to dialogue 
only on the basis of the Lusaka Manifesto with i ts  emphasis on demonstrable 
change. Swaziland is as such concerned with peaceful change in South Africa  
and recognises the u t i l i t y  of contact with South Africa in the processes of such 
change; i t  does however believe that f r u i t fu l  contacts cannot take place at  
the formal po l i t ica l  level in the absence of South African willingness to e f fect  
measures i i the direction of eventual African majority control in South Africa.
Swaziland has in the th ird  place ident i f ied  i t s e l f  publicly with certain
161.
Internationa1 pressures concerned with both the solution of the South West 
African dispute and the question of international sanctions upon South 
Africa. As fa r  as the former is concerned Swaziland policy-makers have 
expressed the ir  conviction that the South West African issue is a matter 
of concern for the United Nations, and that i t  is only on the basis of a 
solution acceptable to the United Nations that the issue can be effect ive ly  
nsolved. On the question of the l a t t e r ,  Swaziland has forcefully  expressed 
i t s e l f  on the question of Bri t ish arms sales to South Africa, to which i t  
stands opposed on the basis that such sales can only serve to harden mutually 
hosti le attudes and thus increase mutual tensions in the Southern African sub­
continent; speaking on a resolution against the proposed resumption of  
Bri t ish arms sales to South Africa at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers'  
Conference in London during 1971, Prime Minister Dhlamini thus pointed out 
'We cannot see arms promoting the safety of Southern Africa or that of the 
ocean surrounding that area. But we can see arms hardening the attitudes 
of those who otherwise could, even at this la te  hour, lend the voice of 
humanity and reason an ear. Indeed we can see arms from the West attracting  
arms from the East and turning Southern Africa into an ideological and 
racial battleground - precisely the type of thing we want to see avoided.1
Fourthly, Swazi policy-makers also believe that i f  Swaziland can be 
presented to South Africa as a working mult i - rac ia l  society, i t  w i l l  
provide South Africa with vis ib le  evidence of the fe a s ib i l i ty  of such 
forms of social organisation, and in doing so, contribute to the process 
of change. The pursuit of the mult i - rac ia l  ideal in the geographic 
heartland of racial segregation is thus encourageo as an important 
technique to concurrently promote Third World po l i t ica l  values in 
Southern A fr ica , and promote po l i t ica l  a l terat ion in South Africa
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i t s e l f .  A lternatively ,  the promotion of a working m ult i - rac ia l  ism 
in Swaziland is evaluated not only in terms of domestic s t a b i l i t y ,  
but in terms of i ts  value as an instrumentality of foreign policy as well .  
Swaziland has, for example, subscribed to the Uni tod Nations International 
Convention on the Elimination of a l l  Forms of Racial Discrimination, (and 
has submitted reports on i ts  own internal situation to the United Nations 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination). Domestic leg is la t ion ,  
dating back to the Race Relations Act. r o. 6 of 1962 further attempts to give 
expression to the mult i - rac ia l  id e a l , and the self-same commitment has in fact  
been endorsed as a cornerstone of the Imobokodvo oarty p o l i c y . * ^  The 
commitment to non-racial ism has been repeatedly emphasised publicly by the 
Imbokodvo leadership : thus, at the opening of Parliament during 1968, Prime 
Minister Dhlanini pledged the government to fu l l  support of the ideals of  
non-discrimination and racial p e a c e , ^  which were to be 
reiterated in the Prime Minister's broadcast to the nation on the occasion 
of the f i r s t  independence anniversary celebrations in September 1969.
Mr. Simon NxumaTo, has addit ional ly pointed out t h a t ^  -'The Swazi National 
Council is a conservative body . . .  But in accordance with the traditions  
of my people, Imbokodvo also rejects racial discrimination. . .  Today,
Imbokodvo's significance l ies  in the fact that in an age of great changes 
i t  recognises the need to go forward with the times . . .  All our peoples must 
retain the ir  vigour, they must stimulate each other in building a tru ly  non- 
racial state . . .  We believe we can establish a fu l ly  integrated non-racial 
society . . .  We think that i t  is possible that Black and White can belong to 
nne society and be brought together by one po l i t ica l  lo y a l ty . '
The use of internal mult i-racialism as a symbol for promoting po l i t ica l  
change in neighbouring South A f r ic a , is a tactic  whose possible va l id i ty  has 
long been recognised. In 1965, e.g. Madconald Maseko, (then one of the
9 0 /leaders of the NNLC) pointed out ' -  ' I  wonder, why does Dr. Verwoerd fear
a democratic Swaziland ? Because a free Swaziland in which a l l  ra<~es l ive
together on the basis of real equality is the greatest threat to his system
and be l ie f  in race mastery. Nothing would be more undermining to Dr. Verwoerd
than to have a Swaziland on his boundaries in which Whites are equal to Blacks,
and in which Whites are not swamped, beaten up. or discriminated against in
any other way. In other words, where Whites and Blacks l ive  happily
together. This would destroy his last  ju s t i f ic a t io n  for the last  White
Laager in A f r i c a .1 This view has, in practice, been incorporated into the
91 /foreign policy perspectives of the ruling Imbokodvo Party. '
Today, Swazi policy-makers believe that the position of South African
Blacks can be ameliorated through the* maintenance of mult i - rac ia l  values in
the te r r i to ry  adjacent to South Africa i t s e l f .  They also believe that i t  can
be useful to bring indigenous White South Africans into direct contact with
the values of a working mult i - rac ia l  society, and this has reinforced economic
considerations in Swaziland's promotion of South African tourism in Swaziland,
The increase in South African tourism to Swaziland has tended to generate a
92/number of social si de-effects which have caused some domestic concern: 
the be l ie f  nonetheless continues to exist  that in offering a mult i -racia l  
alternative with which White South Africans can make substantial contact 
a contribution to South African a tt i tudinal  and hence po l i t ica l  change is being 
made. Actions such as the refusal by South African governmental authorit ies  
to allow mult i - rac ia l  football as part of Swaziland's anniversary celebrations 
during 1969 which would have involved the part icipation of two White 
Johannesburg teams as well as a number of Black South African teams - and 
other efforts to l im i t  contact between White South Africans with the Swazi 
way of l i f e ,  are viewed as confirming the te l l in g  effect which the pursuit 
of this strategy can manifest.
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Closely related to this is the feeling that po l i t ica l  purposes can
be f u l f i l l e d  through promoting the use of Swaziland's educational f a c i l i t i e s
by both White and Black young South Africans. Insofar as the former group
is concerned, i t  is strongly f e l t  that inst i tut ions such as the mult i - rac ia l
Waterford school and, at the level of university education UBLS, can, to the
degree that they involve White South Africans, play an important role in
conditioning South African attitudes towards po l i t ica l  change. Insofar as
young Black South Africans are concerned, i t  is believed that inst i tut ions
such as UBLS can provide f a c i l i t i e s  not otherwise available to Black South
Africans upon South African terrotory. I t  is however recognised by the Swazi
authorit ies that the potential White South African constituency for
partic ipat ion in a c t iv i t ies  at Waterford or UBLS, is composed, in a sense of
the already 'converted'. I t  is also recognised that the reluctance on the
part of South African authorit ies to grant travel documents to Sou , ^rican
Blacks interested in Swaziland educational inst i tu t ions ,  also undermines the
effectiveness of such a strategy. Then too, the sti l l -developing Swaziland
educational system has d i f f i c u l ty  in catering even for the indigenous
population, and this must seriously l im i t  the f a c i l i t i e s  available to those
93/of non-Swazi cit izenship. ' The policy of promoting Swazi-South African 
educational relationships is nonetheless regarded as being a valid means in 
principle , for the promotion of social change in the South African po l i t ica l  
system.
A f i f t h  issue-area of Swaziland's foreign policy designed to promote 
socio-poli t ical change in South Africa in a manner conforming to the 
po l i t ica l  values of the Third World po l i t ica l  culture, relates to the 
contentious issues of asylum for South African po l i t ica l  refugees, and the 
provision of f a c i l i t i e s  for gueril la  operations against the South African 
regime. This issue is in fact a product of the South African-Swazi geographic
relationship : Swaziland does not enjoy a direct geographic l ink with 
Black Africa as does Botswana, yet i t  is an independent Black state with a 
geographic outlet  through Mozambique, on i ts  East, and as such, is a 
potentia lly  favourable location point for i l le ga l  emigrants from South 
Africa, and for the staging of m i l i ta ry  a c t iv i ty  directed at the overthrow 
of the South African state. Swaziland's governmental authorit ies are thus 
placed in a situation where they must constantly balance the ir  economic and 
political interests in maintaining a neutral position of matters relating  
to refugees and l iberat ion movements, and the prerogatives set by radical 
groupings in the international system concerned with violent  change in South 
Africa.
In Swaziland the government is not committed to maintaining the status 
quo in South Africa. However, i t  is equally committed to the b e l ie f ,  both 
by necessity and choice, that change in the South African situation cannot 
be best brought about by revolutionary and violent means. In practice this 
view is reinforced by a number of variables. From an economic perspective 
i t  is deep!) appreciated by the Swazi government that both the present and 
future economic well-being of Swaziland is d irect ly  related to South African 
economic support : combined with the South African-Swaziland strategic
relationship, this underwrites Swazi reluctance to support : variety of p o l i t i  
a c t iv i t ie s  directed towards South Africa which are, or might be interpreted 
by South A fr ica , as being designed to a l te r  the South African situation  
by revolution, violence and force. The educational and technical 
qualif ications of many South African p o l i t ic a l  refugees in Swaziland in 
the past , have tended to surpass those of the indigenous labour force: i t  
is appreciated by the Swaziland government that in an already overburdened 
employment market, an influx of additional workers, 'freedom fighters'  
or not, cannot be encouraged except at the expense of local dissent.
From a more po l i t ica l  point of view, tne re la t ive ly  radical po l i t ica l  views 
of the South African exile  community have often in the past been seen to 
have a disturbing effect  on Swaziland's domestic po l i t ica l  dynamics : 
members of the refugee community have tended to gravitate to the opposition 
rather than to the ruling Imbokodvo Party, and given the re la t ive  
sophistication which the refugee community has in many cases brought to the 
opposition cause, governmental authorit ies have tended to look askance on 
the in f lux of elements whose commitment to the existing Swazi order may be 
in doubt. The harbouring of refugees and gueril la  elements also increases 
the possib il i ty  of South African intervention, d irect ly  or in d irec t ly ,  in 
domestic Swazi a f fa i rs .  This is in fact a deep-rooted fear in Swazi 
po l i t ica l  l i f e ,  one which has been articulated on a number of occas ions^  
and which tends to further condition the attitudes of Swazi policy-makers 
to the whole l iberation question, in a negative direction.
Under such circumstances i t  is not surprising that the Swaziland 
government has adopted a position in terms of which i t  has made i t  publicly  
and e x p l ic i t ly  clear that i t  is unable to provide sustenance and t e r r i to r i a l  
support to gueril la  movements seeking to use Swaziland as a staging point 
for a South African assault. On the matter of asylum for South African 
po l i t ica l  refugees however, policy is by no means as clear-cut. I t  is 
certainly true that the b e l ie f  prevails in opposition circles that Swaziland 
is openly hostile to these i n d i v i d u a l s , ^  whilst evidence exists that  
co-operation has taken place between South African security forces and 
Swaziland's police authorit ies regarding the return of po l i t ica l  refugees 
to South A f r i c a . ^  There is also adequate legislat ion which can be used 
to s ta tu tor i ly  ju s t i fy  the return of South African refugees, po l i t ica l  or 
otherwise, part icular ly  the Deportation Act of 1961, the Immigration Act of 
1964, the Citizenship Act of 1967 and the Immigration (Amendment) [ i i l l  of
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1 9 7 2 . ^  In re a l i ty  however, in the past Swaziland has not proved 
unsympathetic to the refugee plight. In 1970 for  example, the Minister  
of Foreign A f fa i rs ,  Mr. Khumalo was to point out to a United Nations meeting 
in Lusaka, that despite Swaziland's economic and geogr phic position,
South African refugees were 'sometimes1 afforded asylum in Swaziland provided 
that they did not indulge in local p o l i t ic s ,  and that even when this did 
occur, these individuals were not returned to South A f r ic a , but transported 
to areas outside of the South African orb i t .  This position seems to be borne 
out s ta t i s t ic a l ly  by the fact that since 1966, while few refugees have 
actually been allowed to remain in Swaziland, of some 1,212 individuals 
declared 'prohibited immigrants' some 1,024 have been deported e i ther  to 
Zambia or Tanzania?^ There is also some evidence to suggest that l iaison  
between the Swazi and Portuguese authorit ies on the refugee question has 
taken place, and that the l a t t e r  have been prepared to sanction the extradition  
of South African refugees via Mozambique, provided that the individuals 
concerned were not wanted by the Portuguese authorities as well .
In conclusion therefore, i t  seems that whilst economic, and geographic 
circumstances have conditioned Swaziland policy away from actually providing 
support for gueril la  movements against South Afr ica, Swaziland's policy 
regarding the question of South African po l i t ica l  refugees can be clearly  
related to those position and prerogatives of the Third World po l i t ica l  
culture with whom Swaziland identif ies in i ts  attempt to promote the international 
po l i t ica l  influence of the Swazi state.
(v) The Promotion of Group Po l i t ica l  Values : Swaziland as a 
Poir t icTTTctor  in In ternat ional Organisation
Swaziland's concern with group po l i t ica l  values is f in a l ly  reflected  
outside of the Southern African region, in her a c t iv i t ies  in such organisations 
as the United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity. In both of
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these in s t i tu t io n s , Swaziland has recurrently ident if ied herself with the 
policy positions of the Third World states on Southern African issues. In 
the OAU for example, Swaziland has endorsed dialogue with South Africa only on 
the basis of the Lusaka Manifesto, has made i t  clear that formal diplomatic 
l inks would not be established with South Africa under present circumstances, 
and has condemned the sale of Brit ish arms to the Republic. Swaziland has 
also taken a f a i r l y  clear stand in the OAU on the issue of the Portuguese 
presence in Afr ica ,  and has called upon the organisation to do 'a l l  in its  
power1 to achieve independence for 'those areas s t i l l  under foreign domination1?9  ^
Swaziland's public position on South Africa and Portugal is necessarily 
tempered by the nature of Swazi-South African and Swaziland-Mozambique 
geographic and economic rela t ions, and this interplay of po l i t ica l  and 
economic influences has, in practice, tended to introduce an element of 
ambiguity into Swaziland's position at the OAU and into her attitudes  
on anti-Portuguese and anti-South African resolutions : the element of
constraint is however less ^ :nt on Swaziland's position v is -a-vis  Rhodesia 
and given the fact that fornu wazi-Rhodesian transactions are pract ical ly  
non-existent, Rhodesian issues at the OAU are seen by Swaziland's policy­
makers as a useful opportunity to demonstrate Swaziland's 'hard-l ine'  
commitment to the Black African cause. Considerably less restra int  is 
therefore evident in Swaziland's att itude towards Rhodesia, the fu l fi lment  
of this surrogate type of diplomacy being readily  evident on a number of 
occasions in OAU a c t iv i t ie s ,  when Swaziland has associated i t s e l f  with the 
more radical positions of the African community. In current terms,
Swaziland has fu l ly  endorsed the embargo on Rhodesian trade, has called 
for immediate African majority rule in Rhodesia, and has associated herself  
with condemnations of Britain and her 'departure from her usual po l i t ica l  
principles*. 100'Z
169.
Within the United Nations, f-vazi 1 and has also recurrently lent her 
support to the Afro-Asian position on Southern African matters. During 1971 
for example, Swaziland supported a variety of issues concerned with the 
eradication of the vestiges of colonialism in the Portuguese African 
t e r r i to r ie s ,  and the promotion of socio-poli t ical change within South Africa  
i t s e l f .  With regard to the l a t t e r ,  Swaziland lent s ignif icant support to 
Resolution 2775 posit ively affirming the distr ibution of educational material 
on apartheid, the work of the Special Committee on Apartheid and condemnation 
of apartneid in sport. During 1971 Swaziland also publicly expressed her 
association with the United Nations demand for po l i t ica l  change in Rhodesia 
and South West Afr ica ,  and supported the establishment of a United Nations 
Fund for Namibia. During 1972 Swaziland supported Resolution 2908 referring  
to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries, the condemnation of 'foreign economic interests impeding the 
the implementation of this declaration' ( i . e .  Resolution 2979), and the 
establishment of an educational programme for the p o l i t ica l  refugees from the 
Southern African sub-continent. During 1972, Swaziland again sided with 
elements in the United Nations concerned with the elimination of the 
Portuguese presence in Afr ica.
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CHAPTER 5
SWAZILAND AS A NATION-BUILDING STATE AND THE EFFECTS ON ITS FOREIGN 
POLICIES OBJECTIVES, CHOICES AND STRATEGIES
The accumulation of knowledge in international relations reflects the 
concern on the part of social scient ists with constantly integrating theory 
with fact : thus, the evaluation of descriptive data in terms of modular
constructs gives rise to series of hypotheses, conceptualisations and 
ultimately theories, whilst a l te rna t ive ly ,  the re-application of theories 
to material rea l i t ies  stimulates the search for basic idiographic data 
supplementary to that incorporated into existing theories themselves.
Abstract and substantive data thus go hand in hand, and as a result ,  systematic 
inquiry on the part of the international relations scholar involves a constant 
in terre la t ion between what is seen to exist and its  interpretation in 
programmatic form. From another perspective i t  is incumbent upon 
international relations research to integrate theory with fact ,  in the 
interests of a total appreciation of the phenomena under consideration.
I t  is upon this basis that i t  is necessary, at his point, to clearly  
integrate the material referent of this work i . e .  the foreign policy of 
Swaziland (as described in Part I I ) ,  with the original model of foreign 
policy behaviour within the developing state context (as or ig ina l ly  enunciated 
in Part I of this d issertation). More specif ica l ly ,  i t  is necessary to 
consider whether the prototype used in this analysis i . e .  Swazi land,conforms 
to the propositions incorporated into the model i . e .  to the e ffect  that the 
objectives sought by developing states, the p r io r i t ies  which they a t t r ibute  
to certain objectives v is-a-vis others, and the strategies which they employ 
in the real isation of preferred goals, is d irect ly  conditioned by the 
domestic concerns of po l i t ica l  leadership with the nation-building task.
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In order to do this i t  is necessary to consider a number of specific 
questions which d irect ly  impinge on the character of foreign policy-making 
and application in the Swaziland case. F i rs t  and foremost, the ver i f ica t ion  
of the modular proposition is d irect ly  dependent upon the existence within 
the Swazi policy-making-circle of the ethos of nation-building : in other  
words the question must be posed - on the basis of available evidence, to 
what degree is Swaziland's po l i t ica l  leadership intimately concerned and 
involved with nation-building, or, in terms of the def in it ion articulated  
above, with legitimating the inst itut ions of the Swazi state in the 
perceptions of both a domestic and international audience ? Assuming such an 
orientation to ex ist ,  i t  is necessary to consider the economic and po l i t ica l  
exigencies which are generated as a result ,  the manner in which these variables 
impinge upon the def in i t ion of the foreign policy goals of the Swazi state,  
the strategies which are employed by Swazi policy-makers in the attainment 
of these goals. F inal ly ,  since i t  is an integral part of our i n i t i a l  
proposition that the economic and po l i t ica l  values of the developing state 
may conf l ic t ,  some attention must be given to the element of contradiction 
which is present in Swa’ i foreign policy, nd to the context within which 
Swazi foreign policy p r io r i t ie s  are determined, choices made, and trade-offs  
operationalised.
A. Swaziland as a Nation-building Poli ty
The f i r s t  of these issues i . e .  the involvement of Swaziland's 
po l i t ica l  leadership with the nation-building task, can be easily resolved. 
Historical experience tends to suggest that po l i t ica l  leadership is , at a 
minimum, concerned with the maintenance of the po l i t ica l  system, and that 
in the case of developing states, the capacity of leadership to realise this 
end, is d irect ly  dependent upon its a b i l i t y  to promote both the economic and
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po l i t ic a l  development of the newly established state. This seems to be 
no less the case with regard to Swaziland, where the set of policies pursued 
in the post-independence period, d irect ly  re f lec t  the concern on the part of 
the governing e l i t e  with both internal economic expansion and international  
po l i t ic a l  consolidation. We have described at some length the broad-based 
and multi-dimensional programme of economic reform which is currently endorsed 
and being applied in Swaziland today : the concern with the improvement of 
economic infrastructures, agricultural modernisation, industrial growth and 
the exploitation of natural resources - a l l  re f lec t  the importance attributed  
by Swazi leaders to accelerated socio-economic development in the interests 
of a more materia lly  sat isf ied and stable society. S imilarly, the post­
independence years have witnessed a variety of policies directed towards 
establishing the image of Swaziland as a viable, functional and autonomous 
actor in international af fa irs  : numerous efforts have been made to reduce 
the permeability of the state to external po l i t ica l  influences, either  
consciously or fortuitously involved in the Swaziland po l i t ica l  dynamic, 
whilst  both economic and po l i t ica l  contacts with the international community, 
and par t icu lar ly  with the perceivedly fraternal states of Black Afr ica,  
with which Swazi policy-makers ident ify  nave been promoted. Recognition 
in the international realm has m this sense paralleled the concern with 
stabi l is ing governmental structures within the domestic context.
The motivations underlying the concern of Swazi policy-makers with 
the nation-building tasks are , reflect ion of  Swaziland's domestic and 
international circumstances. From an international perspective, the 
geographic situation of Swaziland in the heartland of Southern Africa, in 
combination with the dispar it ies in power between Swaziland and the 
Republic or South Africa, have combined to produce an international image 
of the Swazi state as a "client" state, or even "hostage" state of i ts
immediate neighbour. The natural economic involvement of Swaziland with 
the Republic which has induced Swazi policy-makers to adopt a re la t ive ly  
moderate att itude towards South Africa's  internal polic ies, has further  
reinforced this perception, and in the process has geared the international  
community to seriously question the c re d ib i l i ty  of Swaziland as an autonomous 
and sovereign po l i t ica l  actor. This has been recognised by Swazi policy­
makers, who have as a result ,  constantly sought to e f fect  some re-orientation  
in international attitudes of this nature as adopted towards the Swazi state:  
they have sought to project Swaziland as a po l i t ica l  entity  which, although 
confronted with disadvantageous geo-poli t ical and economic circumstances, 
nonetheless embodies the capacity to determine both its  internal and external 
policies in as self-determining * manner as any other developing state.  
Swaziland's foreign policy in the post-independence period has sought to 
emphasize the re a l i ty  of Swaziland's position, and her conscious attempt 
to broaden her po l i t ica l  options despite her economic and geographic 
dependence upon the South African system. I t  has sought to project  
Swaziland as a credible state nonetheless, and to aff irm the view that ,  as 
such, Swaziland can part ic ipate, in a v ita l and contributory manner in the 
operations of the international system.
The concern of Swaziland with nation-building is not however, only a 
product of the past ambiguity of Swaziland's international image. On the 
contrary, i t  also reflects the influence of domestic circumstances, 
part icular ly  the element of modernisation which Swaziland has experienced, 
and the re la t ive ly  cohesive character of the te r r i to ry 's  social composition. 
I t  has been pointed out above, that despite the re la t ive ly  high level per 
capita income level in Swaziland, and her Gross National Product which in 
per capita terms is one of the highest in Africa, the Swazi economic system 
is characterised by a number of discontinuities which are prevalent in other
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developing societies as well .  The Swazi economy is , a f te r  a l l ,  a dual 
economy wherein serious discrepancies in the distr ibution of income and 
s k i l ls  exist : i t  is an economy which is witnessing an increased unemployment 
rate ,  expanding population growth, and progressive urbanisation in a manner 
which places serious strains on social resources and s t a b i l i t y .  The Swazi 
leadership has come to associate i t s e l f  with accelerated socio-economic 
growth as the natural response to this s ituat ion,  and has sought, through the 
operationalisation of a broad programme of socio-economic modernisation to 
cement society into both a more coherent and functional en t i ty .  I t  is 
moreover of importance to note that Swazi society is , unlike most societies  
in Africa, a un i - t r iba l  society i . e .  based on a single pattern of ethnic 
iden t i t ies .  This is not to ignore the v i ta l  social role of Swaziland's 
turopean community, nor the presence of a minority element in the form of 
Black groups whose origins are not Swazi in character : nonetheless, the 
fact  that the predominant social group in Swaziland, is ,  in population terms, 
overwhelmingly the Swazi t r ibe ,  does attr ibute  to the society an element of  
basic and general integration which is largely unparalleled in most other 
areas of the developing world. And i t  is precisely because of th is ,  rather  
than in spite of i t ,  that the concern with maintaining social coherence is 
attributed considerable value by Swaziland's policy-making e l i t e .
Swaziland is in these terms both similar and dissimilar to other 
developing states. I t  is dissimilar  in the sense that i ts  peculiar 
environmental situation has made the tark of internationally  legitimating  
the state far  more d i f f i c u l t  than has been the case in other developing 
states of the international communicy, which have, at the minimum, been 
automatically accepted as credible and sovereign by other developing states 
of the international system. In the Swazi case the task of projecting the 
status of the state into the system, has been complicated by the fact ,  that 
not only has i t  required the recognition of the developed industrial world,
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but of  most states of the developing world as well .  Swaziland is also 
dissimilar  from other developing states in the l igh t  of her un i- t r iba l  
character, which functions, in pract ice, to reduce the role of culture-  
clash and competition in the operations of the system: in ternal ly  therefore,
the task of nation-building and legit imation has been considerably eased.
In other respects however Swaziland can easily be f i t t e d  to the category 
of  developing states. I t  is a state  which has not yet experienced those 
social forces which are associated with the condition of economic modernity, 
and i t  is one where such modernisation as has been experienced, has in many 
respects, undermined the unity of the social order. In ternat ionally ,  
Swaziland's role is hampered by the re la t ive  lack of power and capabil i t ies  
which is common to the international action of most developing actors : 
Swaziland's m i l i ta ry  power is negl ig ible , and her economic self -suff ic iency  
profoundly l imited. As a result ,  serious l imitations are placed on both her 
international po l i t ica l  weight and status. i t  is this factor, in combination 
with domestic circumstance that underpins the concern on the part of 
Swaziland's leadership with the nation-building task, in a manner not 
fundamentally d i f ferent  to that of other states in the developing-state 
category.
B. Swaziland's Foreign Policy Objectives_and Strategies in the Context of 
the Nation-Building To'sk
The involvement with nation-building has in turn disposed Swazi 
policy-makers towards the realisation of a set of economic and po l i t ica l  
foreign policy objectives geared to economic modernisation and the 
affirmation of po l i t ica l  autonomy respectively. This has in turn caused 
policy to be geared to the operationalisation of strategies concerned with 
internal economic growth, po l i t ica l  consolidation and the extension of 
international p o l i t ica l  influence. Let us consider these economic and 
po l i t ica l  foreign policy values in turn.
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( a) Economic Foreign Policy Objectives and Strategies
From a purely economic point of view, Swaziland is currently
confronted with a number of major problems.^ Indeed, as a recent study
pointed o u t , ^  the prob lem s confronting the Swazi economy are not purely
economic problems, but social,  po l i t ica l  and physical as well:  thus the
strain placed on Swaziland's human and material resources by the d i rec t ly -
economic demands of infrastructural development, agricultural and industrial
modernisation etc, are complemented by such issues as increased urbanisation
under conditions of l imited employment opportunities, the po l i t ica l
aspirations of an increasingly sophisticated and cosmopolitan urban
populace, And such physical problems as relate to integrating the social
framework into a spat ia l ly  cohesive unit through the promotion of a
re la t iv e ly  dense system of t e r r i to r i a l  communications. In a more general
sense, the Swaziland economy is characterised by a serious imbalance between
a developed core area and a backward periphery i . e .  between a segment wherein
past developmental ac t iv i ty  has been concentrated, and one where economic
3/modernisation has largely oeen ignored. This is of course not an unfamiliar
pattern in developing societ ies, many of which are characterised by 'a dual is t ic
structure . . .  imprinted upon the space economy, comprising a 'centre' of rapid,
intensive development and a 'periphery' whose econonty, imperfectly related
to the centre, is either stagnant or d e c l i n i n g ' S w a z i l a n d  is in fact a
5/prototype of what has been deemed a 'second-stage transitional economy': 
as such, i t  has as yet not attained the point of self-sustained economic 
t a k e - o f f / ^  and, in current terms, is engaged in the process of radical 
economic transformation which may, with vast expenditures of social resources, 
enable i t  to reach the level of self -suff ic iency sometime in the near future.
At prese.it Swaziland's policy-makers have committed the system to a 
wide-ranging and multi-dimensional development e f f o r t / /  and there is l i t t l e
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reason to expect that this w i l l  not be continued in the future. Projected
expansion plans already make provision for a large number of enterprises
throughout the economy, the aggregation of which wi l l  require vast
expenditure on the part of public finance and private enter; -se, and
the mobilisation of considerable amounts of technical resources. In
part icular ,  mention should be made of the proposed R5 mil l ion cotton fabrics
factory at Nhlangano, a new R30 mill ion sugar mill  in Northern Swaziland,
expansion of the pulp factory at Bunya, the establishment of a SASOL-type
oi1-from-coal plant, the new R160 mill ion thermal power plant at Mpaka,
and, in the longar-tenr, future, a pig-iron plant which w i l l  in i t i a t e  the
Swaziland economy into the realm of capital goods production. Each of
these projects wi l l  make s ignif icant contributions to national economic
growth:8// the Nhlangano factory, for example, wi l l  eventually employ
6,000 people, and with the eventual use of Swazi cottons w i l l  give the
agricul tural  sector a welcome boost; the oi1-from-coal plant w i l l  do mucn
to reduce the economy's dependence on external energy supplies, as is
s imilar ly  the case with the thermal power plant, which, with its  sale of
e le c t r ic i ty  to ESCOM, w i l l  enhance the value of Swaziland's export sector.
All of these contemplated projects are however capital- intensive endeavours,
Which w i l l  place serious strains on national finance. I t  should also be
borne in mind that alone of the three former High Commission Terr i to r ies ,
Swaziland is currently in the process of establishing a national army to
supplement the Royal Swazi Police in the maintenance of order and the
9/protection of t e r r i to r i a l  in tegr i ty .  The reasons for this action are as 
yet obscure, although i t  is generally accepted that the rationale is to be 
found in domestic rather than in international c ircumstances.^  One 
thing is however, re la t ive ly  c lear ,  and that is ,  that the expenditure on 
this venture w i l l  place a further strain on national economic resources: 
the police budget in 1970-71, for  example, was already over R1 m i l l ion ,  and
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i t  is expected that the i n i t i a l  defence budget wi l l  bj in the region of 
double this amount.
Under these circumstances, and in the 1iguu of the fact that in
current terms the Swaziland economy has not succeeded in accumulating
suff ic ient  capital to sustain the developmental e f f o r t , 11  ^ i t  is unlikely
that in the near future Swaziland w i l l  be able to substantially dispense
with external development aid. This is c lear ly  recognised in a recent
survey conducted by the South African merchant bankers. H i l l  Samuel, which
suggests not only that Swazi finances w i l l  not be able 1 to meet expenditure
which is necessary to ensure a rapid rate of growth', but that i ts  capacity
12/to do so may well decline in the short-term. ' I t  is pointed out, in
part icu lar ,  that South African investment in Swaziland has fa l len 1 far
below expectations',  and that transport problems, (notably the absence cf  a
ra i l  l i n k ) , uncertainties engendered by the localisat ion policy and the
fact that f inancial incentives in South Afr ica's 'border' industries are
greater than those offered by Swaziland, have combined to reduce South
African entrepreneurial interest in the Swaziland economy. There is
also some evidence to suggest that the role of South African technical
13/assistance to Swaziland is on the decline, ' and the combination of 
these factors means that a v i ta l  source of f inancial and technological aid 
to Swaziland may well decrease in importance in future years.
What is perhaps even more fundamental in terms of Swaziland's 
future economic growth is the fact that,  as a developing economy Swaziland's 
main source of revenues are export-oriented.and that in current terms, the 
future of her two major exports are in doubt.
The f i r s t  of these exports is ,  of course, sugar. I t  is ,  in fac t ,  the
sugar industry which is at  the heart of the Swaziland economy : i t
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contributes a quarter of the nation's foreign exchange earnings, i t  
provides employment for one-f i f th  of a l l  people in wage-earning employment 
in Swaziland, i t  provides s ignif icant  income for the Swaziland railway and 
Swaziland E le c t r ic i ty  Board, i t  provides technical training schemes and 
finances, educational development, and through wages, rations and other 
benefits, generates substantial purchasing power in the hands of the people. 
The problem with the sugar industry, as any other agro-industrial processing 
industry in developing states, is that i t  is essentia lly  an export- industr'  
(the local market takes only 10 per cent of  production), and that as such, 
its progress depends on an international trading economy where prices for  
primary products fluctuate v io lent ly ,  and are often below the cost of 
production. I t  is this that has led the Swaziland sugar industry to seek 
special international arrangements tc guarantee i ts  economic base, and 
this in turn has led to Swaziland's accession to the International Sugar 
Agreement and the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, and to the conclusion of 
quota arrangements with the United States, to which Swaziland exports some
35.000 tons. I t  is however the CSA; in which Swaziland has a quota of
86.000 tons, which is the mainstay of the industry, and which has largely  
contributed to i ts  development over the last  20 years. With Bri t ish entry 
into the European Common Market the future of this arrangement, which is due 
to expire in December 1974, is in considerable doubt, and although Swaziland 
has been ' f i rmly assured' that  her sugar exports to the enlarged European 
community w i l l  adequately compensate for the losses incurred with the 
demise of the CSA, i t  may well be questioned as to whether this w i l l  in 
fact be the case. In the f i r s t  place, the Common Agricultural Policy of 
the EEC specif ica l ly  excludes the importation of certain agricultural  
products, one of which is sugar i t s e l f , i n  the second place the EEC is 
currently s e l f -s u f f ic ie n t  in sugar, with the exception of Bri tain  which 
herself intends to phase out sugar imports from the Commonwealth,
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to 1.4 mil l ion tons over the next few years; and th i rd ly ,  the EEC i t s e l f  
has a s ignif icant beet sugar industry which w i l l ,  in the short-term future,  
exert efforts to meet total Bri t ish sugar requirements under favourable 
conditions. I t  is in fact the immediate fate of the sugar industry which 
underlies Swaziland's current concern with Common Market associate membership; 
in the absence of some sort of agreement with the EEC, the future of the 
sugar industry is highly problematic, and the current period has been 
defined as a 'make-or-break period for the sugar i n d u s t r y ' ^  and, one 
might well add, in many ways, for the Swaziland economy as a whole.
The problems of Swaziland's export sector are moreover compounded by 
the fact that the capacity of the economy to function as a long-term iron-ore 
exporter has not lived up to i n i t i a l  expectations. I t  has recently been 
real ised, for example, that at a minimum rate of 2.5 mill ion tons per year,  
most high-grade ores w i l l  have been exhausted by 1 9 7 5 . ^  As far  as medium- 
grade ores are concerned, unfavourable international currency alignments as 
well as unexpectedly high production costs, make i t  unlikely that i n i t i a l  
hopes that sales to Japan w i l l  continue until  1978 wi l l  be realised, unless 
a massiwo price increase can be negotiated with Japanese buyers. There is 
as yet  no indication of this poss ib i l i ty .  In addition, no market has as 
yet been found for the remaining low-grade deposits, and the current be l ie f  
is that prof its  from the mine w i l l  radically  decrease during 1973 and 1974, 
prior  to the closure of the mire during 1 9 7 5 . ^  The future short-term is 
l i k e ly  to witness the phasing out of foreign exchange derived from the export 
of Swaziland's iron-ore resources.
Under these circumstances, progressive increases in national revenue 
as a result of the sale of Swaziland's major export products, cannot be 
taken as a forgone conclusion over the next few years. There is reason to 
believe that the loss of receipts which w i l l  occur with the closure of the Ngwenya
1 8 6 .
mine, and which may occur in the sugar sector may be compensated for by the
export of coal,which could develop into an important foreign exchange earner, 
part icu lar ly  in the l igh t  of the world energy cr is is  : at present, f irmly
assessed coal reserves of 164 mil l ion tons are reported at Mpaka, with a
further 70 mil l ion tons at Mtendakwa, and although i t  appears that only
some 10 mil l ion tons can be economically mined on open cast, world
price rises may make the rest a viable proposition as well . 18,/ The
exploitation of Swaziland's asbestos reserves are also estimated to be
19/economical for the next 20 years, whilst there is reason to believe 
that Swaziland may possess deposits of diamonds and kimberlite whose
20/sale could also add to national ►'“venues in the short or medium-term future.
The progressive expansion of agricul ture, industry and tourism should further
aid the accumulation of capital and the diffusion of technical s k i l l s ,
although a prolonged oi l  cr is is  and fuel restr ictions w i l l  undoubtedly
have negative effects on industry and tourism in part icu lar ,  and may well
21/slow down the growth rate in these two sectors.
When a l l  is said and done however, when the future growth of the
economy is related to projected demands which are l ik e ly  to be placed upon
i t  in the future, i t  seems re la t iv e ly  clear that Swaziland is s t i l l  a
substantially long way of f  from that point of economic development and
growth, where her dependence on external human and material developmental
resources can be s ignif icant ly  reduced. The Swaziland economy has
experienced intense ac t iv i ty  during the 50's and 60's, especially since
the attainment of independence in 1966: i t  is this that allows Swaziland
to be val id ly  categorised as a transit ional economy in the process of
radical transformation. The Swaziland economy is however s t i l l  in what
have been deemed 1 the stages of pre-conditions' which over a comparatively
22 /long period of time prepare the country for self-sustained development.
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that Swaziland may possess deposits of diamonds and kimberlite whose
20/sale could also add to national revenues in the short or medium-term future.
The progressive expansion of agriculture,  industry and tourism should further  
aid the accumulation of capital and the diffusion of technical s k i l l s ,  
although a prolonged oi l  cr is is  and fuel restr ictions w i l l  undoubtedly 
have negative effects on industry and tourism in part icular ,  and may well 
slow down the growth rate in these two sectors. ^
When a l l  is said and done however, when the future growth of the 
economy is related to projected demands which are l ik e ly  to be placed upon 
i t  in the future, i t  seems re la t ive ly  clear that Swaziland is s t i l l  a 
substantially long way o f f  from that point of economic development and 
growth, where her dependence on external human and material developmental 
resources can be s ign if icant ly  reduced. The Swaziland economy has 
experienced intense a c t iv i ty  during the 50's and 60 's, especially since 
the attainment of independence in 1966: i t  is this that allows Swaziland
to be val id ly  categorised as a transitional economy in the process of 
radical transformation. The Swaziland economy is however s t i l l  in what 
have been deemed ' the stages of pre-conditions' which over a comparatively 
long period of time prepare the country for self-sustained development.8^
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For the foreseeable future the Swaziland economy w i l l  continue to be 
intimately related to the external economic environment, the la t t e r  w i l l  
continue to play a v i ta l  role in the development of the former, and Swazi 
foreign policy w i l l  continue to emphasise, as a major value, the importation 
of extra-systemic financial and technical resources into the system. The 
promotion of public and private investment in Swaziland, the mobilisation 
of foreign aid from b i la tera l  and mult i la tera l  sources, the infusion of  
international technical assistance, and the expansion and divers i i fcat ion  
of external trading contacts - these are most l ike ly  to continue as major 
variables and issues in the pattern of Swaziland's relations with the world.
( b) Pol i t ica l  Foreign Policy Objectives and Strategies
The p o l i t ica l  dimension of Swaziland's foreign policy objectives are 
expressed by leadership's concern with reducing the permeability of the system 
in the face of external po l i t ica l  influences, and, more posit ive ly ,  with 
extending the international po l i t ica l  role of  the Swazi state through 
mult i la tera l  association with, and promotion of the po l i t ica l  value" of the 
Third World po l i t ica l  culture with which Swazi policy-makers are sentimentally 
and substantively linked. These concerns, which together underpin leadership's 
involvement with questions of po l i t ica l  autonomy, re f lect  the fact that 
Swaziland, as other developing states, constitutes a system whose resil ience  
to external po l i t ica l  pressures, and whose unit-strength is s t r i c t ly  l imited.
As we have noted, the real isation of Swaziland's development aims, and indeed, 
economic growth as a whole, is inextricably interwoven with the capacity of 
Swaziland's po l i t ica l  leadership to mobilise international development 
resources and integrate them with th local development e f fo r t .  From another 
perspective, the pace of domestic economic expansion is to a considerable 
degree dependent upon the att itudes, actions and in i t ia t iv e s  of other states,  
who can, through the exportation of capital and sk i l ls  to Swaziland, and through
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trade relations with Swaziland, bring pressures to bear upon the Swazi 
policy-making process, and place s t r i c t  l imitat ions upon its  outcomes.
This is not to say that Swaziland is consciously and perennially penetrated 
by exogenous po l i t ica l  pressures, for there is not automatically an element 
of vo l i t ion  in the process whereby the economic vulnerabi l i ty  of the Swazi 
system allows for the operation within the system of externally originating  
influences. Rather i t  is to suggest that the permeable nature of the Swazi 
system is the result of the natural interplay of economic forces between 
Swaziland as a developing state, and the more industrialised and developed 
world. Swaziland, as ctner developing states, performs the role of a primary 
goods exporter and importer of manufactured „ocds in the international economy. 
Swaziland is also an importer of capital and s k i l l s ,  and, within the context 
of the international economy, is , under such circumstances, in a situation of  
re la t ive  economic disadvantage which may be converted to p o l i t ic a l  gains by 
the more unscrupulous actors in the international system. This is not 
however an inevitable process.
Apart from the economic disadvantages under which the Swazi p o l i t ica l  sys 
system must labour, Swaziland's capacity to resist  external po l i t ica l  influences 
i . e .  her po l i t ica l  permeability, is also a product of her geographic and social 
situation. From a geographic perspective, Swaziland is - as has been 
recurrently emphasised - placed in a position which seriously detracts from 
the range of options avai lable to her policy-makers. The Swazi state is a 
land-locked state whose pattern of physical communications is dominated by 
two neighbours i . e .  the Republic of South Africa and Mozambique, both of 
whom have, up to the present instance, articulated a set of po l i t ica l  values 
which are sharply d<' ' from those internalised within the Swazi policy­
making process its n many ways therefore, the restrictions placed on
Swazi policy by ge ophic circumstance are far more acute than those
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confronting developing states which have re la t ive ly  independent means of  
communication, and p o l i t i c a l l y  similar  immediate neighbours. In geo-pol it ical  
terms therefore, Swaziland's position is seriously prejudiced.
Strategically-based p o l i t ica l  restrictions are however to some degree 
offset by the re la t ive  cohesion of Swazi society, which seriously l imits  the 
manoeuverability of exogenous influences within the internal Swazi system.
I t  must be emphasised once again, that the pattern of ethnic, cultural and 
race-based group competition so prominent in most developing states of the 
international community, is not paralleled in the Swazi case, and that with 
the exception of a small foreign Black community, and a European element 
sentimentally linked to actors outside of Swaziland , Swazi society is 
considerably less of a d i f ferent ia ted ent ity  than is comnonly experienced 
in the developed world. I t  must be emphasised, that the loyalty of the 
European community to the insti tu t ions of Swazi statehood is not in the 
opinion of some elements of the Swazi leadership, beyond doubt, and 
sentiments of this nature have tended to be aggravated by the economic 
predominance of the European community which allows i t  to exert a potential  
poli t ica l  influence, a lbe i t  in an informal manner. And insofar as these 
perceptions are incorporated into the policy-making process, measures 
designed to reduce the linkages between internal and external European 
elements are a natural result.  In general however, issues related to 
European loyalties have seldom been infused into policy-making actions,  
governmental attitudes on these issues remain obscure, vague and devoid of  
concrete form, and, as a result ,  the pattern of intra-societal group 
competition which provides unique opportunities for po l i t ica l  manipulation 
by external elements, is largely lacking.
In terms of permeability therefore, the relationship between Swaziland 
and the developed world as a whole, is again one which embodies both elements
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of d iss imi lar i ty  and s im i la r i ty .  Swaziland is similar to other developing 
states by vir tue of her economic vulnerabi l i ty  and dependence on foreign 
economic resources : and, as in the case of pract ical ly  a l l  other developing 
states, the perception of this fact on the part of po l i t ica l  leadership leads 
to the ar t iculat ion and implementation of a category of policies specif ica l ly  
designed to reduce the p o l i t ica l  impact of foreign part icipation in Ihe 
national economy. As with a l l  developing states moreover, the Swazi system 
does not contain a level of technological capacity adequate to offset  the 
effects of strategic disadvantage, and, as in the case of some developing 
states, lack of access to maritime outlets except via the te r r i to ry  of  
adjacent states, places restrictions on the conditions of freedom under 
which Swazi foreign policy is made. I t  is this that underpins a set of 
policies which are specif ica l ly  designed to counteract or negate the 
p o l i t i c a l l y  l imit ing effects of geographic location. F inal ly ,  Swaziland 
is dissimilar to other developing states by virtue of her level o f  social 
integration, and i t  is precisely because of the compact nature of Swazi 
society, that policies designed to fundamentally and drast ical ly  sever 
linkages between in ternally  and externally-located identity groups, are not, 
with a few minor exceptions, readily evident. I t  is thus essentially  
economic and geographic factors which underpin the concern of Swazi 
policy-makers with the permeable nature of the Swazi state.
I t  is however, of major importance to emphasis; that policies  
geared towards the affirmation of autonomy, are not only of an essentially  
negative character, and are not only concerned with consolidating the 
po l i t ica l  boundaries of the state. On the contrary in the case of 
Swaziland as in other developing states, the passive policies related  
to permeabi1ity-reduction are complemented by a more ac t iv is t  category of 
policies specif ica l ly  oriented to not only maintaining, but addit ional ly
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extending Swaziland's po l i t ica l  legitimacy, c re d ib i l i ty  and part icipat ion  
in the international system. In e f fect ive  practice, in Swaziland as in 
other developing states, individual impotency tends to be compensated for  
by a strong emphasis on the technique of mult i la teralised action. In common 
with the developing states as a whole, Swazi policy-makers have come to the 
recognition that association with r a c ia l ly ,  p o l i t i c a l l y ,  and cu l tu ra l ly -s im i la r  
actors in the international system, can provide for a set of leverages of on 
international po l i t ica l  nature, which would, under other circumstances, be 
denied to the Swazi state. I t  is this that underpins Swaziland's 
association with the po l i t ica l  culture of the Third World states, and wlich 
causes the po l i t ica l  values, sentiments and concerns of the Third World states 
to be defined as c r i t e r i a  for Swazi foreign policy. This is not tc suggest 
that Swaziland seeks to broaden her international po l i t ica l  contacts with the 
non-White and non-i.'estern developing states of the international community at 
the expense of contacts of a similar nature with the industr ia lised, White, 
Western world. Nor is i t  to suggest that the indigenous values of Swazi 
foreign policy i . e .  those articulated by policy-makers in response to the 
local social re a l i t ie s  confronting Swaziland, are subordinated to Third 
World values and p o l i t ica l  demands. On the contrary the economic 
developmental pressures confronting Swaziland strongly suggest both economic 
and po l i t ica l  contacts with as many international actors as possible, whilst  
in the calculations of Swazi policy-makers, national interests of a parochial 
nature can never be ent ire ly  sacrif iced to those demands generated by 
Swaziland's international i f f i l i a t e s  and a l l ie s .  Rather i t  is to suggest 
that the positive dimensions of the affirmation of po l i t ica l  autonomy, 
involve policies which place a special emphasis on the cult ivat ion of Third 
World relationships and associations. I t  is this s ituat ion, which reflects  
the set of p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and cultural commonalities between the 
developing states, which gives rise to the sensit iv i ty  displayed by Swazi 
policy-makers to the need to support and promote the po l i t ica l  values of
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the Third World culture, on both a regional and universal basis.
C. Politico-Economic Conflict and Choice in Swazi Foreign Policy
(a) Conflicting Pr ior i t ies  as a Feature of Swazi Foreign Policy
I t  seems re la t ive ly  clear th a t ,  in these terms, Swazi foreign policy is 
geared to the realisation of both specific po l i t ica l  and economic ends, 
related to the affirmation of an independent po l i t ica l  existence, and the 
promotion of domestic economic modernisation respectively. In pract ice , 
this situation tends to lead to an element of contradiction in Swazi foreign 
policy. I t  should be borne in mind that,  in pr inciple , policies concerned 
with po l i t ica l  autonomy of the developing state ,  and those concerned with i ts  
economic, modernisation cannot be reconciled with one another: insofar as
the former emphasises reduction of the permeability of the system, i t  
contains and exclusive dimension which cannot be readily and positively  
related to the value of domestic economic modernisation with i ts  emphasis 
on the importation of foreign economic resources - and hence po l i t ica l  
influences. This is no less true in the Swazi case. As in other developing 
states moreover, foreign policy in Swaziland is conducted in an environment 
of l imited human, material and time resources. The number of skil led  
individuals who can be used in the foreign policy task is l imited,  and the 
quantity of o f f ic ia ls  who are allocated a role in this endeavour vis-a-vis  
the perceivedly more immediate enterprise of domestic policy administration, 
is s t i l l  re la t ive ly  small. The l imited financial resources of Swaziland 
also means that the number of o f f ic ia ls  who can be employed to direct foreign 
policy ac t iv i ty  on a fu l l - t im e  basis is small, and i t  is upon this l imited  
collection of bureaucrats, poli t icians and diplomats that the vastly complicated 
exigencies of foreign policy administration dc\olves.
Under these circumstances, the art iculat ion and application of a
max- mally e f fect ive  and productive foreign policy requires that the l imited 
resources which can be employed to back Swaziland's foreign policy, and 
which can be integrated into the foreign policy system, must be distributed  
in such a manner as to, objectively or seemingly guarantee the largest 
possible returns. This in turn requires that  in considering the objectives 
to be realised through foreign policy action, Swaziland's policy-makers act 
to determine the value, importance or p r io r i ty  of certain discrete objectives 
vis-a-vis others, and conduct foreign policy upon this basis. In Swaziland 
as in other developing states, the response to a situation of broad po l i t ica l  
and economic foreign policy objectives under conditions of scarce available  
resources, is discrimination in favour of certain foreign policy goals at the 
expense of others. In Swaziland's foreign policy moreover, there exis ts, as 
in other developing states, a basic contradiction between such foreign 
policy objectives as are derived from the ' in te rna l '  demands of the nation- 
building task, and those as are derived from the 'external '  nation-building 
task respectively. In Swaziland, no less than in other developing systems 
the promotion of domestic legitimacy through the infusion of foreign economic 
resources in the interests of rapid socio-economic growth, contrasts sharply 
with the demands of po l i t ica l  consolidation with the ir  emphasis on reducing 
the penetrabil ity  of the state in a manner which perceivedly allows i t  a 
greater degree of independent po l i t ica l  action. Thus the economic demands 
of development contradict such po l i t ica l  demands as are associated with the 
value of po l i t ica l  freedom, sovereignty and self-determination.
In the Swaziland case moreover,this dichotomy is complicated by 
Swaziland's concurrent role as a regional actor and as a part icipant in the 
wider international system of ch Swaziland is equally a part. In general
the concern with rapid socio-. lomic modernisation conditions Swaziland's
foreign policy-makers to view tlu omotion of regional economic co-operation
as an important value underlying foreign policy action. And given the 
regional economic hegemony of the Republic of South A fr ica , this necessitates 
the maintenance, i f  not expansion, of contacts of both an economic and 
p o l i t ica l  nature with tf .j South African s t a t e . S w a a i l a n d ' s  international 
po l i t ica l  c re d ib i l i ty  however demands that Swaziland function in as independent 
a manner as possible, and part icu lar ly  as independently as possible from South 
Africa which has t rad i t io na l ly  been regarded as the po l i t ica l  director of both 
Swaziland's internal and external behaviour. The identity  linkages between 
Swaziland's po1icy-makers and those states which in aggregation compose the 
Third World group, has also served to socialise Swaziland's p o l i t ica l  value 
system into that of this wider international group, and given the profound 
distinctions between this po l i t ica l  culture and that of South Africa i t s e l f ,  
further stringent pressures are placed on Swazi foreign policy to adopt an 
anti-conformist stance v is-a-vis t ie  South African system. The po l i t ica l  
demands on Swaziland's foreign policy thus originate from the wide 
international arena, whilst the economic demands are to a considerable degree 
the product of Swaziland's role within the South African region. In practice 
these factors cross-cut the po l i t ica l  independence/economic development 
dichotomy, and make the defin it ion of p r io r i t ie s  in Swazi foreign policy a 
continual and v i t a l l y  important task.
The saliency of these factors is expressed in current terms in a 
number of issue-a* eas in Swazi foreign policy, a l l  of which express the 
Swazi-South African relationship in terms of the conflict ing relationship  
between the demands of po l i t ica l  independence and those of economic 
development.
At the lowest level ,  there is the issue of South African technical 
assistance to Swaziland. In a positive sense, South Africa's involvement
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in development in the same region allows i t  to constitute a part icular ly  
relevant source of information for the Swaziland development programme, 
whilst  the fact  chat South African machinery and plant can be obtained 
considerably more cheaply from South Africa than from alternative overseas 
sources, is also deeply appreciated in Swazi policy-making circ les. In 
the case of the direct involvement of South African personnel in Swazi 
development however, the matter is somewhat problematic and tends to touch 
d irec t ly  on the po l i t ica l  vis-a-v is economic sentiments of the Swazi policy­
making e l i t e .  In current terms there is a profound reluctance to accept 
the operations of South African personnel in Swaziland i t s e l f ,  except in 
circumstances of dire need, and where alternative sources of aid are 
unavailable. I t  is interesting to note for example, that notwithstanding 
the 1969 Swazi-South African agreement providing for the secondment of 
South Africans to the Swazi public service, no South African was to be employed 
in this capacity until  1971, and then only when the Department of Customs and 
Excise urgently required a small number of short-term personnel to meet the 
administrative demands of the renegotiated 1969 Customs Union Agreement.
This is in fact  the sole occasion upon which the 1969 technical assistance 
agreement has been operationalised. Insofar as the training of Swazi 
technicians is concerned, the treatment accorded to persons of colour in 
South Africa has been suff ic ient  to direct the flow of Swazi technicians to 
overseas insti tut ions where racial discrimination is less l ike ly  to be 
encountered. I t  must be emphasised that both the technical underdevelopment 
of the Swazi system and the role which South African assistance can play in 
this area, seems beyond doubt. In current terms, i t  seems equally beyond 
doubt that Swazi policy-makers are confronted with the choice of rationalis ing  
economic development, insofar as human sk i l ls  are required, and accepting the 
offers of a donor state ,  whose a c t iv i t ie s  are in many ways seen to be inimical
to the sovereign and independent status of Swaziland.
This raises a second and considerably more important issue-area of the 
South African-Swazi relationship which expresses the political-economic 
independence-development dichotomy. This refers to the Customs Union 
upon which so much of the economic development depends. The fact of the 
matter is ,  that notwithstanding the considerable economic benefits to be 
derived from part ic ipation in this arrangement, there exists in Swaziland 
policy-making perceptions today, a d ist inct  awareness of certain negative 
factors in this in s t i tu t io n ,  which do, or seem to,  impinge upon the 
independent and sovereign status of the Swazi state.
The f i r s t  of these factors refers to the decision-making processes of the
Union, part icu lar ly  the role of Swaziland (and of the two other part icipants)  in 
the making and taking of inst i tut ional  choices. In pract ice, the distr ibution  
of decision-making power has been a perennial problem in the history of the 
customs union arrangement. Indeed, pr ior  to 1969 i t  was South Africa alone 
which was responsible for  the taking of the Union's decision. Constitut ionally,
i t  was South Africa which was vested with control of payments from the customs
union pool: s im ilar ly  no provision was made for jo in t  consultation between
s t a t e s . ^  In practical terms, whilst  the external customs t a r i f f  could
not be altered by legis la t ion enacted by any member state ,  i t  was South
Africa alone which during the period 1910-69 made such alterat ions,  and did
so in a manner often insensitive and unrelated to the economic interests of 
her smaller partners. These circumstances were to condition the demand for 
jo in t  part icipation in decision-making: the demand for a renegotiated
agreement in 1969 was in fact to be occasioned by just  such demands, the 
immediate issue being the unilateral  decision on the part of South Africa 
to raise sales taxes in the union in a manner which would have negative 
effects on the Swazi tax structure.
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The renegotiated agreement makes provision for quarterly meetings 
of the governing commission of the Union, consultation with regard to the 
conclusion of trade agreements with outside states, and restrictions on South 
Africa's capacity to introduce amendments to dUv- rates in the absence of 
adequate notice and consultation. As such, i, ^enegotidied agreement goes 
fa r  to a l lev ia te  the demands of the minor partners for an equal decision­
making role. In practice however, whilst Swazi authorit ies concede that the 
new constitutionally-sanctioned opportunities for jo in t  consultation 
represent an improvement over the position prior to 1969, i t  is also pointed 
out that the mere existence of a consultative framework does not automatically 
in i t s e l f  increase the decision-making role which Swaziland and her two minor 
partners can play. I t  is strongly fe t that union decisions s t i l l  dc not 
adequately re f lect  a mutual exchange of opinions and a mutual concern with 
economic interests, and that until  such a time as decision-making in the 
customs union reflects a dialogue between stages who accord each other an 
equal, independent and sovereign status, jo in t  participation in any meaningful 
and democratic sense cannot be taken to exis t .  I t  is pointed out that on 
many occasions Swaziland and her minor partners are summoned to meetings merely 
to be informed of South African decisions and that such treatment is not in 
accord with that customarily prevail ing in diplomatic contacts between equal 
states. The pattern of negotiations within the customs union is therefore 
seen as not only disadvantageous to Swaziland's economic interests, but as
deleterious to her sovereign and independent status as well .
A second issue within the customs union framework which is seen to impinge 
on Swaziland's po l i t ica l  interests, relates to the question of the
industr ia lisat ion of the te r r i to ry .  Here again one is dealing with a set of
problems which are h istor ica l ly -rooted,  and whose legacy continues to impinge
on conterrporaty in ter -s ta te  relations, the adjustments of 1969 notwithstanding.
Considerable debate exists as to the precise influence of the South African
economy on past attempts at industr ia lisat ion in the former High Commission 
25/Terr i tor ies;  There seems l i t t l e  doubt however, that to one degree or 
another, South African actions in the period 1910-69 have been inimical to 
the industr ia lisat ion of the minority areas. During this period for  example, 
the ' f ree interchange of goods' within the Union was largely a euphemism, 
and taken in conjunction with the natural disadvantages of the small 
te r r i to ry 's  economies, this was to have an extremely depressing e f f e c t . ^  
During this period South Africa created t a r i f f  barriers for the protection 
of domestic nascent industr ies, whilst  refusing similar protective devices 
to the High Commission Terr i tor ies .  The 1969 agreement, with i ts  provisions 
allowing these states to impose duties to protect new industr ies, and to 
specify major industries for 'margins of protect ion ' , is a direct  response 
to this s i tuat ion, and has contributed in some degree to its  a l lev ia t ion .
The renegotiated agreement has not however removed a l l  the problems, 
and a number of outstanding issues continue to remain. In Swaziland these 
tend to centre, somewhat i ron ica l ly ,  not so much on the matter of inadequate 
protection for the establishment of new industr ies, but rather on the perceived 
refusal of t rad i t io na l ly  protected South African industry to accept 
competition from those industrial ventures which have been established in 
Swaziland, and which can, or w i l l  in the near future, productively compete 
with older and more established South African enterprises. In just i fy ing  
this point, Swaziland's policy-makers refer  to the confl ic t  which has 
surrounded the decision to establish a local f e r t i l i s e r  industry catering 
to both a regional and domestic market: the resistance on the part of the
South African Board of Trade and Industries to this venture, and the fact  
that i t  has contemplated blocking actions which may not be consti tut ionally
sanctioned by the customs union agreement, have further served to reinforce 
the Swazi view that South Africa is concerned with maintaining Swaziland 
in some sort of position of industrial backwardness and decay.27/  The 
opposition of certain South African industr ia l is ts  to the proposed 
electronics assembly plant, and to the Mobamech tractor venture, have 
further reinforced this syndrome.2®7
From the South African point of view i t  can valid ly  be argued on 
economic grounds that industr ia lisat ion of the customs union are; can best 
be promoted through the concentration of resources in specific areas where 
f a c i l i t i e s  already e x is t ,  and that as such the establishment of certain  
industrial ventures in Swaziland i t s e l f  cannot be rationalised insofar as 
the broader economic interests of the region are concerned. I t  can also 
be argued that problems regarding the location of industries on a regional 
basis are natural to relationships between developing and developed 
economies, and have v i r tu a l ly  nothing to do with in t e r - t e r r i to r i a l  poli t ics  
whatsoever. These are however not the dominant considerations as fa r  as 
Swaziland is concerned. The position of Swazi policy-makers is that the 
economic and po l i t ica l  connotations of the issue are inextricably entwined.
I t  is argued, more e x p l ic i t ly ,  that whether or not industrial ventures are 
to be established and operated within Swaziland's t e r r i to r i a l  boundaries 
is a matter to be decided upon by Swaziland's governmental authorities alone. 
Decisions of this nature, i t  is emphasised, l i e  within the prerogative of 
independent government, and to the degree that South African interests  
or authorit ies seek to e f fect  the content of these decisions, they 
prescribe or l im i t  the sovereign status which Swaziland enjoys. In these 
terms therefore, issues relat ing to the industr ia lisat ion of Swaziland 
within the customs framework, are a further instance of the independence- 
development dichotomy in Swazi-South African relations.
Turning from the customs union to the monetary union which currently 
exists between South Africa and the three former High Commission Terr i to r ies ,  
one is again confronted by a delicate balance between economic benefit  and 
perceived po l i t ica l  disadvantage. F i rs t ly  and foremostly, Swaziland's 
policy-makers are concerned with current arrangements in terms of which 
they receive no revenue from investments backing the Rand currency in 
circu la t ion ,  whilst  restr ictions l imit ing the access of the Swazi economy 
to capital markets in South Africa are also seen as indicators of an 
unequal arrangement. Another point of contention concerns currency 
readjustments, the determination of foreign exchange rates and the 
authorisation of foreign exchange transactions : the unilateral decision 
by South Africa to devalue the Rand in 1970 generated steep price increases 
in Swaziland (and Lesotho and Botswana), and this has served to stimulate 
the view that 'foreign excharge and exchange rate policies are determined 
In the l ig h t  of conditions facing the Republic of South Africa, and may 
confl ic t  with the interests of S w a z i l a n d ' . ^  I t  must be emphasised that 
such unilateral actions on South Africa's part have not always proved 
disadvantageous to the Swaziland economy, (the 1970 devaluation, for example, 
gave Swaziland's exports a welcome boost): nor should i t  be thought that
in terms of the monetary union structure Swaziland cannot exercise some 
independent control. Thus in the past Swaziland's credit policies have 
not always paralleled those employed in South Africa. Swaziland's policy­
makers do however, feel that part icipat ion in the Rand currency area places 
serious l imitat ions on the ir  independent action: i t  is pointed out that in
the absence of a national central bank and with Swaziland's gold and foreign 
exchange reserves held by the Reserve Bank, this could not be otherwise.
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The l imit ing effects of the monetary union have reflected themselves 
in a number of ways on recent occasions. Most importantly, Swazi policy - as
that of Lesotho and Botswana -has become increasingly concerned with promoting 
increased part ic ipation in the deliberations and decision-making operations 
of the South African Reserve Bank. The pattern of ad hoc consultation 
regarding monetary matters is neither regarded as e ffect ive  nor in a-cord 
with Swaziland's status as a sovereign member of an internation in ter -s ta te  
economic arrangement, and the nature of dialogue in these meetings is seen as 
analogous to that in the customs union, where mutual interaction and concern 
is sacrif iced to South African dominance. Swazi policy-makers feel concerned 
that such meetings are usually summoned only for the purpose of acquainting 
the minor partners in the monetary arrangement with decisions which South 
Africa has already taken, and complaints have been raised that Swazi objections 
have often been simply and blatantly  i g n o r e d . ^
In the l igh t  of these circumstances, Swazi policy has become geared 
to the creation of formal jo in t -par t ic ipato ry  decision-making f a c i l i t i e s  
within the monetary union. I t  has come to be f e l t  that only such 
inst i tut ions are consonant with the sovereign status of Swaziland in the 
monetary union, and that only through such inst itut ions can ' the legitimate  
interests of a l l  countries (be) taken fu l ly  into account in the management 
of the common currency a r e a ' .3?y/ I t  is on this basis too that Swazi 
o f f ic ia ls  have consulted with o f f ic ia ls  of the IMF regarding the costs and 
benefits of continued partic ipat ion in the monetary area, and have l iaised  
with their  counterparts in Botswana and Lesotho on similar mat t ers. As 
yet Swaziland's policy-makers have not yet reached the point where they believe 
the disadvantages of membership of the currency area outweigh the gains to be 
derived from p a r t ic ip a t io n :" ^  the be l ie f  however is strongly prevalent that  
continued partic ipat ion under existing arrangements is contradictory to the 
urge towards independence and maximum s e l f -c o n t r o l .3^
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The discontinuities generated by the concurrent commitment to the 
goals of economic development and po l i t ica l  independence are f in a l ly  
reflected in a series of issues derived from Swaziland's involvement with 
the insti tut ions of international organisation at the regional, continental, 
and universal levels.
F i rs t ly ,  whilst Swaziland's policy-makers do not at this stage 
seriously contemplate resignation from the Soutnern African Customs Union 
and monetary union despite their  cr it ic ism of these organisations, the 
desire to bring about alterat ions within the context of existing membership 
is considerably less evident in Swazi attitudes to a number of other South 
African regional organisations which f u l f i l l  less v i ta l  and less importantly 
beneficial functions. In practice, the po l i t ica l  dispositions of the policy­
makers of a l l  of the three former High Commission Te rr i to r ie s ,  have 
precipitated a d ist inct  concern with seeking membership of a lternative  
international inst i tu t ions ,  apart from South African dominance and control.
In current terms these sentiments have not been substantial ly translated 
into operational r e a l i t i e s ,  the one most notable exception oeing the 
decision on the part of the BLS states to leave the International Red Locust 
Control Service, in December 1970, for a new organisation which excludes 
Sout. African, Rhodesian and Portuguese part ic ipation.
The policy-makers of Swaziland have however seen i t  to be in the ir  
in teres t ,  both economically and p o l i t i c a l l y ,  to balance their  economic 
dependence on South Africa by attaining membership in other regional economic 
organisations whose ac t iv i t ies  seem to of fer  d is t inc t  benefits insofar as 
Swaziland is c o n c e r n e d . I n  part icu lar ,  Swaziland has sought membership 
of the European Common Market, which i t  sees as an especially important 
element in i ts  attempts to diversify  its  economic relationships. The
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reaction of the EEC is of special interest in that i t  has been made clear  
that until  such time as Swaziland can make suitable arrangements to reconcile 
its  current membership of the South African Customs Union with that of the 
EEC, Swaziland's application for associate membership w i l l  be confronted with 
a number of major d i f f i c u l t i e s .  The announcement by the chairman of the 
representatives committee, in January 1971 that the BLS states could accede 
to the Common Market as associate members with the renewal of the Yauonde 
Convention in 1975, provided that they agree to certain formulae similar  to 
those endorsed by other associated African states, is an important breakthrough. 
In practice however, Swaziland is s t i l l  confronted with the task of 
reconciling i ts  economic interests and commitments on a regional basis with 
those generated by the European organisation. The fact that South Africa 
has as yet done l i t t l e  to f a c i l i t a t e  the dilemma in which Swaziland 
finds i t s e l f  placed has done l i t t l e  to convince Swazi authorit ies that South 
Africa has l i t t l e  interest in the matter other than to maintain a sense of 
Swazi economic dependence on South African dominated regional arrangements.
This in turn has contributed to the po l i t ic isa t ion  of the issue, in terms 
of which i t  is oelieved that South Africa is consciously concerned with 
preventing Swaziland from exercising her r ight as a sovereign and independent 
state to select her international economic partners in a manner in which she 
sees f i t ,  and independently of external considerations and pressures. The 
establishment of links with the EEC has thus rapidly come to be seeri as an 
issue in that category of issues where the po l i t ica l  independence of 
Swaziland must be balanced on her economic relationship with South Afr ica ,  
and insofar as South Africa fa i ls  to recognise, and indeed even encourage Swazi 
part icipation in the EEC, Swazi policy-makers have come to associate the South 
African position as a direct intrusion on the prerogative of national 
independence with which the Swazi state is imbued."^
The foreign policy discontinuities generated by the concurrent 
concern with po l i t ica l  independence and economic se l f - in te re s t  are also 
manifest by the ambivalen4 role of Swaziland in the po l i t ica l  ac t iv i t ies  
of such international organisation as the OAU and the UN, where pressures 
of Swaziland's foreign policy-makers to f u l f i l l  the demands of po l i t ica l  
independence and involvement with the concerns of the Third World group are
most acute. In the OAU in part icu lar ,  Swaziland has been forced to tread a
narrow path and this can be seen, for example, in Swazi actions at the June 
1971 meeting of the OAU at Addis Ababa where Swaziland voted with the 
minority against anti-dialogue resolutions3^  v is-a-vis South Africa in
plenary sessions but was subsequently to abstain at the summit .
In the United Nations, where international pressures driving Swaziland
40 #to dissociate i t s e l f  ' from the regional po l i t ica l  environment conf l ic t  
direct ly  with Swaziland's economic stake in that context, the situation is 
s im ilar ,  and has also served to introduce an element of inconsistency into 
Swaziland's organisational part ic ipation. On a number of occasions 
Swaziland has clearly sided with those United Nations forces concerned 
with short-term social and po l i t ica l  change in South Afr ica ,  South West 
Afr ica ,  Rhodesia and the Portuguese t e r r i t o r i e s . 41  ^ On a number of other 
occasions however, Swaziland has not seen i t  to be in her in terest  to support 
resolutions of this nature, and has either voted against measures of this 
nature, or,  more commorly absented herself from voting proceedings. During
1971 for example, Swaziland e ither  absented herself  or abstained from voting 
on issues relat ing to South African credentials at the UN, the establishment 
of a UN Trust Fund for South Afr ica ,  the arms embargo on South Afr ica, and the 
direction of international trade union a c t iv i t ie s  against apartheid. During
1972 moreover, Swaziland tended to adopt a very low prof i le  on South African
questions in g e n e r a l ; ^  with regard to the South West African issue,
Swaziland merely called for the continuation of UN-South African negotiations, 
whils t  even though i t  condemned the actions of the Rhodesian White minority 
government, and the Portuguese role in Angola and Mozambique, i t  absented 
i t s e l f  from d irect ly  voting on the major Rhodesian resolutions, i . e .
Resolutions 2945 and 2946. Within the UN, Swaziland has been careful to 
emphasise that in no way does i t  support the current racial situation in 
Southern Afr ica ,  and that i t  would l ik e  to see, by some means and at some 
t ime, substantial changes. Swaziland has however also been careful to
emphasise that i t  is engaged in a necessary working relationship with 
Lisbon and Pre tor ia , and that the economic and geographic re a l i t ie s  of the 
Southern African system do not allow i t  to endorse the more radical measures 
directed against the South African and Portuguese regimes. Pol i t ica l  
sentiment thus tends to d i rect ly  con f l ic t  with material calculations, and 
i t  is this which has caused Swaziland, in the United Nations, to recurrently 
emphasise the force of persuasion.
( b) Pol i t ica l  Competition, Economic Development and Foreign Policy Choice
Under these circum >$, contradiction within a politico-economic nexus, 
is not alien to Swazi for .igti policy: policy-makers must therefore constantly
trade-of f  or r e ! • the values associated with po l i t ica l  autonomy to those 
linked to domestic economic development and modernisation, and the manner in 
which they do so determines the degree to which Swazi foreign policy emerges as 
a re la t iv e ly  coherent and e f fect ive ly  operational ent i ty .  In terms of our 
i n i t i a l  model this process, which reflects  the dynamics of foreign policy-choice 
and p r io r i ty -a l lo c a t io n ,  is d irect ly  affected by the total po l i t ica l  and 
economic domestic context w i th ir  which Swazi foreign policy-makers operate. 
Swaziland's foreign policy preferences, distributed along a politico-economic
spectrum, are thus an outgrowth of domestic p o l i t ica l  and economic conditions.
In the above sections i t  has been c learly  suggested that po l i t ica l  
competition within Swaziland i t s e l f ,  is not of a part icular ly  intensive 
nature. In the post-independence period the minority European community, 
which played a v i ta l  p o l i t ica l  role during the early s ix t ies ,  has, to a l l  
intents and purposes, surrendered this position in favour of a low-key 
p o l i t ica l  p rof i le  bolstered by economic weight. At the level of formal 
po l i t ica l  part icipation therefore,  the involvement of the European element 
in Swazi po l i t ics  has been s ign if icant ly  reduced. This is not however a 
part icu lar ly  unusual situat ion in tne post-independence po l i t ics  of newly- 
independent states, where the demise of the colonial system has led to 
profound redistributions of po l i t ica l  power amongst elements indigenous 
to the local colonial communities. What is perhaps unusual about the case 
of Swaziland however, is that in contrast to most other developing states, the 
actor which has emerged as being of primary po l i t ica l  importance in the post­
colonial oeriod, has not been the modern African nationalist  movement, but 
rather the t r iba l  ct tradit ional structures and inst i tut ions.  To all  
intents and purposes the la t t e r  have continued, to the present day, to 
remain the focus of mass identif icat ions and lo ya l t ies ,  and in combination 
with the past incapacity of the modernist Black movements to u t i l is e  
contemporarily relevant po l i t ica l  techniques for the mobilisation of power, 
large segments of the more sophisticated p o l i t ica l  elements in the system have 
continued to perceive the tradit ional inst i tut ions as the only form of viable 
po l i t ic a l  organisation in Swaziland, and to channel their  allegiances in 
this direction. In e f fect ive  practice, the seemingly better adapt ib i l i ty  
of Swazi tradit ional inst itut ions to the demands of modern po l i t ica l  
competition, and the fa i lu re  of the modernist Swazi African nationalist  
opposition to manipulate symbols and engage in actions to undercut tr iba l
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lo ya l t ies ,  have served to depress po l i t ica l  competition in the Swazi system, 
and to lead to a v i r tu a l ly  unprecedented situat ion for the developing sta te ,  
where the most conservative elements within the state have managed not only 
to capture, but to overwhelmingly dominate, the main instruments of national 
po l i t ica l  power.
In combination with these po l i t ica l  features is the economic fact that  
Swaziland is a developing system, which through experiencing a re la t iv e ly  high 
rate of economic growth has not yet attained a position of economic s e l f -  
sufficiency nor of egali tar ian economic reward-distribution. As a l l  developing 
economies, the Swaziland economy is a dual economy characterised by small areas 
of advanced wealth and technology surrounded by primitive peasant society 
based on subsistence agricultural  standards. This is t reflected demographically 
and geographically, by the fact that i t  is largely the minority European 
population which has benefitted from recent economic development growth, and 
that with the exception of certain specific and minor areas of Swaziland, the 
te r r i to ry  as a whole has remained re la t iv e ly  untouched by the forces of 
economic modernisation. I t  has, for example been estimated that in current 
terms 88 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product accrues either to the urban 
area or to the European population, and that only 24 per cent of Swaziland's 
population and 15 per cent of i ts  total t e r r i to r i a l  area has appreciably 
gained from economic development in recent years. Swaziland's economy is ,  
in comparison with the economies of most developing sta tes , a generally 
prosperous one, and this has tended to lead some less perspicacious observers 
to conclude that,  within the broad context of Third World economic development, 
Swaziland is somewhat an aberrant case, whose economic present and future is 
considerably brighter than most. A more penetrating look however, suggests 
that this is not ent ire ly  the case : indicators of a macro nature relat ing  
to Swazi production and trade point undeniably to progress and develooment,
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yet micro-indicators focussed at less than the general level c learly  
indicate that the material position of the average Swazi has not substantially  
improved in recent years, and that in many cases, urbanisation, l imited labour 
opportunities and population growth has created an economic situat ion where 
the lo t  of many Swazi has in fact worsened. In many ways the Swazi case 
underlines the need to clearly  distinguish between the s ta t is t ic a l  economic 
growth of developing societies as a whole, and the substantive benefits of 
economic growth as they are expressed at the grass-roots level.  I t  is 
this distinction that underwrites the concern among Swazi leaders with the 
fac t  that the benefits of economic development be 'more evenly spread',  and 
tha t ,  economic development notwithstanding, more emphasis be placed on 'a 
balanced and equitable distr ibut ion of development'.
In these terms Swaziland emerges, in terms of our i n i t i a l  model, as a 
member of the 'Low Intensity Pol i t ica l  Competition/Low Economic Returns' 
category. In terms of our i n i t i a l  statement moreover, this suggests that 
in the foreign policy value-confrontation between po l i t ica l  autonomy and 
domestic economic development, issues related to the la t t e r  w i l l  tend to be 
emphasised and given pr ior i ty  by Swazi policy-makers in general. In these 
terms, in a wider sense, the internal demands of nation-building with the ir  
emphasis on the promotion of domestic socio-economic development, w i l l  tend 
to be given precedence by the policy-maker, over the po l i t ica l  values 
associated with the external nation-building task, geared as i t  is to 
in ternationally  legitimising the state ,  consolidating i ts  po l i t ica l  
independence through the reduction of i ts  permeability, and extending its  
influence into the international system. I t  must be stressed that  this 
is not to suggest that the foreign policy of Swaziland is entire ly  dominated 
by economic considerations, and that the only c r i te r ia  for foreign policy­
making are those related to internal socio-economic development. Were this
the case, the making and application of foreign policy would constitute  
a fa r  more simple task. This would however suggest a serious decline in 
the a b i l i t y  of Swaziland to maintain i t s e l f  as a p o l i t i c a l ly  independent 
actor in the international system, and i t  is precisely as a result of this 
fac to r ,  and of i ts  real isat ion by a leadership which is motivated by 
p o l i t ica l  as well as economic concerns, domestically and in ternat ionally-  
rooted, that Swaziland, as any other s ta te ,  is involved with pol i t ics  as 
well as economic issues, and with the p o l i t ica l  dimensions of foreign policy 
action. What is rather suggested here, is that choice is an inexorable 
element of the foreign policy-making process, that choices between economic 
and po l i t ica l  values which impinge on domestic development and international  
autonomy are integral features of the policy-making processes of the developing 
s ta te ,  and that within this framework, when confronted with situations which 
require a def in i t ion or allocation of preferences, the Swazi policy-maker w i l l  
be conditioned to favour the economic values of -omestic modernisation by the 
character of local po l i t ic a l  and economic conditions.
D. Conclusion : The Future of Swaziland's Foreign Pol icy  ?
I t  is however, of considerable importance to emphasise that the 
process of foreign policy choice and p r io r i ty -a l lo c a t io n ,  within the p o l i t i c a l -  
economic nexu*- described above, is a highly dynamic one, whose shif ts  re f le c t  
the element j f  a l terat ion which is constantly present in a l l  societies, and 
part icular ly  in developing societ ies, where the pattern of po l i t ica l  and 
economic structures and inst itut ions are re la t iv e ly  unconsolidated or set.
This is no less true with regard to Swaziland, which although a fossil ised  
and obscure developing poli ty  in some respects, is nonetheless a polity  
which is inextricably involved in the process of both economic and po l i t ica l  
modernisation. Swaziland is ,  as other developing societies, in a process of
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social change : the momentum which is created in this regard must 
fundamentally a l te r  the context within which the policy-making process 
operates, and, under these circumstances, i t  would not seem inappropriate,  
in conclusion, to consider in terms of our model, some factors which i t  
seems, w i l l  influence the direction of Swazi foreign policy in the future.
Two of these seem to be of part icular  importance. In the f i r s t  
place, although on the basis of current developments i t  seems unlikely that  
Swaziland w i l l  experience an economic growth rate which w i l l  bring her to 
the point of self -suff ic iency in the indef in i te  future, there is good reason 
to expect that her strategic position w i l l  be fundamentally altered within 
the next few years. More e x p l i c i t l y ,  the establishment of an independent 
Black government in Mozambique w i l l  fundamentally a l te r  the p o l i t ica l  and 
geographic situation with which Swaziland policy-makers are confronted : 
i t  w i l l  allow Swaziland access to a maritime outlet which is controlled by 
a po l i t ic a l  regime whose values and po l i t ica l  predispositions are more 
closely akin to those internalised within Swaziland i t s e l f ,  and i t  w i l l  
substantial ly reduce Swaziland's dependence on the communications system 
of the Republic of South Africa. As such, the impact of geographic 
factors upon Swaziland's po l i t ica l  actions w i l l  be s ign if icant ly  blunted, 
and the system's permeability as a result of strategic circumstance w i l l  
be reduced. I t  must however be emphasised that an independent Frelimo- 
dominated government in Mozambique is not without certain economic and 
p o l i t ica l  disadvantages for Swaziland. Economically, the f lu id  and 
effect ive  transportation of goods and material into Swaziland, is d irect ly  
dependent on the capacity of Frelimo to assume and maintain po l i t ica l  
control in the new Mozambique s ta te ,  and in practice the c iv i l  s t r i f e  which 
has occurred in Mozambique during the transitionary period to po l i t ica l  
independence, has caused severe dislocation in the importation of goods,
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destined for Swaziland, from Lourenco Marques. P o l i t i c a l l y ,  to the degree 
that the new independent government in Mozambique lends i t s e l f  to support 
of the gueril la  struggle in South Afr ica ,  increased pressures w i l l  be 
placed on Swaziland by very virtue of i ts  strategic position, to identi fy  
i t s e l f  with the ' l ib e ra t io n 1movements'more strongly than i t  has done in 
the past : This could well generate severe economic and p o l i t ica l
repercussions, especially i f  a strong reaction is experienced on the 
part of the Republic of South Africa i t s e l f .  The future po l i t ica l  
independence of Mozambique insofar as i t  touches upon the strategic and 
p o l i t ica l  position of Swaziland is by no means clear, and the e f fects ,  at 
this point in time, are s t i l l  tinged with an element of ambiguity which 
in the dynamic prevail ing s i tuat ion, does not lend i t s e l f  to precise 
analysis. What is clear however, is tha t ,  positively or negatively,  
alterat ion in the po l i t ica l  status of Mozambique wi l l  have profound effects on 
Swaziland's international position, w i l l  fundamentally a l te r  the regional 
po l i t ica l  and economic configuration with which Swaziland's policy-makers 
are confronted, and, in so doing, bring about basic changes in the objectives, 
strategies and preferences of Swazi foreign policy.
Apart from these factors which w i l l  a f fect  that strategically-induced  
permeability of the Swaziland system, Swaziland's future foreign policy behaviour 
is also l ike ly  to be affected by internal po l i t ica l  developments, part icular ly  
in the character of p o l i t ica l  competition within the system. Jt has, for  
example, been noted that at present Swaziland constitutes a po l i t ica l  system 
where the continued resil ience of the t r iba l  system has operated to depress 
the level of po l i t ica l  opposition which can be offered by the more modern 
African nationalist parties of Swaziland. Whether or not this situation  
w il l  continue to prevail into the short-term future is open to debate, and, 
i t  would seem, depends on two factors. I t  is in the f i r s t  place of
importance to note that the recent suspension of the Swaziland Constitution 
( in  April  1973)^3y/ has led to Swaziland becoming, what is to a l l  intents 
and purposes, an absolute monarchy, and that in current terms, the role 
played by the oppositional elements in Swazi p o l i t ic s ,  (par t icu lar ly  the 
NNLC) has been to a large degree eradicated: the level of po l i t ica l
competition is today even lower than has been the case in the past. On 
the basis of past experience moreover, there is every reason to believe 
that the proposals to be announced by the Royal Commission, which is 
currently involved in drafting a new constitution,  w i l l  suggest that the 
highly centralised monarchico-tribal system which exists at present, be 
maintained. In fact ,  even the more modern elements of Swaziland's 
government have reiterated this position:44// they have, in the post­
independence period, supported a number of measures designed to consolidate 
the position of the governing party as the overwhelmingly predominant 
element in the system. These measures would include amendments introduced 
into the Standing Orders of the House of Assembly which e f fec t ive ly  muzzle 
opposition speakers , 45// the Immigration (Amendment) Bi 11,46// and, just  
prior to April 1973, the Constitution Amendment B i l l  which would have 
increased the number of royal nominees in Parliament.4^  A number of 
traditional-minded Swazi have indeed expressed admiration for  the attitude  
towards po l i t ica l  opposition on the part of the South African government, 
and this would further seem to indicate the l ik e ly  emphasis on centralisation  
in the new future constitution. One should also bear in mind the terms of 
reference of the current constitutional commission, which is specif ically  
directed to define a po l i t ica l  structure expressing, what is vaguely
defined as 1 the Swazi national character' ,  i . e .  po l i t ica l  domination by the 
48/King: i t  is also implied that 'd iv is ive  and destructive' oppositional
a c t iv i ty  should not be part of the new order, that the po l i t ica l  role of
the trade union movement w i l l  be 1 re-examined1, and that the new constitution  
must l im i t  the capacity of the jud ic iary  to overrule the government at the 
appeal le v e l .49/
In evaluating the future level of p o li t ic a l  competition in Swaziland,
a second fact should however be borne in mind; namely, that the level of
p o l i t ic a l  competition within a system cannot be inferred simply from the
opportunities provided for p o li t ic a l  opposition to express i ts e l f  through
a constitutional framework. On the contrary, p o l it ic a l processes largely
transcend formal in s titu t io n a l structures, and in many ways operate
independently of legally  sanctioned patterns of government organisation.
In the case of Swaziland, this suggests that certain broad soc io-po lit ica l
forces may well operate to generate new p o lit ic a l  patterns notwithstanding
the re s tr ic t iv e  character of the proposed new constitution. In the more
p o l i t ic a l ly  sophisticated urban and industrial areas for example, there is
some evidence to suggest that support for the modernist and nationa lis t
counter-elites is on the in c lin e , and that the forces of p o l it ic a l
modernisation and an ti- tr ib a lis m  are already making s ign ificant inroads
amongst the non-Swazi Black population, the industrial workers, and increasing
numbers of young and more educated detribalised Swazi who cannot readily be
50/absorbed into the s t i l l -c o n s tr ic te d  developing economy. What is perhaps
of even more significance is that s im ilar forces tend to operate within the 
Imbokodvc National Party, i . e .  within the bastion of Swazi t ra d it io n , i t s e l f .
The Imbokodvo is ,  as has been noted, a re la t iv e ly  cohesive organisation where 
the combination of tr iba l lo y a lt ie s ,  e f f ic ie n t  organisation and centralised  
structure depress the po ss ib il i t ies  for in tra -party  conflic t and competition.
In current terms however, these factors have not in themselves proved su ff ic ie n t  
to completely preclude an element of in tra-party  competition, which derived
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from several sources, augurs of considerable importance for the p o lit ic a l  
development of Swaziland in the future.
In the f i r s t  place, an element of in tra -party  stress is derived from 
the highly personalised charismatic character of leadership, which, in the 
case of the INM, as in the case of other African p o lit ic a l p a rt ie s , seriously 
l im its  p o ss ib ili t ies  for the f lu id  transfer of leadership, under conditions 
where such proves necessary. There seems l i t t l e  doubt that those factors 
which make for the in tra -party  predominance of the King w i l l  continue to 
allow the la t te r  to remain at the heart, and in control of the party system 
so long as he is mentally and physically able. I t  should nonetheless be 
borne in mind that the advanced age of Sobhuza places severe lim itations on 
his a b i l i ty  to continue to function in an integrating capacity into the 
long-term fu ture , and, in practice, the effects of this are already being 
f e l t  in the internal dynamics of the party, which are increasingly becoming 
characterised by a jockeying of personalities and groupings intent upon 
establishing themselves in a position whereby, in the event of the death 
of the King, positions of leadership can be monopolised. The fact that 
the heir to the throne (who according to Swazi custom is only chosen with 
the actual death of the king) is unlikely to possess the p o lit ic a l education 
and expertise of the present Ngwenyama, and, as a result w i l l  not be able to 
dominate Swazi p o lit ic a l l i f e  to the extent that Sobhuza has done in the past 
further aggravates the position as numerous individuals and groups seek to 
consolidate or gain power at the expense of the next Ngwenyama. The 
dysfunctionalities precipitated by charismatic leadership seek thus to wreak 
effects in the INM no less than in analogous situations in African party 
p o lit ic s .
The level of in tra -party  competition derived from the struggle for
future power tends to be further enhanced by the existence within the party 
of conflic ting attitudes regarding the processes of modernisation, the role 
of the INM in these processes, and the form that the party should assume in 
th e ir  face. I t  is of importance to recognise that, common tr iba l  
identif ica tions  notwithstanding, social and economic modernisation in Swazi 
society has led to the emergence of elements within the Swazi system who 
perceive p o lit ic a l modernisation - especially the p o lit ic a l modernisation 
of the governing party, the INM - to be a v ita l  and necessary concomitant 
to the patterns of development expressed throughout Swazi society as a whole.
In practice, the INM is a broad-based party with an 'absorptive' character, 
and this has meant, that there exists within the INM today a growing number 
of 'modern' p o l i t ic a l ly  aware Swazis, who desire greater p o lit ic a l  
p artic ipa tion , who resent the dominance of the INM by the trad it io na l chiefs, 
and who as such constitute an important source of internal co n fl ic t  within  
the party i t s e l f .  What one sees developing within the INM reflects a pattern 
of in tra -party  competition experienced in a modernising context by a variety  
of African p o lit ic a l parties as a whole. What one sees, is a growing sense 
of competition between an emerging group of bureaucrats, (concerned with 
the development of operationally-effic ic-nt mechanisms to meet the demands 
of socio-economic r e a l i t ie s ) ,  and older tr ib a l authorities with an emnhasis 
on and orientation towards trad itiona l procedures which have proved e , rective  
in the past. There exists in the INM today a growing breed of vigorous 
young po lit ic ians - such as Senator Polycarp Dhlamini (M inister of J u s t ic e ) , 
Elias Dhladhla (M inister of State for Establishment and Training1, Simon Nxumalo 
and Dr. Allen Nxumalo etc. - who are increasingly impatient with the Imbokodvo 
establishment as i t  currently e x is ts , and who seek the rationa lisation  of the 
party, of its  objectives and operating procedures, in the face of modernity.
I t  is to be expected moreover, that the death of Sobhuza w i l l  radically
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enhance these strains outgrown from the modernisation process; the new 
Ngwenyama, inexperienced as he is ,  w i l l  be faced with an on-going p o l i t ic a l  
system led by e l ite s  of experience and confidence, most of whom have been 
involved in p o lit ic a l manoeuvering for over a decade, and few of whom w i l l  
accept the dominance of the trad itiona l in s t i tu t io n s , and of the next 
Ngwenyama, as they have done in the past.
This pattern of s tra in , is - though to a s t i l l  lim ited degree - already 
evident, as sentiments that the current nature of the INM is leading 
Swaziland to a position of p o lit ic a l immobility and cultural obscui ■■mtism, 
become articu la ted , and as the gap between the more modern elements in the 
party and the Throne backed by conservative rural support, become more 
d is t in c t .  In practice divergencies of opinion have occurred in the realm 
of two major issues. F i r s t ly , antagonism have been generated within the 
IN M  with regard to the question of the relationship between the maintenance 
of trad itiona l patterns of Swazi culture and the demands, and modernising 
influence, of socio-economic development; thus, on the one hand, younger 
members of the INM establishment w h o  emphasise the primacy of development 
(such as Mr. Simon Nxumalo) have come into direct co n fl ic t  with more 
trad itiona l members of the Establishment (such as Prince Mfanasibili Dhlamini, 
a nephew of the King), who have publicly expressed fears as to the long­
term effects on Swazi culture of accelerated development, and who have 
ssed for a closer integration of the two variables with each o t h e r . ^
' second of these issue-areas concerns the question of land reform, which 
.ntimately related to the trad itionalist-m odernist debate within the INM, 
by virtue of the terms of the Swazi Constitution giving fu l l  and sole authority  
for the control of Swazi Nation land to the SNC. T ra d it io n a lis t  elements in 
the SNC have strong!v resisted suggestions that a lterations in processes of 
land be effected - and necessarily so since the current sole a b i l i ty  of the
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chiefs to a l lo t  Swazi Nation land constitutes the basis of th e ir  p o lit ic a l  
power -  and this has necessarily created antagonisms between this group and 
more modernised elements within the party concerned with rational economic 
development.
What does this suggest insofar as the future of Swazi Foreign policy is 
concerned ? Host b lun tly , i t  suggests the possible demise in the face of 
modernisation of the p o li t ic a l  role of the t ra d it io n a l is t  elements in Swazi 
policy-making, and the increased incorporation into the policy-making process 
of p o l i t ic a l  values which are more closely related to the ideological 
categories currently articu lated in the rest of Black A frica , and throughout 
the Third World as a whole. This does not imply an automatic transformation 
of Swazi foreign policy into a set of social actions whose major feature is 
a radical m ilitancy, and whose major emphases are p o l i t ic a l ,  rather than 
economic, as in the past. I t  does however suggest tha t, in terms of our 
model, Swaziland may be moving towards the 'High Intensity P o lit ica l  
Competition/Low tconomic Returns' prototype, where the commitment to foreign 
policy values related to the issues of p o li t ic a l  autonomy rather than domestic 
economic development, is at once both more pronounced and evident. I t  is 
thus not inconceivable, that with an increased element of d if fe re n tia t io n  and 
c o n fl ic t  within the p o li t ic a l  system, with a greater balance between the 
p o lit ic a l  weight wiich can be exercised by trad itional and modernist elements, 
the symbols of national p o lit ic a l independence w i l l  become far more sa lient  
to the p o lit ic a l process, and the capacity of policy-makers to a rticu la te  
positions which tend to emphasise economic development, and the su sequent 
necessary involvement of foreign economic forces in the national economy, 
substantia lly  undercut. The freedom which Swazi policy-makers currently 
enjoy in following a development-oriented policy may, under these circumstances,
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become somewhat restr ic ted , and the demands on government to ju s t i fy  this 
position in re lation to p o lit ica l self-determination, increased.
In conclusion therefore, Swaziland is in many ways d if fe ren t from 
other developing societies. Swaziland is a state whose internal social 
composition and cohesion serves to enhance the range of options available  
to foreign policy-makers in the de fin it ion  of objectives, the making of 
choices and the articu la tion  of strategies for implementation in the 
international environment: i t  is however also a developing state whose 
p o lit ic a l options are lim ited by a particu larly  acute set of geographic 
circumstances. In common with other developing states, Swaziland is 
dependent for i ts  economic development on external in it ia t iv e s  and supports, 
i t  i s ,  as a u n it ,  devoid of stockpiles of national power which automatically 
legitimate its  claims to international status, and i t  is a state whose acial 
characteris tics , h istorica l past and p o lit ic a l a f f in i t ie s  integrate its  
p o lit ica l leadership with the general culture prevalent in those states 
which are neither White, Western nor highly-industralised in character.
I t  is this that underpins Swazi foreign policy behaviour with its  emphasis 
on the assertion of p o l i t ic a l  autonomy and the modernisation of domestic 
society and economy. In te rn a lly , the rate of economic growth, and the 
re la t iv e  absence of a credible p o lit ic a l counter-e lite  which can e ffec tive ly  
manipulate the symbols of national independence, allows Swazi policy-makers 
to emphasise the la t te r  foreign policy values i . e .  those of an economic 
nature, rather than those of the former. Swazi society is however, both 
in a state of modernisation and social change : i t  cannot therefore be assumed 
that the particu lar preferences of the current policy-making e l i t e  w i l l  
remain constant into the indefin ite  future.
2 1 9 .
NOTES OIJ CHAPTER 5
1. See Chapter 3 above.
2. F a ir ,  Murdoch and Jones, ib id .
3. F a ir ,  Murdoch and Jones, ib id.
4. Friedmann, ib id .
6. Friedmann, ib id .
6. Rostow, ib id .
7. See Chapter 3 above.
8. The Star, 7.1.74.
9. The Star, 19.3.73 and 10.5.73.
10. The Star, 19.3.73.
11. The S tar, 17.11.72.
12. The Star, 17.11.72.
13. The Star, 17.11.72.
14. Times of Swaziland, 16.3.73.
15. Times of Swaziland, 16.3.73.
16. The Star, 7.1.74. African Development, February 1973.
17. The S tar, 7.1.74.
18. The Star, 7.1.74.
19. African Development, February, 1973.
20. The Star, 7.1 .74.
21. The Star, 7.1.74.
22. Rostow, ib id.
23. For a description of some of the p o li t ic a l  instruments which can be 
used by Swaziland to influence South A frica , see C. Potholm in 
Potholm and Dale, ib id .
24. See Section 12, Schedule of the South Africa Act of 1909.
25. The view that the customs union has stunted the industrial development
of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland is advanced by D. Cowan - 'Towards a 
Common Market in Southern A fr ic a 1. Optima, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1967, and in 
'South African Customs Union' in Standard Bank Review, ib id . A contrary 
position is adopted by the Financial M a il, 14.7.67, and in Leistner and 
Smit, ibid.
220 .
26. This is referred to , in te r  a l ia ,  in Swaziland Government : Development
Plan 1963-1966. (Mbabane, Government P r in te r , 1964).
27. For a description of South African resistance to this project, see
Financial Mail.
28. I t  should also be noted that South Africa has not favoured the
establishment of a television assembly plant in Swaziland: see
Times of Swaziland, 9.2.73: The S tar, 31.8.73, 23.9.73, 20.7.72:
Financial M ail, 4.2.72: Financial Gazette, 21.4.72.
29. Second National Development Plan, i b i d . , p .25.
30. Sentiments of this nature were recently expressed at a jo in t  currency 
conference held in Swaziland during March 1973 (Times of Swaziland, 
25.3.73).
31. See 1972/73 Budget Speech (The Parliamentarian : Parliamentary Reports. 
Swaziland, Vol. L I I I ,  1972, p .353).
32. Second National Development Plan, ib id . ,  p .25.
33. Financial Gazette, 10.12.71.
34. Financial M ail, 24.12.71.
35. In 1974 moreover, a decision was taken to establish a local currency 
to be used in domestic transactions in parity with the Rand (Rand 
Daily M ail, 23 .3 .74).
36. Other issues which have brought about an element of con fl ic t  in 
South African-Swaziland relations include South African refusal to 
countenance the screening of the controversial film  ' Last Tango in 
Paris' in Swaziland. (Rand Daily M ail, 26 .7 .73); and the question 
of compensation for V e loss of te rr i to ry  occasioned by the 
construction of the Strijdom Dam on the Pongola River near the 
Swaziland border (Rand Daily M ail, 5 .6 .73 ).
37. See S. Nxumalo -'Swaziland and In tra-African Trade' ib id . ;
and S. Nxumalo - ' International Trade and Investment . . . ' ,  ib id .
38. This fact has been recognised in some South African business circles  
(The Star, 13.12.72).
39. The invidiousness of Swaziland's position between the OAU and South
Africa is typ if ied  in the case of the recent decision by the OAU to 
support o il sanctions against South Africa : this has generated 
profound p o li t ic a l  and economic problems for a l l  of the former High 
Commission Territories  (See, for example, Rand Daily M ail, 19.11.73, 
end The Star, 18.12.73, 29.11.73 and 5.12.73).
40. For Swaziland's voting record at the United Nations see D. Hirschmann - 
'Southern African Voting in the United Nations General Assembly, 1971-72' 
(Johannesburg, South African In s ti tu te  of International A ffa irs , 1973).
2 2 1 .
41. D. Hirschmann, ib id .
42. D, Hirschmann, ib id .
43. Times of Swaziland 20.4.73. For background see The Star, 20.4.73  
and 18.4.73.
44. See speech by Prime Minister in News From Swaziland, 25.3.72: The Star,
20.4.73, 14.4.73, 29.8.73: The Times of Swaziland, 14.10.60: the
issue is also dealt with in the standard works on Swaziland's p o lit ic a l  
history, i . e .  Potholm, ib id . ,  Stevens, ib id. and van Wyk, ib id .
45. The Parliamentarian, Parliamentary Reports (Swaziland), Vol. LI I I ,
1972, p .353.
46. The Star, 18.11.72.
47. The Star, 28.7.72 and 4.12.72.
48. Rand Daily M a il , 6 .9 .73 .
49. The Star, 29.8.73 and 18.4.73.
50. See The S tar, 29.8.73.
51. See African Confidential, May 5th, 1972.
appendices
2 2 2 .
APPENDIX I SWAZILAND'S TREATIES. +
+ The Swaziland Ministry of Foreign A ffa irs  does not have a Treaty 
Officer nor a fu l ly  up-dated Treaty Register: the following -
which is transcribed d irec tly  from the existing Treaty Register - 
does not therefore represent a fully-complete l i s t .
i )  BILATERAL TREATIES
ALBANIA
Extradition Treaty
ARGENTINA
Extradition Treaty 
A ir Services Treaty
AUSTRIA
Legal Proceedings Treaty 
Exchange of Notes of Legal Proceedings 
Treaty.
A ir Services Treaty 
Consular Treaty
BELGIUM
1926
1889/1909 
1946. (Superseded 
1965: Terminated 1971.)
Extradition Treaty 
Legal Proceedings Treaty 
Supplementary Convention on Legal 
Proceedings.
Air Services Treaty 
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 
Treaty on C iv ilian  War Victims 
Arrangements to F a c il i ta te  Travel 
Consular Treaty
Receipt of Compensation for War Damages 
Treaty
BOLIVIA
Extradition Treaty 
Commercial Treaty
BRAZIL
Commercial Relations Treaty
Air Services Treaty
Exchange of Notes on A ir Services
1931/1932
1951
1956
1960
1907/1911/1923/1968
1922/1931
1932/1935
1951
1953
1957 (Terminated 1970)
1960 (Superseded 1970)
1961
1948
1892/1911
1911
1936
1946
1952
223.
BULGARIA
Settlement of Financial Matters Agreement 1955 (Terminated 1970) 
Exchange or Notes on Financial Matters 1959 (Terminated 1970)
BURMA
Air Services Treaty
Exchange of Notes on Air Serv'ces
CHILE
Exchange of Notes on A ir Services 
Extradition Treaty
CHINA
Customs Ta rif fs  Treaty
Treaty on E xtra -T err ito r ia l Rights
COLUMBIA
CUBA
Extradition Treaty 
Air Services Treaty
Extradition Treaty
Air Services Treaty
Exchange of Notes on A ir Se vices
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Extraditio.. Treaty 
Legal Proceedings Treaty 
Supplementary Convention on Legal 
Proceedings 
Commercial and Navigation Treaty 
Exchange of Notes on Commerce and 
Navigation 
Treaty on Mutual Upkeep of War Graves 
Air Services Treaty
Naturalisation and Compensation Treaty
DENMARK
Extradition Treaty 
Supplementary Convention on 
Extradition  
Legal Proceedings Treaty 
Visa Abolition Treaty 
Air Services Treaty 
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 
Consular Treaty
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
1952
1953/1957
1965
1897/1909
1928
1943 (Terminated 1970)
1888/1929
1947
1904/1930
1948
1957
1924 (Continued 1970) 
1927/1931 (Modified 1971)
1937 (Modified 1971)
1923
1926
1949 (Terminated 1970) 
1960 (Terminated 1971) 
1949 (Terminates 1970)
1873/1909
1935
1932 (Modified 1971) 
1947/1948 (Superseded
1952
1953 
1962
1969)
Air Services Treaty 1951
224.
ECUADOR
Extradition Treaty
EGYPT
Exchange of Notes on Commerce 
War Graves Agreement 
Agreement on the Resumption of 
Diplomatic Relations and British  
Property in Egypt 
Exchange of Notes on British Property 
in Egypt
EL SALVADOR
Extradition Treaty
ETHIOPIA
Air Services Treaty
FINLAND
Extradition Treaty 
Legal Proceedings Treaty 
Convention Regarding the Suppression 
of the I l l i c i t  Importation of Alcoholic 
Liquor into Finland 
Visa Abolition Treat)
A ir Services Treaty
FRANCE
Extradition Treaty
Supplementary Convention on Extradition  
Legal Proceedings Treaty 
Air Transport Treaty 
Consular Treaty 
War Graves Treaty 
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 
Exchange of Notes on War Damage Claims 
Abolition of Consular Fees on B il ls  
of Health Agreement
GERMANY
Extradition Treaty
Convention Reapolying for Extradition  
Treaty
Legal Proceedings Treaty 
Monetary Agreement 
Air Services Treaty 
Consular Treaty
Exchange of Notes on A ir Services
i 880/1910
1930
1952
1959 (Terminated 1970) 
1962 (Terminated 1970)
1881/1909
1958
1924
1933/1935
1933 (Terminated 1970) 
1961 (Superseded 1970) 
1965 (Terminated 1971)
1876/1910
1896/1908/1910
1922/1932
1946
1951
1951 (Terminated 1970)
1953
1954 (Terminated 1970) 
1939
1872/1911
1960
1923/1930/1959
1953
1955
1956 
196:
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GREECE
Extradition Treaty 1910/1912
Legal Proceedings Treaty 1936/1939 (Modified 1970)
Consular Treaty 1953
Visa Abolition Treaty 1965
Agreement on the Recognition of Tonnage 
Measurement C ertif icates 1926
GUATEMALA
Extradition Treaty 1885/1909
Additional Protocol on Extradition 1914
HAITI
Extradition Treaty 1874/1909
HUNGARY
Extradition Treaty 1873/19V (Continued
1971)
Supplementary Declaration on Extradition 1901/1911 (Continued
1971)
Supplementary Convention on Extradition 1936 (Continued 1971)
Legal Proceedings Treaty 1935 (Modified 1971)
A ir  Services Treaty 1960)
ICELAND
Extradition Treaty 1873/1937
Supplementary Conven, on Extradition 1938 
Visa Abolition Treaty 1947/1948
A ir  Services Treaty 1950
A rb itration Convention 1905
Exchange of Notes Renewing Arbitration  
Convention 1937
INDONESIA
IRAN
A ir Services Treaty i960
Commercial Convention 1903
Agreement Modifying Commercial Convention 1920
Exchange of Notes on Payments Relations 1954 (Terminated 1970)
A ir  Services Treaty 1960
IRAQ
Extradition Treaty 
Legal Proceedings Treaty 
Air Services Treaty
1932 (Continued 1970) 
1935/1939 (Modified 1970) 
1951 (Terminated 1970)
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ISRAEL
A ir Services Treaty 1950
Exchange of Notes on A ir  Services 1959
Extradition Treaty 1960 (Continued 1970)
ITALY
Extradition Treaty 1873/1911
Legal Proceedings Treaty 1930/1932
Exchange of Notes on I ta l ia n  Assets 1947/1948
Visa Abolition Treaty 1947/1948
A ir Services Treaty 1948
Agreement of Carriage of Dangerous Goods
in A irc ra ft  1351
Consular Agreement 1954
Exchange of Notes on A ir Services 1962/1963
JAPAN
Agreement on Tonnage Measurement of 
Merchant Ships 
A ir Services Treaty 
Consular Treaty
1922
1952
1964
KUWAIT
A ir  Services Treaty
Exchange of Notes on A ir Services
1960
1963
LEBANON
A ir Services Treaty
Exchange of Notes on A ir  Services
1951
1953/1962
LIBERIA
Extradition Treaty 1892/1903
LIBYA
A ir Services Treaty 1953
LUXEMBOURG
Extradition Treaty 1880/1910 (Continued
1970)
Agreement on Compensation for War Damages 1954 (Terminated 1970
Agreement on Arrangements to F a c il i ta te
Travel 1960 (Terminated 1970
227.
MEXICO
Treaty on Reciprocal Exemption from 
Compulsory M il i ta ry  Service 1943
Consular Treaty 1954
MONACO
Extradition Treaty 1891/1931
NETHERLANDS
Extradition Treaty 
Legal Proceedings Treaty 
Commercial Treaty 
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 
Agreement on Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods in A irc ra ft  
Agreement on Arrangement to F a c il i ta te  
Travel
1898/1914
1932/1934
1935
1947
1951
1960 (Superseded 1970)
NICARAGUA
Extradition Treaty 1905/1909
NORWAY
Extradition Treaty 
Agreement Relating to Extradition  
Legal Proceedings Treaty 
Visa Abolition Treaty
Consular Treaty
Air Services Treaty
Exchange of Notes on Air Services
1873/1909
1907
1931 (Modified 1970) 
1947/1948 (Superseded 
1969)
1951
1952 (Terminated 1970) 
1953/1955/1956/1965
(Terminated 1970)
PANAMA
Extradition Treaty 
Air Services Treaty
1906/1909
1951
PARAGUAY
Extradition Treaty 1908/1913
PERU
Extradition Treaty
Air Services Treaty
Exchange of Notes on Air Services
1904/1909
1947
1961
PHILIPPINES
Air Services Treaty 1955 (Terminated 1971)
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 1955/1956/1957/1958
(Terminated 1971)
228.
POLAND
Legal Proceedings Treaty *931/1933
Extradition Treaty 1932
Agreement on Tonnage Measurement
C ertif icates  1934
Agreement on Naturalisation Compensation 1948 (Terminated 1970)
Agreement on Settlement of British Claims 
Against Polish Government 1954 (Terminated 1970)
A ir  Services Treaty 19*"
PORTUGAL
Extradition Treaty 1892/1921
Treaty on Demarcation of Swaziland- 
Mozambique Boundary 1927
Agreement on Tonnage Measurement
C ertif icates  1926
Legal Proceedings Treaty 1931/1933
Agreement on Flag Discrimination in
Portuguese Ports 1933
Treaty on Commercial Relations Between 
Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland 1938 
Agreement on Identity  Documents of 
A irc ra ft  Personnel 1940
Treaty on A ir Services Between Terr ito ries  1945 
Exchange of Notes on A ir Services 1952/1955
Treaty on Commerce and Navigation 1914
RUMANIA
Extradition Treaty 1893/1909
Agreement on Settlement of Financial 
Matters 1960 (Terminated 1970)
SAN MARINO
Extradition Treaty 1899/1910
Visa Abolition Treaty 1949
SOVIET UNION
Agreement on Reciprocal Notification
of Arrest and Imprisonment 1937
Payments Agreement 1947 (Terminated 1970)
A ir  Services Treaty 1957
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 1960
Abolition of Consular Visa Fees Agreement 1964
SPAIN
Extradition Treaty 1878/1910
Supplementary Declaration on Extradition 1889
Treaty on Commerce and Navigation 1922
Exchange of Notes on Customs and Tariffs  1923
Convention Revising Treaty on Commerce 
and Navigation 1927
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Exchange of Notes Revising Commerce and 
Navigation Treaty 1928
Legal Proceedings Treaty 192C/1931
Air Services Treaty 1950
Consular Treaty 1961
SUDAN
Air Services Treaty 1961
SWEDEN
Legal Proceedings Treaty 1930/1931
Air Services Treaty 1946 (Terminated 1971)
Visa Abolition Treaty 1947/1948 (Superseded
1970)
Consular Treaty 1952
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 1952 (Terminated 1971)
Agreement on Double Taxation 1960/1961
SWITZERLAND
Extradition Treaty 1880/1909
Supplementary Convention on Extraoition 1904/1934
Leg*" Proceedings Treaty 1937/1940
Air Services Treaty 1950
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 1957
Aorcgation of Declaration of Death Duties
Duties in the Canton de Vaud 1957
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 1959
Arrangements to F a c il i ta te  Travel 1963
SYRIA
Air Services Treaty 1954
THAILAND
Extradition Treaty 1911/1912
Air Services Treaty 1950
Exchange of Notes on A<r Services 1954/1956/1959/1961
TONGA
Amity Treaty 1958
TURKEY
Legal Proceedings Treaty 1931/1933 (Modified 1971)
A ir Services Treaty 1946 (Terminated 1971)
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 1946/1947/1948/1951
(Terminated 1971)
Agreement on Commercial Debts Owed by 
Residents of Turkey 1959 (Terminated 1970)
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Agreement on Real and Personal Property 
Extradition Treaty 
A ir Services Treaty 
Exchange of Notes on Air Services 
Agreement on the Financing of Programmes 
of Cultural and Educational Exchange
1899/1907
1931 (Continued
1946
1955/1956
1965
1970)
URAGUAY
Extradition Treaty 1911
Protocol Amending Extradition Treaty 1891
Visa Abolition Treaty 1961/1962
A ir  Services Treaty 1947
YUGOSLAVIA
Extradition Treaty
Treaty on Commerce and Navigation 
Legal Proceedings Treaty 
A ir Services Treaty
1.400/1909 (Continued 
1971)
1927
1936
1959 (Terminated 1971)
YEMEN
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 1934
UNITED NATIONS
Children's Fund: Protocol 
Educational, S c ientific  
Organisation: Agreement
World Health Organisation: Provision of 
Technical Assistance Agreement 
United Nations Children's Fund: Assistance 
Agreement.
United Nations 
United Nations 
and Cultural 
on Aid
United Nations Special Fund: Assistance 
Agreement
United Nations Special Fund: Technical 
Assistance Agreement 
United Nations Special Fund: Exchange of 
Letters Amending Technical Assistance 
Agreement 
Protocol Amending World Health 
Organisation Agreement
1952
1953 
1959
1956
1960
1960
1963
1964
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i i )  MUlTILATEKAI TREATIES
Convention on Protection of Submarine Cables Paris 1884
Convention on Copyright Berne 1886
Declaration on Protection of Submarine Cables Paris 1886
Protocol on Protection of Submarine Cables Paris 1887
Agreement on Additions to Copyright Convention Paris 1896
Agreement on Opium Geneva 1925
Treaty Renouncing War (Kellogg Pact) Paris 1928
Convention on Road T ra ff ic Geneva 1949
Convention Abolishing the Requirement of
Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents Hague 1861
Convention on the Limitation of the Employment
of Force for Recovery of Contractual Debts Hague 1907
Convention: Opening of H o s til i t ie s Hague 1907
Convention: Laws and Customs of War on Land Hague 1907
Convention: Conversion of Merchant Ships into
Warships Hague 1907
Convention: Laying of Automatic Submarine
Contact Mines Hague 1907
Convention: Bombardment by Naval Forces in
Times of War Hague 1907
Convention: Restrictions on the Exercise of the
Rights of Capture in Maritime War Hague 1907
Convention on Copyright Berlin 1908
Agreement on Obscene Publications Paris 1916
Protocol on Copyright Berne 1914
Convention on Liquor T ra ff ic  in Africa St. Germain 1919
Convention on the Freedom of Transit Barcelona 1921
Convention on the Regime of Navigable Waterways
In International Commerce Barcelona 1921
Declaration on the Right to a Flag of State
Without Seacoast Barcelona 1921
Convention on Obscene Publications Geneva 1924
Convention on the Sim plification of Customs
Formalities Geneva 1923
Protocol on the Prohibition of the Use in War
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases,
and of Bacterialogical Methods of Warfare Geneva 1926
Convention on Slavery Geneva 1926
Convention Revising Copyright Conventions of
1886 and 1908 Rome 1928
Convention on the Rules of International Aerial
Transport Warsaw 1929
Convention and Protocol on the Suppression of
Counterfeit Currency Geneva 1929
Convention on the Conflict of Nationality  Laws Hague 1930
Convention on M il i ta ry  Obligations in the Case
of Dual Nationality Hague 1930
Protocol on Statelessness Hague 1931
Convention on the Regime of the S tra its Montreux 1936
Convention on Stamp Laws in Connection with
B il ls  of Exchange and Promissory Notes Geneva 1930
Convention on Stamp Laws in Connection with
Cheques Geneva Geneva 1931
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Convention on the Protection of Fauna and Flora London 1933
Convention on the International Status of Refugees Geneva 1933
Convention on Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace Geneva 1936
Convention on the Status of Refugees From Germany Geneva 1938
Protocol on the Status of Refugees From Germany Geneva 1939
Interim Agreement on International C iv il Aviation Chicago 1944
Agreement on International C iv il Aviation Chicago 1944
Convention on International Air Services Chicago 1944
Agreement: Food and Agricultural Organisation
of the United Nations Quebec 1945
Agreement: International Monetary Fund Washington 1945
Agreement: International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. Washington 1945
Agreement on Reparations Paris 1946
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations London 1946
Protocol on Amendments to the C iv il  Aviation
Convention of 1944 Montreal 1947
The General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs Geneva 1947
Convention cn the Privileges and Immunities of
the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations New York 1947
Convention: The World Health Organisation Washington 1947
Protocol on Obscene Publications Washington 1947
Convention on the Control of Red Locusts Washington 1947
r rotocol on Amendments to the 1910 Agreement
on the Suppression of the Circulation of
Obscene Publications New York 1949
Convention: The Red Cross Geneva 1906
Convention on the Amelioration of the Conditions
of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field Geneva 1949
Convention on Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Force Geneva 1949
Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War Geneva 1949
Convention on the Protection of C iv il ian  Persons
in Times of War Geneva 1949
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Rome 1950
Convention on International Sanitary Regulations Geneva 1950
Convention on International Sanitary Regulations Paris 1926
Convention on International Sanitary Regulations
and Aerial Navigation Hague 1933
Agreement Dispensing with B ills  of Health Paris 1934
Agreement Dispensing with Consular Visas on B ills
of Health Paris 1934
International Sanitary Convention Modifying the
1926 Convention Washington 1944
Protocol Prolonging the Sanitary Convention of
1944 Washington 1946
Convention on the Status of Refugees Geneva 1951
Protocol Cancelling the 1906 and 1929 Agreement
on Drugs Geneva 1952
Protocol Amending 1949 Convention on Red Locusts London 1953
Protocol Amending 1926 Sal very Convention New York 1952
1909
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A rtic les  of Agreement: International Finance
Corporation Washington 1955
Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons New York 1954
Supplementary Convention on Sal very Geneva 1956
Convention on the Nationality  of Married Women New York 1957
Postal Convention Ottowa 1957
Convention on the High Seas Geneva 1958
Convention on the T e rr ito r ia l  Sea and Contiguous
Zone Geneva 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf Geneva 1958
Protocol on the Compulsory Settlement of Maritime
Disputes Geneva 1958
International Sugar Agreement London 1958
Convention on Amendments to the Charter of
the World Health Organisation New York 1959
Convention on Diplomatic Relations Vienna 1961
Optional Protocol on the Compulsory Settlement
of Disputes Vienna 1961
Protocol on Amendments to the International C iv il
Aviation Convention of 1944 Montreal 1961
Convention on the Legalisation of Foreign
Public Documents Hague 1961
Convention on Discrimination in Education Paris 1960
Protocol on Additional Regulations to International
Sanitary Regulations of 1951 Geneva 1960
Convention on Conflicts of Laws Relating to the
Forms of Testamentary Dispositions Hague 1961
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs New York 1961
The Opium Convention Hague 1912
Convention on Dangerous Drugs Geneva 1925
Convention on Narcotic Drugs Geneva 1931
Protocol on the Control of Drugs Outside of
The Scope of the 1931 Convention Paris 1948
Convention on the Rules of Submarine Warfare London 1936
Convention Revising the 1886 Convention for
the Protection of L iterary and A rt is t ic  Works Brussels 1948
Universal Copyright Convention Geneva 1952
Protocol Relating to Amendments to 1944 C iv il
Aviation Convention Montreal 1954
Additional Regulations to 1951 International
Sanitary Regulations Geneva 1960 & 1965
Amendments to 1951 Sanitary Regulations 
Protocol Prolonging the International Sugar
Geneva 1963
Agreement of 1958 London 1963 & 1965
Convention on Unemployment Washington 1919
Convention Concerning Labour Organisation and San
Employment Francisco 1948
Convention Concerning Holidays with Pay in
Agriculture Geneva 1952
Convention on Unemployment Washington 1919
Convention: Minimum Age of Children in
Industrial employment Washington 1919
Convention: Rights of Association of Agricultural
Workers Geneva 1921
Convention: Workmen's Compensation in Agriculture Geneva 1921
Convention: Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Geneva 1928
234.
Convention on Forced and Compulsory Labour Geneva 1930
Convention on Workmen's Compensation for
Occupational Diseases Geneva 1934
Convention: Regulation of Certain Special
Systems of Recruiting Workers Geneva 1936
Convention: States of Wages and Hours of Work Geneva 1938
Convention: Freedom of Association and the Right San
to Organise Francisco 1948
Convention: Protection of Wages Geneva 1949
Convention: Migration for Employment Geneva 1949
Convention: Application of Principles of Right
to Organise and Bargain C ollective ly Geneva 1949
Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labour Geneva 1957
Convention and Statute on Freedom of Transit Geneva 1969
Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States Geneva 1969
International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination New York 1969
Protocol to the United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees New York 1968
International Convention on Diplomatic Relations Vienna 1969
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1931 -
1932 -
1935 -
1935 -
1939 -
1944 -
1946 -
1949 -
1969 -
11i )  SPECIAL JOINT TREATIES CONCLUDED BY
SWAZILAND IN CONJUNCTION WITH BASUTOLAND, 
(LESOTHO) AND THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE, 
(BOTSWANA).
Customs Union Agreement Between Basutoland, the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate and Swaziland with the Union of South 
Africa.
Exchange of Notes Providing for the Temporary Modification 
of the Customs Union Agreement Between the Union of South 
A fr ic a , Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and 
Swaziland, in Respect of the Free Interchange of Maize.
Agreement Providing for the Elimination of Double Taxation 
of Farmers Carrying on Business Both in the Union of 
South Africa and in the High Commission Te rr ito r ie s .
Agreement of Accesion: The High Commission Terr ito ries  
and the African Telecommunications Union.
Agreement of Accesion: The High Commission Terr ito ries
and the African Postal Union.
Payments Agreement Between Basutoland, the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate and Swaziland.
Agreement Between the Officer Administering the Government 
of the Union and the High Commissioner for Basutoland, the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland for tne Prevention 
of the Laying of Death Duties Under the Laws of the Union 
of South Africa and the Territories  of Basutoland, 
Bechuanaland and Swaziland in Respect of the Same Assets.
Exchange of Notes Amending Customs Union Agreement of 
1910 Between the Union of South Africa and the Territories  
of Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.
Agreement Between the Governments of the Union of South 
Africa and the United Kingdom for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion in 
Regard to Income Imposed in the Union and in Basutoland, 
the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.
Customs Union Agreement Between the Governments of 
Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho and South A fr ic a .
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STATE STATUS BASE LOCAL STAFF
United Kingdom High Commission Mbabane High Commissioner: 
F ir s t ,  Second and 
Third Secretaries.
Israel Commission Mbabane Charge d 'A ffa ires .
Republic of 
China
Embassy Mbabane Ambassador 
Extraordinary & 
Plenipotentiary: 
F irs t ,  Second and 
Third Secretaries.
Portugal Embassy and 
Consulate
Mbabane Ambassador 
Extraordinary & 
Plenipotentiary: 
Consul
United States 
of America
Embassy Gaborone Charge d 'A ffa ires:  
Second Secretary: 
Director in the 
Office of Southern 
Africa - Regional 
Coordinator of A . I .D . :  
Acting Director.
OSARAC.
Austria Embassy Pretoria -
Australia High Commission Pretoria -
Belgium Embassy Pretoria -
Botswana High Commission Gaborone ••
Canada High Commission Pretoria -
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STATE STATUS BASE LOCAL STAFF
France Embassy Lusaka *
Germany Embassy Blantyre •
India High Commission Lilongwe •
Iran Embassy Johannesburg -
I ta ly Embassy Pretoria -
Japan Embassy Lusaka -
Kenya High Commission Lusaka -
Korea Embassy Nairobi -
Netherlands Embassy Pretoria -
Nigeria High Commission Gaborone -
Switzerland Embassy Pretoria -
Sweden Embassy Pretoria *  »
Tanzania High Commission Lusaka -
Zambia High Commission Gaborone -
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
United Nations Representative: 
United Nations 
Development 
Programme
Mbabane Resident Representative 
U.N.D.P.: Country 
Representative. F.A.C.
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STATE STATUS BASE LOCAL STAFF
France Embassy Lusaka -
Germany Embassy Blantyre -
India High Commission Lilongwe -
Iran Embassy Johannesburg ♦
I ta ly Embassy Pretoria -
Japan Embassy Lusaka -
Kenya High Commission Lusaka -
Korea Embassy Nairobi -
Netherlands Embassy Pretoria -
Nigeria High Commission Gaborone •
Switzerland Embassy Pretoria -
Sweden Embassy Pretoria •
Tanzania High Commission Lusaka •
Zambia High Commission Gaborone •
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
United Nations Representative: Mbabane Resident Representative
United Nations U.N.D.P.: Country
Development Representative. F.A.C.
Programme
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SWAZILAND'S REPRESENTATION ABROAD (November  1973 )
STATES/ORGANISATION STATUS STAFF
Germany Consulate Honorary Consul
Korea Consulate Honorary Consul
Republic of China Consulate-General Honorary Consul-General
Greece Consulate Honorary Consul
United States of 
America
Embassy Ambassador Plenipotentiary  
Counsellor: F irs t and Third 
Secretaries.
United Nations Permanent Mission Permanent Representative: 
Counsellor: F irs t and Third 
Secretaries.
United Kingdom High Commission High Commissioner: 
Counsellor: F irs t  and Third 
Secretaries.
East Africa High Commission 
(N airob i)
High Commissioner: Counsellor: 
F irs t  and Third Secretaries.
Belgium (E .E .C .) Embassy Ambassador: Economist: 
Third Secretary
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SWAZILAND'S MEMBERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
Swaziland is currently a member of three ’"or international 
organisations -
a) The Organisation of African Unity; 
bj The Commonwealth;
c) The United Nations and i ts  Specialised Agencies (including the 
International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance 
Corporation, and the International Development Association.
APPENDIX V
SWAZILAND'S DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: DOMESTIC 
ORGANISATION AND PERSONNEL AS AT NOVEMBER 1973
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Prince Makhosini Dhlamini
1. EXECUTIVE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECTION The Honourable S.M. Matsebula
PERMANENT SECRETARY: 
M.N. Dhlamini
2. POLITICAL UNDER-SECRETARY
SECTION C.V. Kuhlase
ASSISTANT SECRETARY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (2 Further Assistant
Miss H. Mhlanga Prince Tshekedi Secretaryships Vacant)
CHIEF OF PROTOCOL
3. PROTOCOL M.B. Mdziniso
SECTION
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY-CHIEF OF PROTOCOL 
Z.L. Mkhonza
4. ADMINISTRATIVE 
SECTION
SENIOR ACCOUNTANT & CLERICAL STAFF
APPENDIX V I
PROJECTED INVESTMEM PROGRAMME 1 9 7 3 / 7 4  TO 1 9 7 5 /7 6
(From Second National Development Plan 1973- 
1978. Published 1973. Government Printer.  
Mbabane.)
(Rand)
PROJECT Total Cost 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION
Ministry of Agriculture 
Office Block 360 000 200 000 160 000
Finance Office Block 200 000 10 000 100 000 90 000
P.W.D. Maintenance Depots 
Mbabane 225 000 45 000 75 000 55 000
Outstation 40 000 - '5 000 30 000
Mobile 25 000 - 10 000 10 000
Offices: D is t r ic t  Admini 
Administration 25 000 25 000 25 o n
Vehicles 150 000 150 000 150 000
Swazi National Courts 5 000 10 000 -
Renovation Masundwini 
Royal Residence 36 000 36 000
Survey Branch Equipment • • • 13 000 10 000 10 000
Lozitha State House 2 000 000 «• 500 00 500 000
Precise Levelling Project 125 000 - 25 000 25 000
Heavy Plant Depot n o  ooo - 50 000 60 COO
Wiring Government Houses 13 500 10 000 10 000
Radio Equipment: Building 
Branch 25 000 10 000 5 000 5 000
General Offices 25 000 25 000 25 000
Sub-Total 532 500 1 258 000 1 093 000
PROJECT
(Rand)
Total Cost 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76
LAW AND ORDER
Police Sta f f  Horsing •  •  • 66 718 50 000 50 000
Prisons Staff  Housing •  •  • 81 580 40 000
New Prison 215 000 ■ 145 000 70 000
Prisons Minor Improvements
General 56 800 30 000 30 000
Mai kerns Prison Sewerage 31 754 30 246 -
Communications and
Training equipment 36 000 36 000 -
Police Minor Improvements •  •  • 28 000 23 000 20 000
Court Buildings - Mbabane 68 000 25 000 43 000
Police Communications 20 000 40 000 20 000
Police Stations 50 000 50 000 50 000
Security Guard for H.M.
the King 140 000 140 000 -
Pigg's Peak Prison 50 000 • 50 000
Borstal F a c i l i t ie s 65 000 - — 50 000
Witness Accommodation 10 000 10 000 —
Sub-Total 544 344 471 000 290 000
The investment programme l is ts  projects in the same way as 
they appear in the capital budget. The presentation thus 
d i f fe rs  from the summaries of sectoral investment plans given 
at the end of each chapter, since the la t te r  generally group 
projects b programmes.
(Rand)
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PROJECT 1
COMMUNITY SERVICES -  
Water and Sewerage
Total Cost 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76
Manzini Sewerage 170 500 14 797 50 000 50
Manzini Water 
Mbabane Sewerage
600 000 108 000 50 000 50 000
Shopping Complex 98 395 18 395 — m
Outfall Sewer and Ponds 512 800 250 000 237 800 •
Msunduza Reticulation 348 000 - 84 300 97 900
Western Outfall  Sewer 
Mbabane Water
293 200 - 148 200 102 900
Waterworks 228 147 11 400 - -
Reservoir and Mains 572 000 290 000 262 000 -
Dams and Pumps 231 000 - 131 000 100 000
Pipelines 226 000 • 135 000 91 000
Siteki Water 200 000 20 000 30 000 150 000
Pigg's Peak Water 139 500 109 500 « -
Kwaluseni Sewerage 230 000 130 000 100 000
Kwaluseni Water 150 000 « 75 000 75 000
Urban Water Reticulation 20 000 20 000 20 000
Urban Sewerage Reticulation 60 000 20 000 20 000
Boarder Gauging Stations 
Water Resources
36 450 16 500 16 050 3 900
Investigation 1 000 1 000 1 000
Fire Hydrants - Matsapa 2 000 2 000 • m
Nhlangano Water Supply 100 000 10 000 40 000 50 000
KaHlatsi Water Supply 200 000 20 000 30 000 75 000
Construction Unit 75 000 50 000 20 000
Sub-Total 1 001 592 1 480 350 936 700
2 4 3 .
PROJECT T o t a l  C o st
(Rand)
1973/74 1 9 7 4 / 7 5
Housing
Site and Service Schemes 
Zakhele 
Other 
Basic Housing Units 
Outstation Housing 
Agriculture 
Buildings Branch 
Health
Community Development 
Commerce and Cooperatives 
Posts and Telecommunications 
Water Branch 
Contract O f f ' -e r  Housing 
Riverside L< ,ve and 
Manzini 605 000
Government Housing 600 000
Ministerial Housing 200 000
Aided Self Help Schemes 
D is t r ic t  Commissioner's 
House and Alterations
5 600 
25 000 
150 000
75 000 
20 000 
40 000 
25 000 
10 000 
10 000 
20 000
200 000 
200 000 
50 000 
25 000
15 000
50 000 
175 000 
250 000
270 000 
200 000 
100 000 
75 000
5 000
1 9 7 5 / 7 6
50 000 
200 000 
260 000
135 000 
200 000 
50 000 
150 000
Sub-Total 870 600 1 125 000 1 04: 000
24 4 .
(Rand)
PROJECT ' T o t a l  Cost  1 9 7 3 / 7 4  1 9 7 4 / 7 5
OTHER COMMUNITY SERVICES
National Centre Complex 
National Centre200 000 
Archives 
Broadcasting 
Equipment 
Transmitter 
Buildings 
Community Development 
E le c t r ic i ty  Supply 
KaHlatsi and Nhlangano 
Physical Planning Study 
WFP Special Projects 
Local Authority Loans 
Capital Works: Small Towns 
Manzini Library 
Mobile Libraries  
Books
National Parks and Monuments 
Information Equipment
- 10 000 50 000
180 000 40 000 90 000
15 000
200’000 - 20 000
. . . 20 000 -
• e * 65 000 70 000
530 000 400 000 130 000
330 000 180 000 90 000
. . . 60 000 60 000
. . . 200 000 200 000
50 000 50 000
. . . 10 000 •»
. . . 10 000 20 000
. . . 50 000 50 000
. . . 10 000 10 000
1 9 7 5 / 7 6
50 000
15 000
30 000 
75 000
60 000 
200 000 
50 000
10 000 
25 000 
50 000 
10 000
Sub-Total 1 110 000 980 000 625 000
2 4 5 .
(Rand)
PROJECT T o t a l  C o s t  1 9 7 3 / 7 4  1 9 7 4 / 7 5  1 9 7 5 / 7 6
SOCIAL SERVICES -
Education and Training
Primary Schools 
Classrooms, furni ture
and Equipment 
Agriculture
St. Mark's Infants 52 050
Primary Curriculum Reform 
Workshops
Evelyn Baring Primary 60 000
St. Phi l l ips Deaf School 23 540
Secondary Schools 
General 
Evelyn Baring 
Mhlatane
Manzini Central 10 000
Matsapha National  
High School 1 483 740
Science Teaching 62 216
Mbabane Central
St. Marks 15 000
Lubombo Central
Cana
Bhunya
Mhlume
Eric Rosenberg 
Ngwane 
Ekukhanyem 
Secondary Agriculture  
Upgrading (New Schools) 
Diversif icat ion (Other 
Schools)
Housing
20 000 25 000 30 000
5 000 5 000 5 000
27 050 - -
7 000 5 000 5 000
- 15 000 30 000
20 000 40 000 -
23 540 - »
150 000 50 000
31 500 53 000 60 500
19 850 77 000 60 500
10 000
825 000 398 740
25 000 20 000 5 000
12 000 20 500
15 000
41 500 47 000
10 500 21 000 22 500
10 500 22 500 22 500
7 000 15 000 22 500
7 000 13 500
7 000 13 500
7 000 25 500
5 000 20 000 30 000
60 000 40 000
33 500 22 000
50 000 50 000 50 000
24 6 .
(Rand)
PROJECT T o t a l  Cost  1 9 7 3 / 7 4  1 9 7 4 / 7 5
Teacher Training
General . . .  27 500 10 000
Practical subjects . . .  10 000 10 000
Curriculum Development
Centre 40 000 -  40 000
Agriculture 20 000 - 25 000
Swaziland Industrial  
Training Inst i tu te
General Development . . .  50 000 80 000
Equi;~ent 238 000 160 000
S tV i  Training Inst i tu te  . . .  -  25 000
S.A.C.U.C. Farm 
Improvements 40 000 35 000
Youth Training Programme . . .  10 520 20 000
Bamboo Inn 30 000 10 000 10 000
English Language Project 51 446 24 528
U.B.L.S.
Kwaluseni Site 160 000 80 COO 80 000
General Development . . .  115 000 75 000
Agricultural Degree 
Studies 231 900 -  100 000
Animal Health and
Management Diploma 215 000 -  50 000
1 9 7 5 / 7 6
60 000 
10 000
80 000 
25 000
20 000 
10 000
75 000 
131 900 
165 000
Sub-Total 1 829 488 1 505 240 1 062 400
247 .
(Ra nd )
PROJECT T o t a l  C o st  1 9 7 3 / 7 4  1 9 7 4 / 7 5  1 9 7 5 /7 6
%
Health
Hospitals
Hospital Improvements 75 000 * *
Hospital Equipment 170 000 - • -
Mbabane Hospital
Extensions 513 200 50 000 200 000 200 000
Hlatikulu 40 000 - 40 000 *
Pigg's Peak 40 000 - * 40 000
Matsapa Mental 50 000 - 50 000 -
Matsapa T.B. 10 000 - 10 000 W
Rural Clinics
Construction . . . 51 593 36 300 36 000
Renovations and
Improvements 20 000 20 000 20 000
Public Health Centres 22 854 25 000 25 000
Central Medical Store 9 800 9 800 - -
Rural Sanitation and
Water Supplies . . . 22 000 33 000 44 000
Public Health Training
Centre 50 000 50 000
Sub-Total 251 247 464 300 365 000
2 4 8 .
( R a n d )
PROJECT T o t a l  C o s t  1 9 7 3 / 7 4  1 9 7 4 / 7 5  1 9 7 5 /7 6
ECONOMIC 'SERVICES -  
Agriculture and Forestry
Census of Agriculture 93 742
Tea Project 267 000
Crop Promotion 247 458
Seed Multiplicat ion 187 000
Chinese Extension Project 75 000
Livestock Improvement:
General 43 000
Shiselweni LEC 40 000
Hhohho LEC 41 000
Mpisi Farm and FTC 112 820
Highveld Demonstration Ranch 160 000
Cattle Holding Grounds 88 940
Lowveld Catt le  Breeding 
Station 128 000
Veterinary Diagnostic Unit 74 416
Livestock Disease Control 
Foot and Mouth Disease 
Control Fence 135 000
Quarantine Camps 66 000
Land Purchase and Development 
Land Purchase 
General RDA Overheads 
Northern RDA 
Central RDA 
Southern RDA
Mahlangatsha, Sipocosini 
and Ebulandzeni RDA's 
Soil Conservation Units 
Co-operatives 
Swaziland Credit and 
Savings Bank 
Agricultural Pland and
Equipment 1 350 000
Field Officers Housing 12 000
Aerial Photography and 
Mapping 179 340
Tractor Development Project 225 000
Grain Storage Project 110 554
Pineapple Diversif icat ion  
Project 135 000
P i lo t  Marketing Project 17 500
Minor Schemes: Ir r igat ion  
Fishery Development 
Intensive Feeding and 
Small Dairy Enterprises 
Livestock Marketing
10 000
85 300 66 800 70 000
78 548 68 000 70 000
84 000 103 000
35 000 10 000
17 500 8 000 8 000
30 000 10 000
16 000 25 000
20 000
75 000 65 000
10 000 50 000
60 000 10 000
15 000 13 000 7 500
50 000 60 000
30 000 26 000 10 000
350 000 350 000 350 000
140 831 100 000 100 000
103 478 70 000 70 000
24 000 50 000 50 000
40 000 50 000 50 000
30 000 20 000 20 000
475 000 500 000 500 000
6 000 12 000 24 000
250 000 300 000 350 000
350 000
12 000
140 000
140 000
40 000 20 000 20 000
50 000 10 000
6 000 5 000
33 000 30 000 30 000
13 900 14 200 14 300
12 500 25 000 40 000
20 000 30 000 35 000
PROJECT T o t a l  Cost
(Rand)
1973/74
2 4 9 .
1 9 7 4 / 7 5  1 9 7 5 / 7 6
Farmers Training Centre: 
Big Bend 
Manzini 
Nhlangano 
Ngonini 
Mapobeni I r r igat ion  
Scheme
Sifunga Sugar Scheme 
A r t i f i c ia l  Insemination 
Unit
Forestry: General 
Land Purchase 
Ortho-photo Mapping
117 000 50 000 50 000 7 000
180 000 40 000 90 000 50 000
26 430 5 000 5 000 »
20 000 10 000 5 000 5 000
5 000 000 • 50 000 500 000
200 000 200 000 • *
• 30 000 20 000
t •  • 10 000 15 000 20 000
50 000 50 000 • •
150 COO 125 000
Sub-Total 3 313 057 2 326 000 2 480 800
PROJECT
(Rand)
Total Cost 1973/74 1974/75 1 9 7 5 / 7 6
Transport and 
Communication
Main Roads 
Mpaka-Nomahasha-Siteki 
Mai kerns
Northern Sugar Road 
Manzini-Sidvokodvo and 
Usutu Bridge 
Nglangano-Mahamba 
Hlatikulu-Nhlangano 
Pigqs Peak Sawmill 
Pigg's Peak Motshane 
Helehele-Siphcfaneni 
IComati Bridge 
D is t r ic t  Roads 
Programme 
Plant
Minor Improvements Roads 
Maintenance Unit Plant 
Telecommunications 
Automatic Exchanges 
Automation of  Circuits  
Cables 
Telex
Telegraph and Telephone 
Links
Extension of Internal  
Open Wire Routes 
Subscribers Equipment 
Consultancy
Posts
Post Office Replacements 
Post Office Extension 
Matsapa Airport Extensions 
Civil  Works 
Buildings 
Equipment
800 000 » m -
220 000 110 000 110 000 -
000 000 50 000 500 000 450 000
750 000 60 000 300 000 450 000
100 000 10 000 90 000 -
200 000 - e 50 000
130 000 • 30 COO 100 000
400 000 » - 40 000
200 000 - 20 000
150 000 • 15 000 135 000
175 000 190 000 210 000
50 000 50 000 50 000
22 000 25 000 25 000
65 000 10 000 10 000
783 000 14 000 692 000 12 000
230 000 • 190 000 40 000
170 000 170 000 «• -
242 000 95 000 142 000 -
116 000 116 000 - *
32 200 7 626 m m
147 350 69 350 39 000 39 000
297 000 161 000 124 000
15 000 15 000 7 000
•  *  • - 17 000 •
596 000 381 000 1 005 000
230 000 # - 200 000
225 000
'
165 000
Sub-Total 1 028 976 2 957 000 3 182 000
251.
PROJECT T o t a l  Cost
(Rand)
1973/74 1974/75 1975/76
Industry and Power 
NIDCS
Small Enterprises Development 
Estate Exp-nsion 
New Trading Estates 
Rental Purchase Financing 
Increased Equity Capital 
Commercial Loan Fund
Mining Exploratory Equipment 
Matsapa Industrial Estate
550 000
95 000 
25 000 
50 000 
20 000 
160 000
9 000
600 000 700 000
n o  ooo
25 000 
50 000
15 000 
15 000
115 000 
25 000 
50 000
21 000 
15 000
Coal Prospecting Studies 
Mining Laboratory Equipment 
Mapping o f  Coalfield  
Tourism
Thermal Power Station
400 000 
8 000 
50 000
400 000 
8 000 
25 000 25 000 
55 000 
1 336 000
40 00C 
3 813 000
Sub-Total 1 342 000 2 231 000 4 779 000
PROJECT Total Cost
(Rand) 
1973/74 1974/75 1975/76
Commerce
Amadoda Distributors
Swazi Craft
Handicraft Centres
Rural Traders Training 
Project 1 055
56 000 
27 000 
2 000
1 055
40 000 
3 000
2 000 
2 000
Sub-Total 86 055 43 000 4 000
Total 11 909 859 14 740 890 15 862 900
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